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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ANDREW BENNETT and JOSEPH LEPGOLD examine the prospects for collective security in the post-Cold War international system. While some impediments remain, they argue that the international and domestic prospects for a new concert of great powers are favorable.

ROBERT JERVIS argues that arms control in the post-Cold War era must be pursued as an adjunct to, not a substitute for, ways of dealing with sources of conflict and methods of managing disputes. He shows that while some of the potential causes of war are likely to lie within the military arena, there is little reason to believe they will be the most potent ones.

LOUIS BOLCE, GERALD DE MAIO, and DOUGLAS MUZZIO analyze the 1992 elections, reexamining the proposition advanced by some Republican strategists and political commentators that the GOP could attain majority party status by attracting 20 percent of the African American vote. Presidential and congressional exit poll data show no politically relevant black subgroup supported George Bush. His defeat resulted from the defection of key white demographic, socioeconomic and ideological Republican support groups—mainly to independent presidential candidate Ross Perot.

HENRY BIENEN examines violence and leadership in Africa. He argues that violence has been used to maintain the power of elites, not to change social systems. In his view, to explain violence we must look to patterns of governance, not to individual pathologies.

IRA KATZNELSON, KIM GEIGER, and DANIEL KRYDER explore the policy implications of the role played by southern Democrats in Congress during the 1930s and 1940s. They show on what issues southern Democrats deviated from the positions of their southern brethren and on what issues they remained loyal.

MICHAEL BERNHARD examines the role that the reemergence of civil society played in the democratic revolutions of 1989 in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR., reviews three recent books on Operation Desert Storm. He concludes that perceptions of a decisive victory through air power, coupled with a revival of an idealistically based declamatory foreign policy, may encourage a new era of military interventionism.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict

ANDREW BENNETT
JOSEPH LEPGOLD

For the third time in this century and the fourth since 1815, the end of a great-power conflict has caused policy makers and scholars to take collective security seriously. World War I led to the League of Nations, but this organization foundered on resentments from the war, national expansionism, and inadequate institutional mechanisms. The United Nations grew out of the lessons of World War II but fell short of early hopes due to the emerging cold war. Now, the end of the cold war raises the question of whether conditions for collective security are more favorable now than in 1815, 1919, or 1945.

Yet despite UN success in the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict, there is a widespread sense that a new world order requires new institutional mechanisms to replace those made obsolescent by the end of the cold war. The criteria for collective security are very demanding, and the UN coalition's success in the Gulf owed much to unusual circumstances: clear aggression; a sharply perceived threat to regional and global security; and American deftness, motivation, and persistence. The messier internal denouement in Iraq and civil war in Yugoslavia might be more typical of future conflicts.

Three schools of thought in international relations theory—Realism, Liberalism, and Institutionalism—help to clarify the requisites of collective security.

ANDREW BENNETT teaches in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and writes on the American foreign policy process and American-Russian relations. JOSEPH LEPGOLD teaches in the School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University. His work focuses on the international and domestic politics of alliances and on security relations between the United States and Europe.

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Their implications suggest a reinvention of the concept, a process that has already begun as observers rethink the issues in light of changed international conditions.[1] We extend and deepen this discussion by briefly recounting previous attempts at collective security and discussing and critiquing its requirements. We then ask whether the end of the cold war and the subsequent Gulf War make it possible to satisfy these conditions and whether a collective security regime based on a great-power concert could be looser and more eclectic than was earlier imagined. We conclude with implications for post-cold war collective security mechanisms.

Three Previous Attempts at Collective Security

The great powers have constructed three versions of collective security mechanisms. Such mechanisms partially centralize security arrangements by vesting enforcement of sanctions against breaches of the peace in an international though not supranational forum.[2] They all reject the unrestrained power balancing through competitive alliances that characterize laissez-faire approaches to security.

The first, longest lasting, and most successful attempt at collective security was the Concert of Europe, which helped prevent great-power war from 1815 to 1854. Although enforcement was decentralized, its members supported Europe's great-power equilibrium, shared a strong distaste for war after the costly Napoleonic Wars, and agreed to consult and take joint action in response to threats to peace. From 1815 through 1822 and to a lesser extent until 1854, they also shared a longer and broader conception of self-interest than is usual in international relations, although the shared stakes did not extend beyond the inner club of great powers.[3] These commitments weakened when the more liberal British and French regimes opposed domestic interventions favored by Austria and Russia.

Like the Concert, the League of Nations assumed great-power cooperation. Its founders drew on numerous experiences in addition to the European Concert, including the Hague Conferences and interallied planning during World War I, but it could not overcome identification with the Versailles Treaty's punitive settlement of the war. It lacked a concert of interests, as Germany, Japan, and Italy opposed the postwar status quo. It even lacked a quorum of great powers,

[1] See Brian Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf," *New York Review of Books*, 7 March 1991; and Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse,'" *Survival* 23 (May/June 1990); Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Spring 1991); Stanley Hoffman, "The Price of War," *New York Review of Books*, 17 January 1991; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security* 16 (Summer 1991).

[2] Kenneth W. Thompson, "Collective Security," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 565.

[3] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982): 362–367; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985): 78.

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since the Soviets joined only in 1934 and were expelled five years later for attacking Finland, while the United States stayed out from the start. The democracies supported the status quo, but would not take responsibility for enforcing it. Britain and France would not isolate Italy after its invasion of Ethiopia for fear of pushing it toward Germany, and they then failed to resist Germany's aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia.

In the third attempt, the great-power victors of World War II centralized enforcement of collective security in their own hands on the United Nations Security Council (SC) in the belief that postwar peace required continuation of the wartime concert.[4] But with the former common enemy Germany weak and partitioned, Soviet-American cooperation broke down over conflicting ideologies and security concerns, and the resultant bipolar bloc system undermined the entire mechanism. Except for the Korean operation, made possible by Moscow's temporary absence from the SC, the cold-war UN could not act against breaches of the peace as set out in its charter. The UN regime thereby lost effectiveness and coherence between the 1940s and the 1980s.[5]

What Does Collective Security Require?

With the end of the cold war, a new debate is emerging over what collective security requires. The requirements depend on how the concept is defined; there are two distinct formulations.[6] In one conception, collective security is a regime designed to sustain a particular status quo. If implemented, this "offer[s] the certainty, backed by legal obligation, that *any* aggressor would be confronted with collective sanctions."[7] It requires a common definition of aggression and willingness to act whenever it occurs. The UN General Assembly stipulated in 1974 that "the first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute *prima facie* evidence of an act of aggression" (Resolution 3314, Article 2). However, some UN members insisted at the time that not even this general definition was binding,[8] and it has had little apparent impact on SC behavior. The political utility of trying to freeze the status quo thus seems dubious.

[4] Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 34.

[5] See Ernst B. Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations," *International Organization* 37 (Spring 1983).

[6] We thank Lawrence Finkelstein for pointing this out to us. See also Finkelstein, "From Collective Security to Collective Defense To . . ." in *Implications of German Unification for Future All-European Security* (Proceedings of the Seminar for Senior Academics sponsored by the Paul Loebe Institute, Berlin, 1–7 July 1990), 189–197.

[7] Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), 168, quoted in Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe." (Emphasis added.)

[8] Ahmed M. Rifaat, *International Aggression* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), 278.

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In a second definition, collective security seeks only to ensure that change is peaceful and that force is used only in self-defense. It is not tied tightly to existing political arrangements or any explicit definition of aggression. This view is supported by the evolution of the UN Charter, by its specific provisions, and by its use in the Gulf War. Because the League Covenant was tied to the post-World War I status quo that lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many Germans, UN founders deliberately wrote the charter separate from any potential World War II peace settlements. Article 39, the gateway to enforcement provisions under Chapter VII, mentions threats to the peace and breaches of the peace as well as explicit aggression. This broad authority allowed the SC to regulate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (under Resolution 688, 5 April 1991) and to set the conditions under which Baghdad could resume exporting oil (Resolutions 706, 15 August 1991 and 712, 19 September 1991). These resolutions may set a precedent for SC involvement even after hostilities end, if the SC determines that a threat to the peace still exists.

Under this interpretation, the charter does not limit SC authority to specific acts of aggression; this permits a requisite SC majority to act whenever it deems this necessary to preserve peace. Conversely, when the SC is divided, it is not handcuffed into any particular response by a written definition of aggression. This more flexible view of collective security is one way to interpret President George Bush's speech to the General Assembly in September 1991, in which he noted the tensions between ethnic self-determination and the world community's overriding interest in resolving border disputes peacefully.[9] These competing principles require that collective security promote peaceful change without prejudging the substantive rights of any party in a dispute. Contemporary Realists, Liberals, and Institutionalists each have important things to say about whether cooperation is possible on this basis.

Realist Views

To many Realists, self-help seems to preclude collective security or at least to pose stringent conditions. Perhaps the least problematic of these is Inis Claude's criterion that power be diffused among "a number of" major states, since this would be satisfied in any multipolar system. The rationale is that no state should be strong enough to resist collective sanctions.[10] Claude refers to the most ambitious manifestation of collective security, in which sanctions would be applied directly to great powers. But the major powers are unlikely to be coerced on vital interests under a collective security system, a fact embodied in the SC veto. What is essential is thus the power differential between the great-power group

[9] "Bush Asks General Assembly to Repeal Resolution Equating Zionism with Racism," *New York Times*, 24 September 1991.

[10] Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), 195; and Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 256.

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and others: the major powers must have the economic and military strength to restore peace whenever it is threatened by any combination of other states.

This requires a concert of interests among great powers. In the three attempts at collective security, concerts formed to defeat aspiring hegemons but dissolved when conflicting goals overrode incentives to protect the new status quo. Normally the major powers compete too much among themselves for order to be anything but an accidental by-product. So under what conditions do the fluid, counterbalancing coalitions of a balance-of-power system, in which it is legitimate to use and threaten force within the group,[11] cease to exist among the major powers?

The literature on cooperation under anarchy is helpful here. In single-play games, cooperation requires that actors prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection. This is true in the Stag Hunt and Prisoners' Dilemma games. The key difference between the two in a single play is that in the Stag Hunt, it is best to cooperate if you know your fellow player will do so, while in Prisoners' Dilemma, it is best to "rat" on your fellow player whether they inform on you or not. But in concerts, which can be likened to iterated games, the preference for mutual cooperation over mutual defection can override incentives to defect.[12]

In addition, even under the Prisoners' Dilemma conditions characteristic of concerts, mutual cooperation is more likely if it is not only preferred to mutual defection but greatly so, if there are few rewards for exploiting others, and if there are few risks or costs for being exploited.[13] The game may even become a Stag Hunt if mutual cooperation becomes more valuable than exploiting the other. Nothing in Realist thought precludes this, especially if the system becomes multipolar, which decreases fear of exploitation by any one great power,[14] and if cooperation is anchored through reliable institutions. These are likely consequences of successful counterhegemonic wars, and each was evident during the early Concert of Europe period. This unusual cooperation to support the status quo lasted until the payoffs returned to their more usual values.[15] More lasting cooperation may be possible now if, as Lawrence Freedman argues, few national interests are now unique as well as vital.[16]

For small as well as large states to entrust their interests to collective mechanisms requires "an extraordinary act of faith" "without previous demonstration [except Kuwait] that collective security works."[17] Put differently, the shadow of the future must be long: future interactions must be valued more than current

[11] Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," throughout.

[12] See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[13] Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985).

[14] Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," 69–70.

[15] Ibid., 64–79.

[16] Lawrence Freedman, "Escalators and Quagmires: Expectations and the Use of Force," *International Affairs* 67 (January 1991): 30.

[17] Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 255–256.

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ones. This will be true if interactions among the same states are expected to continue; if stakes are fairly uniform in each round (for example, issues do not vary so much in importance that it is tempting to defect on major ones); and if reliable, prompt information on others' actions is available.[18] The first two can be difficult to achieve in security affairs, where knockout blows are possible and interests are often perceived competitively.

Widespread vulnerability to economic sanctions is also essential according to Realists, since war is a last resort.[19] But Realists also emphasize the difficulties in achieving this. Sanctions hurt sanctioners as well as targets. There can be large economic rewards for breaking sanctions. Klaus Knorr thus concluded that "coercively wielding economic power . . . is rarely successful."[20] It is even more difficult if the target is already committed to an objective. A recent study ranked sanctioners' goals from "modest policy change" through "disruption of military adventures" and "other major policy changes." Sanctions failed 70 percent of the time in the three most ambitious categories of goals, and their overall success has declined along with America's weight in the world economy.[21]

Realists may undervalue economic sanctions, however. Even if economic coercion cannot often change a target's behavior, it might help deter future transgressions, impose significant costs on an aggressor, and signal the international community's view that an action is illegitimate. Thus David Baldwin, using the same data as Knorr, concludes that sanctions can usefully serve many purposes.[22] And even if sanctions cannot work alone, they might legitimate further enforcement measures. Moreover, nonphysical sanctions can broaden participation in enforcement; not all states can or need to use force.

Finally, according to Realists, partial disarmament is necessary: few states will forcibly resist aggressors if the costs are too high.[23] Fortunately, arms races can be slowed if offensive and defensive weapons are distinguishable, if defending what one has is easier than attacking others, and if exporters agree that arms transfers are counterproductive.[24] The offense-defense distinction is never clear cut, and many states will arm beyond the requirements of territorial defense for insurance, but technology can make it harder as well as easier to take and hold territory. For arms suppliers, economic incentives create a Prisoners' Dilemma,

[18] Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," 16–18; Robert O. Keohane and Robert Axelrod, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985): 232–234.

[19] Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 257; Claude, *Power in International Relations*, 195.

[20] Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 6.

[21] The data are from Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Role of Economic Sanctions in Collective Security" (Institute for International Economics, 1990, Mimeographed); see also David Fromkin, *The Independence of Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 82–84.

[22] David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[23] Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 259.

[24] Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 186–210.

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although cooperation could become more valuable as technologies become more dangerous and widespread.[25]

Liberal Views

Liberal and other national-level theorists pose two more conditions for collective security. First, ideological, ethnic, and cultural affinities and antagonisms between states cannot preclude cooperation or enforcement between any pair. The United States thus set aside its ties to Britain, France, and Israel in the 1956 Suez crisis and pressured them to halt their invasion of Egypt. Failure to achieve such flexibility weakened collective security in the late 1930s, when Soviet-American ideological differences inhibited cooperation against Hitler and compounded their absence from the League. This same problem, together with great-power rivalry, limited East-West cooperation via the UN after World War II. In contrast, the Concert of Europe worked as long as it did because ideological lines "were not so rigidly drawn as to prevent a high degree of . . . collaboration between the [monarchist] eastern and [liberal] western powers."[26]

Second, states must agree on the relationship between international security and internal governance. They might, for example, share a commitment to a particular kind of regime. Disagreements on this issue weakened the Concert and the UN. Austria's Metternich and Russia's Alexander I tried to use the Concert to preserve existing governments and to prevent liberal revolts against monarchies. Britain and France objected to this, and Britain consequently stopped attending meetings of the great powers' foreign ministers. Similarly, during the cold war, communist and noncommunist UN members did not agree on legitimate forms of government, much less the role of joint action in fostering particular kinds of regimes.

In particular, Liberals provide four arguments for why peace is best guaranteed among market democracies.[27] First, since voters abhor wars' costs, wars need moral as well as practical legitimacy; this is difficult if the enemy is democratic and thus presumptively legitimate. Second, relatively open political processes in democracies help make motives transparent, easing misunderstandings that can drive the security dilemma.[28] Third, democracy requires compromise at home, and this carries over to foreign policy behavior. Finally, market economies allow mutual gains from trade, making peace more profitable than war.[29]

[25] For example, see "East Bloc's Cold War Arsenals Are Arming Ethnics," *Washington Post*, 8 July 1991.

[26] Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 34.

[27] Our definition of liberal market democracies follows that of Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1164.

[28] Ibid., 1160, esp. the quotation from Immanuel Kant.

[29] Ibid., 1161. See also Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), chap. 7.

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Some of this reasoning is debatable. Democracies have intervened in other democracies (although usually covertly); they can misunderstand one another through the very openness of their communication[30]; democratic processes can feed expansionism as well as accommodation; and close interdependence can induce conflict when relative as well as absolute gains matter.[31] Still, the evidence is convincing: while democracies have fought virtually no wars against one another for 200 years, other kinds of regimes have often done so.[32] Since democracies have fought other kinds of regimes, the absence of wars among democracies is especially convincing. Thus, to the extent that collective security is based on a regime of great-power democracies, it may be able to inhibit conflict among its members while sustaining common purposes against nondemocratic aggressors.

Institutionalist Views

Institutionalists highlight the impact on state behavior of shared definitions of problems, convergent expectations, and organizational constraints and tools. In this view, world politics is institutionalized to the degree that actors' expectations converge, that clear rules follow from this, and that institutions are at least somewhat autonomous and can alter their own rules. Unlike Realists and Liberals, who argue respectively that these factors are epiphenomena of the distribution of power among states or the compatibility of their internal systems, Institutionalists acknowledge the roles of international power and internal politics, but argue that norm-governed behavior can be a key intervening variable. So, unlike Idealists, Institutionalists do not assume that rules alone drive behavior. If states' preference rankings do not allow for gains from cooperation, institutionalization is irrelevant.[33]

This raises two crucial questions: Can joint gains be realized from a collective security system? Will states focus on those benefits rather than their relative gains? In general, Realists doubt that international anarchy allows states to focus on absolute gains, since strengthening today's partner could strengthen tomorrow's adversary.[34] But this argument crumbles as the number of great powers increases beyond two. In a bipolar system, Realists rightly argue that relative gains readily transform interactions into Prisoners' Dilemma games, in which

[30] Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

[31] For these and other critiques of the Liberal view, see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990).

[32] See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes 1816–1965," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (1976): 50–69; Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," and his "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," parts 1 and 2, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer and Fall 1983): 205–235, 323–353.

[33] See Robert O. Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics" in Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).

[34] Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988).

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the dominant strategy is to defect. In contrast, relative gains have less of this effect in multipolarity, since no pair of the major actors tends to define their competition as zero sum. In multipolarity, if states A and B make an agreement that provides joint gains but B gains relative to A, A still gains relative to others.[35] This applies across international issues, including those involving the instruments of force or threats to use force.

Although the security dilemma and the possibility of a preemptive knockout blow make it difficult for states to focus on joint gains in security affairs, this is not an insuperable obstacle.[36] Realists acknowledge that concerts after counter-hegemonic wars temporarily change states' payoffs from Prisoners' Dilemmas to games where cooperation is easier. And if a concert is based on compatible internal systems rather than the short-term attenuation of competition that exhausted victors exhibit after a major war, there is no reason for the expected value from joint gains to diminish over time. Most contemporary arguments for a revamped European security system are based on such a multipolar concert.[37]

Institutionalists would thus maintain that support for collective security can be consistent with egoistic assumptions about states' interests if the value of maintaining a regime outweighs that of defecting in any given case. States that defect undercut their overall reputation for cooperation, weakening not only the regime they violate but others as well.[38] Institutions can also make cooperation dependable by increasing transparency and lowering transactions costs. Strong regimes are difficult to create, so states often perpetuate imperfect ones rather than rebuild them from scratch.[39]

Institutions can thus affect states' willingness to cooperate over the long term, as well as the means they employ, by shaping the way problems are defined. For example, by helping to guarantee that stakes in a dispute remain relatively constant over time, a collective security regime can encourage those satisfied with the status quo to take a long view, even of situations involving their major interests.[40] They will be less likely to preempt under pressure if they believe that waiting for collective measures will not put them in a worse competitive position. To accomplish this, the institution must help prevent sudden escalations and attempts at faits accomplis.

Institutionalists thus potentially qualify Realists' objection that collective enforcement can be guaranteed only when complete great-power agreement makes

[35] Duncan Snidal shows this formally in "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (December 1991).

[36] Jervis, "Security Regimes."

[37] See Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe"; and Richard Ullman, *Securing Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

[38] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 105; and his reply to Mearsheimer in *International Security* 15 (Fall 1990): 192–194.

[39] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 100–103.

[40] See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 129–130.

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a collective mechanism unnecessary. To Realists, collective security demands that the great powers share high enforcement costs even when their interests are marginal and that they refrain from unilateral action even when their vital interests are at stake.[41] In part, such concerns led Winston Churchill to advocate UN mechanisms that would accommodate the great powers' regional interests and their lack of interest in small or distant states. To Institutionalists, if joint gains can be realized by a concert on a global basis, the predictability this generates could well make cooperative behavior more reliable across the board.

International institutions are also valuable if they facilitate collective actions that would otherwise be impossible.[42] Although peacekeeping has been undertaken outside the aegis of multilateral organizations, these institutions provide added legitimacy and over time a repertoire of procedures. Monitoring elections in Namibia in 1989 and Haiti in 1990 might not have occurred without the flexibility in the use of peacekeeping forces developed through the UN since the 1950s. The UN has built increasingly sophisticated procedures from a growing list of successful peacekeeping and mediation efforts in Cambodia, Angola and Namibia, El Salvador, and others; and it has more such experience than any other international organization.

Are Conditions Propitious for Collective Security?

Does the post-cold war world meet these requirements of collective security more fully than in 1815, 1919, or 1945? In this regard, the breakup of the Soviet Union and changes in the international distribution of power are especially important. Soviet internal political changes have had the most far-reaching effects. The breakup of the old union and the preoccupation of its successor states with internal reform and economic stability have made possible a liberal concert that includes Eurasian powers, Japan, and the United States. It remains to be seen what responsibilities Russia might assume in such a concert, although Russia's external goals now seem to broadly mirror those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.

In addition, power has diffused significantly among the top states, although a large gap continues to separate them from the rest of the world. From 1950 to 1987, the U.S. share of world gross national product (GNP) fell from 42 percent to 25 percent. Much of this relative decline was offset by German and Japanese growth: the combined share of world output of these two countries plus the five permanent SC members dropped only slightly, from 73 percent to 70 percent.[43] Global military expenditures show similar trends, with the United

[41] Earl C. Ravenal, "An Autopsy of Collective Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Winter 1975–1976): 706, 707, 711, 712. See also Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 251, 252.

[42] Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism," 5.

[43] These data come from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook* (New York: United Nations), 1960 and 1987 editions; CIA estimates of Chinese GNP cited in A. Doak Barnett, *China's Economy in*

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States declining from 35 percent to 30 percent and the big seven states dropping from 82 to 74 percent of the world total between 1965 and 1988.[44]

More worrisome, nuclear and ballistic missile technologies have proliferated. Aside from the great powers, seventeen Third World countries have ballistic missiles with ranges over 100 miles. Nine of these—Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, South Africa, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil—have missiles with ranges over 500 miles.[45] Of these nine, Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons; India has tested a nuclear weapon; and South Africa, Iraq, Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Pakistan either have active nuclear weapons programs or could fabricate weapons quickly. It could become increasingly difficult to enforce collective security at acceptable cost if weapons of mass destruction continue to proliferate.

Prospects for collective security must also be considered in light of the kinds of foreseeable conflicts. They include intra- and international disputes in Europe and the Third World. In Europe, the collapse of Leninism has reopened old ethnic conflicts, many with an external dimension. Ongoing disputes pit the remnants of Yugoslavia against themselves and against Albanians, Bulgarians, and Greeks; while tensions among the former Soviet republics have ramifications elsewhere in Europe and Asia. As former Secretary of State James Baker put it, the former USSR could become a "Yugoslavia with nuclear weapons thrown in."[46] In the Middle East, the Gulf War and Kurdish problems typify crises over external borders and internal separatism.

The end of the cold war erased some of the clarifying effect of superpower commitments, and greater instability is a predictable result. Alliance arrangements in Eastern Europe, though imposed by the USSR, dampened internecine conflict there, and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact makes violence likelier.[47] A similar cause-and-effect relationship is evident in Saddam Hussein's apparent belief that small countries like Kuwait would be easy pickings once they ceased to be cold war stakes.[48] In view of these monumental changes, are conditions for a collective security mechanism posed by the three schools satisfied?

Global Perspective (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1981); *CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1990), 37; Herbert Block, "Soviet Economic Growth" in Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, *The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 246.

[44] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (Washington, DC: GPO), various years.

[45] Leonard Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 20–28.

[46] Quoted in "Soviet Union As We've Known It Is Gone, Baker Says," *Washington Post*, 9 December 1991.

[47] Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," 145.

[48] "Alliance and Image Concern Gorbachev," *Washington Post*, 18 February 1991; see also Thomas Friedman, "Today's Threat to Peace is the Guy Down the Street," *New York Times*, 2 June 1991.

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A Realist's Interpretation

Will factors at the international system level that concern Realists improve prospects for collective security in the post-cold war world? Theorists have differed over whether a nascent shift from bipolarity to multipolarity will lead to more or less conflict, with wide disagreements over both the logical and empirical bases for competing claims. A second factor that concerns Realists – the offense-defense balance – provides grounds for some optimism. On a third issue of normative disincentives to change the status quo forcefully, renewed ethnic antagonisms may promote conflict, but most states also want to strengthen existing norms changing borders forcibly.

The central issue concerns the relationship between the number of great powers and the prospects for peace. On the one hand, Kenneth Waltz and others argue that bipolarity is less conflict prone than multipolarity, since it reduces the uncertainties and miscalculations that can lead to war.[49] In this view, the two great-power poles do not fear the loss of smaller allies, as this will not upset the central distribution of capabilities. The poles thus will neither over-react ("chain-gang") nor underreact ("pass the buck") in response to threats to smaller allies, as they do in multipolar systems, but respond in proportion to the interests at stake.[50]

On the other hand, as Robert Gilpin argues, bipolar rivalries can readily become zero-sum games in which differing rates of economic and technological change lead to power transitions fraught with miscalculation. Hegemonic wars are a typical outcome.[51] The zero-sum nature of bipolarity can also lead great powers to react strongly to marginal threats, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan, in the belief that even small losses affect the credibility of commitments. In this view, multipolarity induces more fluid balancing behavior, and the very uncertainty of alliance commitments helps deter the use of force.

This debate is difficult to resolve, because it turns on whether the chain-ganging, buck-passing, and miscalculations about alliance commitments in multipolar systems are worse than overreactions in the periphery under bipolarity. Many also conclude that the level of conflict in either kind of system depends on factors other than the number of great powers, including actors' willingness to take risks, the dynamics of power transitions within and between systems, the spread of nuclear weapons, and states' internal characteristics.[52]

[49] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 161–193; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."

[50] Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder use these terms in "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990).

[51] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 88–93.

[52] See, respectively, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, "Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict," *World Politics* 41 (October 1988); Gilpin, *War and Change*; Steven Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Winter 1990/91).

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The mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between polarity and peace supports this conclusion.[53]

On the narrower issue of enforcing collective security, the diffusion of power among the major powers and the large gap between these and other states make it difficult for any state to defy a great-power consensus. Diffused power should also make the UN and other conflict-management bodies less dependent on a narrow base of support.[54] The continued gap between strong and weak states also eases enforcement by minimizing the number of key actors who must cooperate to effect it.

Realists also focus on whether the offensive or defensive forces of the great powers are dominant. But for the purposes of collective security, such balances among regional powers and between these states and the great powers are more important. Collective enforcement would be most difficult if local offensive forces favored regional aggressors but local defensive forces dominated against distant great powers. For example, freeing Kuwait would have been hard if Iraq's offensive forces had dominated against Kuwait, as they did, but its defenses had dominated against the coalition, as some feared.

It is hard to generalize about whether the offense or defense is more potent globally or locally, since technology, terrain, and actors' sizes vary widely across regions. Recent experiences point to great-power offensive dominance, but with no assurance that it will last. The three most indicative recent conflicts between great and small powers were the 1982 Falklands War, the 1987 U.S. naval deployment in the Persian Gulf, and the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf in 1991. Each time, great powers and offensive forces appeared dominant. Yet in the first two cases Britain and the United States had ships destroyed or damaged by inexpensive anti-ship missiles. In the third case, the United States used its air and naval superiority and satellite intelligence to forestall attacks on its ships but was less successful in preventing missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia.

These cases thus suggest that great-power offensive forces can still reverse local acts of aggression but that this condition may not last if small, inexpensive, and increasingly "smart" forces such as anti-ship, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles continue to proliferate. For this reason, the major weapons suppliers are becoming more interested in a regime focused on limiting transfers of advanced conventional weapons and "weapons of mass destruction": surface-to-surface ballistic missiles as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.[55]

[53] See, among others, Charles W. Ostrom and H. J. Aldrich, "The Relationship Between Size and Stability in the Major Power International System," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (November 1978); Jack S. Levy and T. Clifton Morgan, "Structure of the International System and the Relationship between the Frequency and Seriousness of War" in Margaret P. Karns, ed., *Persistent Patterns and Emerging Structures in a Waning Century* (New York: Praeger, 1986).

[54] John Gerard Ruggie, "Contingencies, Constraints, and Collective Security: Perspectives on UN Involvement in International Disputes," *International Organization* 28 (Summer 1974): 517.

[55] See Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation" in *World Armament and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1990* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1990), 375; and "Talks Begin on Arms Sales to Third World," *New York Times*, 9 July 1991.

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Whether territorial expansion is profitable is related to the issue of whether the offense or defense dominates. The destructiveness of modern arms as well as the more interdependent and knowledge-based nature of modern economic production have lowered the benefits and raised the costs of expansion.[56] Overall, these changes make economic sanctions more effective than in an autarchic world. Since Iraq could not have sold Kuwaiti oil on world markets, whatever the outcome of the Persian Gulf War, because of the Security Council's resolutions, its seizure would have borne less fruit than, for instance, Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Still, the costs of being exploited remain high enough that some states will not easily trust their security to collective mechanisms.

Appreciation of the high costs of expansion parallels a new awareness of the costs of client states. After painful lessons in Afghanistan and Vietnam, America and Russia now value mutual cooperation more and have less fear of being exploited.[57] Zero-sum competiton over small clients has lessened considerably; while the credibility of commitments still matters to great powers, the less competitive climate emphasizes reassurance against instability rather than deterrence of another well defined bloc. This has reduced the great powers' tendency to overreact to threats of losing minor allies.

In addition, although the end of the cold war has reopened border issues, a norm against violent border changes is strengthening. The cases of Africa, Latin America, and the Mideast after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait are illustrative. In Africa, thinly spread populations, a plethora of ethnic groups with strong tribal loyalties, and the lack of prominent natural barriers have made existing boundaries, largely drawn by nineteenth-century European colonialists, such a Pandora's box that almost all African governments resist any forcible boundary changes.[58] In South America, states have similarly accepted the pre-independence boundaries under the principle of *uti possidetis*—the Roman principle that possession confers legal right, which was understood in South America to mean acceptance of the colonial boundaries in effect when revolts began in 1810.[59] In the Mideast, Iraqi aggression has curbed pan-Arabic rhetoric and solidified the primacy of existing states within their present borders. While none of this precludes crossborder breaches of the peace, it suggests greater de facto agreement on the status quo than is sometimes recognized.

This norm will not stop the disintegration of existing states, but it could help contain the external effects of such implosions and build legitimacy for collective

[56] Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," *International Security* 15 (Winter 1990/91): 12–16.

[57] See Robert Legvold, "The New Embrace," *New York Times*, 13 December 1990.

[58] Jeffrey Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," *International Organization* 43 (Autumn 1989).

[59] Martin Ira Glasser and Harm de Blij, *Systematic Political Geography*, 4th ed. (New York: Wiley, 1989), 91.

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enforcement in the Third World. The latter is important, since enforcement would be primarily a major-power task, and violence is likeliest in the Third World. Widespread political legitimacy thus requires that a collective security regime embody regional practices as much as possible. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), for instance, interprets national self-determination at most to permit secession, and then with no consequences for other borders; the International Court of Justice has upheld the OAU precedent, explicitly respecting regional practices. More generally, a norm protecting all boundaries from external aggression is attractive to the small states that comprise much of the Third World.[60]

With regard to relations between great and small powers, prospects are better for a great-power concert of interests than at any time since 1945. This is especially true of America and Russia. They shared some interests even during the cold war, such as discouragement of nuclear proliferation, but they can press such issues more strongly now that they no longer compete for allies in the Third World. With serious budget problems in both countries, arms transfers may be driven more by negotiable economic incentives than by zero-sum security and ideological considerations. This may lead to mutual restraint on transfers of conventional weapons and those of mass destruction, although it has not yet done so.

A Liberal's Interpretation

The ambiguities and disagreements among Realists raise the importance of the national-level factors that Liberals see as critical to prospects for collective security. Changes at this level appear to satisfy the requirement that neither antagonisms nor friendships among nations preclude enforcement of collective decisions. The post-cold war era thus differs in a key respect from those in which collective security was tried before. Previously, collective security was motivated by continued fear of an aspiring hegemon after its defeat; it foundered later, largely on national-level antagonisms. The present period is partly analogous insofar as NATO won a cold war and thus far at least has facilitated continued cooperation by outlasting the effects of Soviet disintegration and German unification.

The similarity ends here, however, as the softening of East-West rivalry is due at least as much to Soviet democratization as to Soviet disintegration, a systemic factor. Moscow might therefore be incorporated into established patterns of security cooperation more fully and rapidly than either France in 1815 or Germany in 1919 and 1945. If so, the resulting concert would come about and operate by quite different dynamics than in the past; the glue holding it together would not be fear of the former hegemon but shared security, political, and economic

[60] Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of Boundaries," 688, 690.

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interests that include the former hegemon. Russia's bid to join NATO, while premature, indicates the trend. Now all the great powers save China are either democracies or are trying to build democracy. Furthermore, few national-level ties prevent great powers from constraining one another or disciplining their smaller allies.[61] UN action against Iraq exemplified both developments: the level of U.S.–Soviet cooperation was unprecedented, and Moscow approved a resolution to use force despite its former close ties to Baghdad.

Market incentives have also brought states' interests closer together. Economic pluralization in Russia and Eastern Europe has ended autarchy. And because integration into the world economy is impossible if Russian or other CIS leaders revert to older foreign policy methods and goals, the gains of mutual cooperation and costs of mutual defection are greater than would be true if security and economic issues were separable. These developments have made western economic aid to the former Soviet Union politically possible for the first time since the 1940s.

An Institutionalist's Perspective

Finally, through Institutionalist eyes, UN norms are adaptable enough to provide the main vehicle for post-cold war collective security. For this to occur, in addition to the conditions required by Realists and Liberals, joint gains must be achievable. We discussed earlier why this is possible in security affairs as well as other international issues. To be sure, positive-sum conceptions of security remain tentative among major powers, although American scholars have long paid attention to interdependence, and Russian "new thinkers" have recently joined them. Still, UN developments since the mid-1980s have been significant. The permanent SC members have met privately since January 1987, first to discuss the Iran-Iraq war and then other regional conflicts such as Angola-Namibia, Ethiopia, and Cambodia.[62] Concomitant with this, the UN has gone from five to thirteen peacekeeping operations since 1991, more than tripling the number of actively deployed peacekeeping troops.[63]

In a concert based mechanism, institutional rules and norms follow from states' perceived interests; only at the margins can the institutions themselves affect interests. Yet, as big-power cooperation grows, these margins may also. Institutions could help regularize states' stakes by getting involved early in a dispute, minimizing incentives to escalate out of ambition or fear. All else equal, by regularizing what is at stake to the parties, the mechanism can induce them to

[61] The U.S.–British "special relationship" and close U.S.–Israeli ties might be exceptions, though Britain would not support the U.S. militarily in Indochina in 1954, and the U.S. has pressured Israel to change its settlement policies.

[62] Finkelstein, "From Collective Security to Collective Defense To . . . ," 194.

[63] "U. N. Busier Than Ever Globally, Struggles with Peacekeeping Role," *New York Times*, 25 January 1993.

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take risks to cooperate and thus promote peaceful settlement. Brian Urquhart implies this in arguing that peacekeeping forces might be deployed "in dangerous areas, if possible in advance of a crisis," when stakes are still low.[64] To do this, the SC would probably need to discard its own principle that all concerned parties must consent to peacekeeping operations. With less prospect of a big-power veto to protect recalcitrant regional disputants, the UN can choose to go beyond this constraint.[65]

This would return the UN to the conceptual basis of its charter, which saw pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement as symbiotically related. The two became disjoined when the SC was paralyzed, but they need not be: the more confident states are that SC decisions will be enforced, the more likely they will be to settle peacefully.[66] At the charter drafting conference, the major-power planners emphasized this link; the SC, they said, had been given flexible powers largely to put teeth into the provisions of Chapter VI, which suggests means for pacific settlement.[67] Urquhart's ideas tighten the connection from the other side, making enforcement more likely if a broader array of preventive measures fail.

Another feature of the post-cold war world might seem to impede cooperation from an Institutionalist perspective. This is the fact that America's relative decline, Soviet dissolution, the weakening of bipolar alignments, and the rise of Germany and Japan have increased the number of actors strong enough to make or break enforcement actions. This will complicate cooperation among the great-power group. However, a concert of interests eases the problem of decisiveness: two players who prefer mutual defection to mutual cooperation will never cooperate, but an infinite number with harmonious interests will always do so.

Finally, regimes can monitor and pool data on states' compliance, often by means unforeseen in 1945 and unacceptable during the cold war. Military confidence-building measures exemplify this. Aside from reduced force levels, these include agreements on demilitarized zones, notifications of exercises, limits on exercises and on moving forces to threatening positions, and consensus on which weapons are defensive rather than offensive. Precedents for future accords were set in the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the 1986 Stockholm Accords on confidence-building measures in Europe, and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) accords that followed from them.[68]

[64] Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf," 37.

[65] Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse,'" 201.

[66] Finkelstein, "From Collective Security to Collective Defense To . . . ," 190.

[67] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1958), 658.

[68] For details, see Catherine M. Kelleher, "Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe" in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Power in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).

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First Tests of the New World Order: Kuwait and Yugoslavia

In sum, the Realist outlook for post-cold war stability is ambiguous, Liberals are unabashedly optimistic, and Institutionalists see hopeful signs in the UN's increasing activism. One way to sort through these conflicting views is to ask whether they accurately characterize not just general trends but the two most revealing post-cold war conflicts: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Yugoslavia's civil war. In the former case, great-power cooperation was closer than at any time since the Concert of Europe, and the UN played a role in Kuwait not seen since the Korean War. At the same time, the bumpy process through which cooperation arose over Kuwait and the continuing failure to achieve a durable ceasefire in the Balkans illustrate that UN practices set early in the cold war are now outdated.

Realists would argue that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was partly an outcome of the end of tight bipolar blocs, especially diminished Soviet restraints on Iraq. Institutionalists and Liberals, however, also have grounds to argue that the unprecedented UN response, including diplomatic support by the democratizing USSR, showed the potential for post-cold war collective security. Both arguments have merit: new regional conflicts may arise as alliances loosen, and UN action by the great-power democracies may be the best means to resolve them. At the same time, the Gulf war illustrated the UN's weaknesses as well as strengths as an enforcer of collective security.

By the criteria of decisiveness, inclusivity, burden-sharing, and compatibility with member states' domestic politics, the coalition's actions in the Gulf conflict were impressive but inadequate. The SC, with its record of stalemate and its great-power veto, was not decisive enough to deter Iraq's attack on Kuwait. To the extent that he considered possible UN sanctions, Saddam Hussein probably concluded that the threat of a Soviet veto would prevent strong action against him. The SC ultimately approved "all necessary means" to evict Iraq from Kuwait, but only after months of delay.

Just as important, the enforcement process was not inclusive. Germany and Japan endured public pressure to contribute to the coalition's effort, but were excluded from SC decision making. Though ultimately successful, this ad hoc burden sharing led to such frictions between the German and Japanese governments and their respective publics that it may be harder to get cooperation in future cases. Inclusion of these two economic powers is vital, because future victims may be unable to pay for UN enforcement, as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did.

The UN role caused fewer political problems among permanent SC members, where it probably helped speed up decisions on the Gulf war. In the United States, the Bush administration sought a SC resolution approving the use of force and then used this to win congressional support by warning that domestic opposition would weaken the UN. Moreover, the UN imprimatur gave the military operation substantial legitimacy, making it easier for France and Britain to

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join the United States. In these and other ways, great-power cooperation was at least not set back by the Gulf war, and useful UN precedents may emerge from it. Still, the Gulf coalition depended on a single dominant power. Since this cannot be taken for granted in the future, a concert is the only alternative.

Unlike the Gulf War, the Yugoslav civil war tested the great powers' willingness to act in cases of less than vital interest where culpability for a breach of the peace is murky. It is a test that they have thus far largely failed. Although UN efforts achieved a ceasefire between Serbia and Croatia for most of 1992, they did not prevent the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor the genocidal "ethnic cleansing" of its territory. As of early 1993, the ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia had broken down and the risk remained of conflict spreading to the Kosovo and Macedonian regions of the former Yugoslavia, which could drag Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey into the fighting. Thus, while the case of Kuwait demonstrated the potential for the UN to act, despite its institutional shortcomings, when vital great power interests are immediately at stake, that of Yugoslavia has painfully highlighted the need for UN reforms if the organization is to act in less clear-cut cases. As institutionalists argue, when great power interests are important but indirect, and when they are subject to incremental rather than immediate threats, a well functioning institution can lengthen actors' time horizons and encourage broader views of national interests.

The failure to contain Yugoslavia's civil war suggests that regional security organizations can fail if they are not backed by the global jurisdiction, resources, inclusiveness, and legitimacy of the UN. NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the West European Union each failed repeatedly to maintain a ceasefire in Yugoslavia. Unlike the UN, none of these institutions has mechanisms for or experience with peacekeeping forces, and none could impose an economic embargo encompassing all of Yugoslavia's main trading partners. It may be possible to restructure regional security organizations to better provide collective security, especially in Europe, which some consider the easiest case.[69] But this assumes that international conflicts can be isolated within regions. Moreover, the Middle East and much of the rest of the Third World lack the necessary institutions, consensus, and regional power balances to maintain peace without global assistance.

Three other factors contributed to the UN's slow response. First, the UN hesitated because its members initially saw the Yugoslav conflict as primarily internal, and the UN is proscribed from intervening in states' internal affairs. By November 1991, however, UN members came to recognize that mounting numbers of refugees and civilian casualties, as well as the dangers of escalation, had blurred the line separating domestic and international jurisdiction, necessitating some global response.

Despite this increasing awareness of the interests at stake, a second factor, Germany's absence from the Security Council, continued to slow the UN re-

[69] See Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe."

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sponse. Germany is the one great power with immediate interests in Yugoslavia, given its geographic proximity and the influx of Yugoslav refugees into Germany. Other permanent Security Council members, most notably the United States and Russia, were preoccupied with domestic problems and chose to shunt the Yugoslav problem aside. Germany finally took matters into its own hands in December 1991, declaring its willingness to recognize unilaterally Croatian and Slovenian independence and pressuring others to acquiesce. Following the lead of Germany and other European countries, the United States extended recognition to Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia in April. These moves initially counterbalanced Serbia's military superiority over Croatia and Slovenia and encouraged Serbian movement toward the UN-brokered ceasefire among these republics. When the UN, despite Germany's concerns, did not assertively back up its members' recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, however, Serbia renewed its aggressions, this time focusing its attacks on Bosnia. This sequence of events illustrated Germany's de facto great power status but also the limitations of its role as a nonmember of the Security Council.

A third reason the UN did not take more effective action in Yugoslavia is that it lacked precedents and options between a narrowly-defined peacekeeping operation and a full police action. The secretary-general's special mediator insisted that a cease-fire be in place before deploying peacekeeping forces, which allowed extremists on both sides to delay UN action by violating successive ceasefires. In addition, by requiring that the two sides agree where peacekeeping forces would be deployed, the UN forced them to bargain on the central issue of borders even as combat continued. This assured that the conflict would drag on until a military stalemate emerged. By early 1993, the UN and its members belatedly began to acknowledge that not all parties were able or willing to agree fully to a peace plan and to keep their military forces and factions under control. Consequently, UN discussions began to focus on a "peace enforcement" contingent of UN forces that would go beyond the traditional UN peacekeeping role and be empowered to use preemptive force to prevent outbreaks of violence after a ceasefire agreement.[70]

For many reasons—deference to regional organizations, reluctance to intervene in a primarily internal conflict, few options between narrowly defined peacekeeping and police action, and lack of German membership on the SC—the UN was slow to act in Yugoslavia.[71] The UN cannot afford similarly costly delays in other post-cold war regional conflicts that may escalate to endanger great power interests.

[70] "U.N. Plans Strong Bosnian Peace Force," *Washington Post*, 7 March 1993.

[71] Interestingly, those involved in the policy process in the United States and Europe have given a similar analysis of the reasons that unilateral and collective efforts at establishing peace in Yugoslavia failed. See "A Bloody Failure in the Balkans," *Washington Post*, 8 February 1993.

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Conclusions and Policy Implications

Realists, Liberals, and Institutionalists lay out demanding conditions for collective security, but taken together these views permit more optimism about its prospects than in 1919, 1945, or even 1815. Realists emphasize that collective security must be based on a great-power concert, that these states must agree what is necessary to preserve peace and order in specific cases, that they must prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection, and that they repeatedly interact. Liberals highlight the absence of national-level ties strong enough to impede enforcement and the potential among market democracies for a pluralistic security community. Institutionalists emphasize a regime's capability to minimize the costs to states of unrequited cooperation.

Recent developments indicate that many obstacles remain. Proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction continues, although the major powers appear more willing to control it after the Gulf conflict. Also, many post-cold war conflicts have ancient ethnic roots, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims.[72]

Still, the requirements for collective security are better satisfied today than ever before. Most important, prospects are good for a major-power concert able to respond collectively to aggression. Not only are cooperative U.S.–Russian interests greater than at any time since 1917, but changes in Russian behavior are closely linked to deep-seated political and economic pluralization. This halting Russian move toward liberal democracy is the critical factor in creating prospects for a collective security regime more promising than previous efforts, all of which foundered on incompatible domestic systems. Thus, if democracy fails in Russia, and particularly if a successor regime arises that is not only less democratic but more nationalistic on foreign policy issues, collective security will be much harder to achieve through the UN. Moreover, despite Soviet defeat in the cold war, the international system has not become unipolar: American power has clear limits, and the United States must build coalitions to achieve key objectives.

These conclusions support five themes from an emerging policy-oriented literature. First, peacekeeping, enforcement, and conflict prevention can be linked in new ways. Now that superpower disagreements no longer paralyze the UN on regional and ethnic conflicts, the UN can consider ways to prevent and defuse conflicts across much of the spectrum of violence. At the low end, these would include third-party mediation and economic sanctions. The UN might also deploy deterrent forces at the request of one party to a conflict, which would require changing the principle of mutual consent. At the high end, the UN could follow precedent and provide peacekeeping forces only after a ceasefire and then fire only when fired upon. Alternatively, the UN might deploy forces even without a prior ceasefire or consent by all parties to a dispute, and these forces might

[72] Hoffmann, "The Price of War," 6.

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do more than simply fire when fired upon.[73] Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has articulated this thinking, and the UN is incrementally adopting it. He even suggests that UN troops might be deployed in tense situations to deter the use of force by any party to a dispute—a heretofore untried kind of forcible preventive diplomacy.[74] The SC might take such a step if Serbia were to threaten Kosovo.

Meanwhile, the SC is giving peacekeepers more authority to use force in several ongoing operations. UN troops in Bosnia are expected to be able to enforce an armistice, since assurances that they have this flexibility might help induce otherwise unreachable settlements, and a similar step is likely when UN troops replace American peacekeepers in Somalia.[75] At the top of the spectrum would be police action, as in Korea and Kuwait. The response will depend on the circumstances, but it is important that the UN have a range of options to deter unilateral military escalations.

If peacekeepers could potentially be involved in combat in many places, the Security Council will need a more reliable way to provide troops for them. Thinking within the UN and among its constituents has evolved quickly on this issue. In June 1992, Boutros-Ghali proposed a standing UN army, and others have proposed revival of the UN's stillborn Military Staff Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the permanent Security Council members. But more recently, the idea of a permanent force dominated by the major industrial powers has been criticized both by small Third World states, who fear a great-power gendarmerie, and U.S. military officers, who fear that it would lead to too many American casualties.[76] Boutros-Ghali now suggests systematic standby arrangements in which governments would commit to providing on short notice specific numbers and kinds of specially trained forces for UN operations.[77] This would not rule out a more advisory role for the Military Staff Committee or some body like it. The committee might, for instance, routinely advise the SC on force planning and monitoring of arms transfers.[78]

This reinvention of collective security in effect urges the creation of means to regularize the stakes of continuing interactions among actors. Previously, states could not assume collective security would work. In an extreme but illustrative

[73] Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf," 74.

[74] "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping," Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, United Nations A/47/277, S/24111, 17 June 1992, 9, 13. See also the thinking of Brian Urquhart, a former UN Secretariat official with long-time responsibilities for peacekeeping, "The United States in 1992: Problems and Opportunities," *International Affairs* 68 (1992): 316.

[75] "U.N. Plans Strong Bosnian Peace Force," *Washington Post*, 7 March 1993; "U.S. Would Let Some GIs Serve Under U.N. Flag," *Washington Post*, 5 January 1993.

[76] "Idea of a Potent U.N. Army Receives a Mixed Response," *Washington Post*, 29 October 1992.

[77] "An Agenda for Peace," 15; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Winter 1992/93): 92–93.

[78] Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf," 37.

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case, Kuwait could have ceased to exist in August 1990. But if states could count on UN mechanisms to monitor destabilizing arms flows and deployments, and respond incrementally with peacekeeping forces, willingness to trust collective mechanisms could grow.

Second, a revived major-power concert would best anchor a refurbished collective security regime, but delicate diplomatic issues must be worked out. The tension between inclusiveness and decisiveness suggests that permanent SC membership be restricted to states that have large resources to contribute, share other members' core values, and represent a large fraction of humanity. By these criteria, Germany and Japan would join the present permanent members with full voting rights. The Soviet seat was quickly transfered to Russia to avoid a divisive debate over membership,[79] but that discussion is now unavoidable with Germany, Japan, and several large Third World states demanding inclusion. A workable compromise might include two components. Germany and Japan would be offered permanent SC seats with full voting rights if they pass constitutional changes allowing them to contribute militarily to UN policing. Washington has endorsed this, and Bonn and Tokyo are trying to implement suitable constitutional changes. In addition, India, Nigeria, and Brazil might become permanent members without a veto, or three new permanent SC seats could be rotated among the largest countries of each region.[80]

Third, dilution of the SC veto would make the UN still more decisive, even as it becomes more inclusive. The Americans who drew up plans for the UN considered various proposals for voting in the SC, such as different obligations when dissenting as opposed to abstaining. But Franklin D. Roosevelt felt a tight concert was necessary and that great powers should not be bound to SC decisions from which they dissented.[81] Such unanimity is less necessary today. Not all major powers need contribute militarily to enforcement, as the Gulf conflict showed, since only economic coercion requires the widest possible participation. Enforcement might thus require a strong SC majority with no single state having a veto, although the permanent members should retain a veto on actions involving their own internal disputes and on changes in SC procedures. This would leave conflict within a major power as the one area that neither this nor any other mechanism could easily address.

Fourth, collective security will be legitimate and more effective if the powerful do not simply impose solutions on the weak. To build support for enforcement beyond members of the SC, states most threatened by aggression must share in decisions about how to enforce the peace, although not necessarily on the same

[79] "West Acts to Defer Issue of New Council Seats," *New York Times*, 3 January 1992.

[80] "Germany Tells the U.N. It Wants a Permanent Seat on the Council," *New York Times*, 24 September 1992; "U.S. Backs Council Seats for Bonn and Tokyo," *New York Times*, 30 January 1993; "Japanese Debate Taboo Topic of Military's Role," *New York Times*, 17 January 1993; "Bonn Addresses Bosnian 'No-Fly Zone'—Sort Of," *Washington Post*, 3 April 1993.

[81] Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, 33, 35.

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level as permanent SC members. Thus, regional bodies will have a role so long as collective enforcement is imperfect. Neighbors often can provide help to peacekeepers, who may lack intimate knowledge of the context.[82] This does not deny tensions between universalistic conflict management principles and decentralized ones: alliances inherently provide selective rather than collective security.[83] In this sense, Roosevelt's preferred global mechanism differed significantly from Churchill's desire for a Supreme World Council that would have final authority over resolution of disputes but would deal actively only with those threatening more than one region.[84] But since alliances will be necessary indefinitely, regional and global principles might each be utilized. Roosevelt and Churchill gave the UN ultimate jurisdiction, and its charter permits regional self-help when the SC cannot act. The fact that some problems are dealt with selectively does not mean that all must be or that truly collective responsibilities cannot grow over time.

Finally, the scope of states' domestic jurisdiction should be narrowed under carefully defined conditions. This is already occurring in practice; the UN needs to reflect on the kind of precedents it wishes to set. Although Article 2 (7) of the charter precludes the UN from intervening in domestic disputes, this has never applied to enforcement. Beyond this, the roles of third-party mediation and peacekeeping have grown to include monitoring elections, disarming insurgents, and providing humanitarian assistance.[85] The latter is the hardest to reconcile with sovereignty; many states worry that diluting the principle of internal autonomy will justify interference in their domestic affairs.[86] For the UN to provide humanitarian aid in a way that is widely seen as legitimate, careful guidelines are needed. Interventions without invitations from any government present the clearest challenge to sovereignty and thus should only be considered when a humanitarian situation clearly threatens international peace and security, or officials in the affected country are clearly blocking efforts to alleviate mass starvation or genocide. To ensure the widest legitimacy, such intervention should have SC sanction whenever possible.[87] Most recently, a major precedent was set when the UN entered Somalia solely on humanitarian grounds without active opposition from any member. That Washington was forced to initiate this operation indicates a need for upgrading the UN's ability to initiate such actions.

[82] Norton and Weiss, "Superpowers and Peacekeepers," 216; Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf," 37.

[83] Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 266.

[84] Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, 39–40. Roosevelt initially favored Churchill's ideas but needed a broader appeal to legitimate UN participation to the U.S. public. See Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy" in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 238–245.

[85] Russett and Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order," 70.

[86] Lee H. Hamilton, "When It's Our Duty to Intervene," *Washington Post*, 9 August 1992.

[87] Ibid.; Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," *Survival* 33 (September/October 1991): 460.

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Arguably, Article 2 (7) does not settle the issue, since it has been variously interpreted among UN bodies.[88] In any case, even those who interpret existing authority in this area narrowly suggest standing agreements to provide the organization with the tools to respond quickly in humanitarian emergencies.[89] The Kurdish tragedy may broaden the precedent of such intervention. More hypothetically, criteria may evolve for collective intervention in disputes that begin internally and either ravage a state or spread to neighbors. Aside from humanitarian cases, these could include cases of civil war where an outside power tries to turn the balance in its favor or secessionist movements that embody aspirations to self-determination.[90]

None of these recommendations means that collective security will be easily achieved. Much international conflict will not be amenable to enforcement, however much the great powers may agree. But a concert will expand the range of situations in which collective security is possible. The resulting regime will not perpetuate any particular status quo in a fluid world, but signal that forcible change is unacceptable. Realism, Liberalism, and Institutionalism all provide a basis for this reinvention of collective security. Many practical ideas follow from this, and leaders can be more optimistic about their prospects than at any time since Metternich and Castlereagh remade the international system at the Congress of Vienna.*

[88] Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*, 3rd ed., rev. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 68.

[89] Doris Messner and David J. Scheffer, "No Manifesto for Armed Intervention," *Washington Post*, 28 May 1991.

[90] See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 6.

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Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War

ROBERT JERVIS

If the main objective of arms control is to make war less likely, then any theory of arms control must rest on a theory of the causes of war.[1] Most analysts start with the premise that the anarchical nature of the international system is crucial: armed conflicts occur because no higher authority can prevent them.[2] This is consistent with the realist tradition, which has dominated American thinking since World War II. The central assumptions are that states are the main actors in international affairs, that the external environment is more important in determining states' behavior than their domestic characteristics, that this behavior was conditioned by the absence of an international sovereign, and that in this context states must be preoccupied with their own security.

Although this framework does not specify exactly when and where armed conflict will occur, it does give general directions to arms control. First, it tells us that we cannot eliminate the possibility of war without creating world govern-

[1] For good discussions of the causes of war, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973); and Jack Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of the Theories and Evidence" in Philip Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 209–233. Bernard Brodie argued that because the danger of Soviet-American war was so slight and because the destruction of such a war could not be limited, arms control should concentrate on its third objective of saving money: Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," *International Security* 1 (Summer 1976): 17–36. There is quite a bit to be said for this view, and arms control may have contributed to the stability that Brodie noted.

[2] The classic statement is from Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

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ment. Second, it points to states rather than individuals, economic classes, interest groups, bureaucracies, or transnational organizations as the sources of conflict and cooperation in international politics. Third, it could lead analysts to think about which kinds of systems are more war-prone than others. Indeed, there has been a great deal of research on whether bipolar or multipolar systems are more conducive to war.[3] But because this factor cannot be altered, arms control analysts were drawn to the ways in which states' security policies can produce wars that are inadvertent in the sense that they could have been avoided without sacrificing the states' core values.

It is now almost trivial to note that arms control is made possible by the fact that the superpowers have common as well as conflicting interests even—or especially—in the military arena and that cooperation and conflict are so closely linked that we can hardly analyze one without paying attention to the other. In the political and intellectual atmosphere of the late 1950s, however, this perspective did not come naturally. Memories of McCarthyism were still vivid; the claim that the United States had common interests with the Soviet Union could be seen as dangerously close to being "soft on communism"; partly because the Soviet Union seemed to be gaining on the West in almost all respects, most members of the American elite were preoccupied with the task of competing with the communist adversaries. Indeed, while liberals scorned the ideological rhetoric of the Eisenhower administration, they criticized it as much for its failure to develop a vigorous military posture as for its diplomatic clumsiness.

In this era, military policy and disarmament were considered quite separate, if not antithetical. Most of those who were concerned with disarmament believed either that such efforts could only follow a general reduction of conflict between the superpowers or, more frequently, that disarmament would produce such desired political changes. Thus, the linked arguments of the emerging arms control community that each superpower should be concerned about the other's military posture for reasons of mutual safety as well as for competitive advantage, and the view that disarmament and arms control were aspects of security policy, not alternatives to it, were major intellectual and political contributions.

Arms Control Postulates

Thomas Schelling emphasized "the possibility that one can simultaneously think seriously and sympathetically about our military posture and about collaborating with our enemies to improve it."[4] He and Morton Halperin similarly introduced *Strategy and Arms Control* as follows: "The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military

[3] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[4] Thomas Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," *Dædalus* 89 (Fall 1960): 892.

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establishments."[5] Note that the claim is not merely that the United States and the Soviet Union have some interests in common. Even the most hardened cold warriors were willing to see some areas where the superpowers could negotiate. But the stronger and less obvious argument is that it is in the area of military policy, where common sense and much previous discussion had located the highest degree of conflict, that the superpowers had major reasons to cooperate. In significant measure this argument rested on the broader development of deterrence theory and the claim that, in Brodie's familiar words: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."[6] A shift in the way war was viewed opened a space for arms control. Measures which were in both sides' military interests were precluded as long as people thought that wars were absolute struggles in which each side tried only to weaken, thwart, and harm the other and believed that the state could best prevent wars by being in the best position to defeat the other should war occur. As we will see later, many of the criticisms of arms control rest on this conception of deterrence.

By contrast, arms control rests on the theory that wars can occur because states have failed to realize the cooperation which their interests actually entail. For its centrality as well as its disagreement with previous views, the claim that hostile states almost always have important interests of military policy in common can be called the fundamental postulate of arms control. Although perhaps only one side can win a war, both could lose it in the sense of there having been at least one if not several outcomes that would have been mutually preferred to fighting. I use the word "realize" in two senses: to understand and to put into practice. Because the purpose of arms control research was not only academic, the two senses of "realize" were linked: it was hoped that as the intellectual explanation for the potential common interest gained plausibility, the superpowers would act on their improved understanding.

Closely related to this theme is the second postulate of arms control: arms control and security policy are not opposed to each other. "What we have tried to emphasize more than anything else," Schelling and Halperin noted in concluding *Strategy and Arms Control*, "is that arms control, if properly conceived, is not necessarily hostile to, or incompatible with, or an alternative to, a military policy properly conceived."[7] "There is hardly an objective of arms control, that is not equally a continuing urgent objective of national military strategy—of our unilateral military plans and policies."[8] In the context of the 1950s, the idea of common interest between scholars concerned with avoiding war and the military was as surprising to some as the idea of common interest with the Soviet Union was

[5] Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 2.

[6] Bernard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), 76.

[7] Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, 141.

[8] Ibid., 4.

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to others. In fact, the two conceptions are linked. For if U.S.–Soviet military relations were zero-sum, then it would have been difficult to find overlap between arms control and military policy. Again, what is central is the conception of war and how it might be prevented. To say that there is no conflict between intelligent arms control and intelligent unilateral military policy means that there must be significant common interest between the two sides, and that winning war in the sense of defeating the other's army can no longer be the dominant goal. Once one argues that conflict is inhibited because both sides realize that to engage in it is to leave them both worse off than if they had been more restrained, arms control is compatible with good military policy because our conception of what makes military policy good has changed. But—and these are troublesome points to which we will return—this claim was not made fully explicit, is subject to rebuttal on both theoretical and practical grounds, and has been the focus for later arguments, although not always couched in these terms.

Crisis Stability

Although there are several ways in which arms control might help realize Soviet-American common interest and shape the conception of proper American military policy, the central contribution of the 1960 *Dædalus* writers was to emphasize the importance of crisis stability. Indeed, this has remained the focus of the theory and, to a lesser extent, the practice of arms control ever since. The basic idea is that even if both sides prefer peace to war, war could result through "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack" to use Schelling's well-known phrase.[9] Thus Schelling and Halperin declare: "The most mischievous character of today's strategic weapons is that they may provide an enormous advantage, in the event that war occurs, to the side that starts it."[10] A first-strike advantage, coupled with the belief that war is very likely, if not inevitable, would make it rational for a state to attack even if it was peaceful because the alternative to attacking would be seen, not as peace, but as being attacked. Under these circumstances, the state's efforts to deter the adversary or protect itself in case of war would make war more likely. Observing the state's preparations, the adversary would see the danger of war increasing and would itself make ready to strike. While it was not much mentioned in the early literature, the obvious case which seemed to fit this model was the outbreak of World War I, although the relevant history is actually quite ambiguous and has been subject to fierce dispute. The crucial

[9] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 9; Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), chap. 6.

[10] Robert Powell argues that under most plausible assumptions, the situation is not as dangerous as one might think: see "Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age," *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989): 61–76. I have argued that standard analysis neglects important psychological processes and dynamics: *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), chap. 5.

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variables that the arms controllers focused on were the relative advantage of first as compared to a second strike (that is, the vulnerability of weapons systems and their associated apparatus) and the perceived likelihood of war. (We will return to a significant omission—the states' expectations about the value of a world that stays at peace.) Unlike some causes of war, these are manipulable by policy and so are particularly appropriate for a theory that can lead to actions.

Does the State Want the Adversary's Forces to be Vulnerable?

While it is clear then that the state should seek to keep the peace by decreasing the adversary's incentives to attack, should it decrease its own incentives to do so? That is, does it want the adversary's forces to be invulnerable and therefore its own population to be vulnerable? The first arms control postulate certainly implies that this could be the case: just because the adversary wants to reduce its vulnerability does not mean that this posture would be bad for the state. Indeed, the logic of crisis stability implies that the danger of war will be reduced if both sides are immune to surprise attack. But the early arms control literature rarely declared that the United States would be better off if the Soviet strategic forces were difficult to destroy.

There are three ways in which this argument might be joined that derive from different, but not conflicting, ways of analyzing the causes of wars. First, one can claim that crisis instability can cause wars without asserting that this is the *only* cause of war, or even the most important one. Schelling and Halperin imply pride of place to this danger when, in the sentence quoted above, they refer to first-strike advantage as "the most mischievous character of today's strategic weapons,"[11] and the impression of importance is underlined by the lengthy discussion of the topic. But this position could only be justified by comparing this danger to others, which little arms control literature did. Furthermore, it is interesting that Schelling and Halperin do not say that the first-strike advantage poses the greatest danger of war, but rather that this is the most troublesome aspect "of today's strategic weapons." There then may be greater dangers arising from sources other than the weapons. The obvious questions are what these other dangers might be, whether concentrating on crisis stability distracts us from dealing with them and, indeed, whether increasing crisis stability, especially by decreasing the vulnerability of Soviet strategic forces, magnifies these other dangers.

These questions can be approached through a second avenue. The theory of war that focuses on crisis instability can be seen as a part of a more general theory that stresses the security dilemma and the spiral model of conflict. The security dilemma arises because many of the ways in which states try to increase their security have the unintended consequence of decreasing the security of

[11] Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, 9.

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others. The spiral model of conflict sees the resulting action-reaction dynamic as accelerated by each side's inability to understand the other or to see how the other is interpreting its own behavior. These processes generate and magnify conflict, leading to unnecessary wars.[12] But wars can also start through the failure to deter the adversary: if threats led to insecurity and war in 1914, the British policy of conciliation and of taking full account of the supposed security needs of the other side produced war twenty-five years later.[13] Deterrence theory, in brief, argues that wars are caused by states failing to develop the military strength and credible threats necessary to dissuade others from challenging the status quo. Furthermore, threats are most likely to be believed when the state can carry them out at reasonable cost, which in turn is more likely to be the case when the state can protect its own population (that is, if the adversary's strategic forces are vulnerable).

Deterrence theory and the spiral model then makes very different arguments about the relationship between threats and vulnerability on the one hand and war on the other. Yet, the community of deterrence theorists overlaps very heavily with the community of arms controllers. And in some ways, deterrence and arms control are compatible, if not complementary. Both point to the importance of credibility and argue that threats and promises must be contingent; that is, the state must show the other that it can and will take actions the other does not want *if and only if* the other takes prohibited actions. But the two paths to war are quite different and in practice, although not in theory, the policy prescriptions often contradict each other. Arms control stresses the dangers that arise when reassurances and promises—especially the promise not to strike—are either not made or are not believed; deterrence stresses the dangers that arise when threats are absent or dismissed. Thus, when Schelling writes on arms control, he talks of the danger of inadvertent war and the necessity for reassurances that show the adversary that the state will refrain from attacking if the adversary will. When he writes on deterrence, he argues that war can occur if the state appears weak, and that it must show that it will not back down in the face of threats.

Nature and Intentions of the Adversary

To go further we need to turn to the third avenue and the question of whether the state wants the other side's forces to be vulnerable. Classic arms control, like classic realism, sees the actors as essentially identical; discussions of crisis

[12] See John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (January 1950): 157–80; Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951), 19–20; Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 83–86; Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 198–223; and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62–90.

[13] In fact, the history of neither case carefully matches the models that bear their names: see Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988): 685–89.

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stability are couched in terms of two interchangeable actors. But other theories—those of Kant, Marx, and Wilson, for example—see the causes of war as lying within particular kinds of states. Far from ignoring domestic characteristics and treating all states as identical "billiard balls,"[14] these theories assert that certain states cause wars by being aggressive. This is implicitly true for much deterrence theory. The language there often posits one side that is defending the status quo and another that is challenging it. The implication is that aggressive states cause wars and the problem is how to halt aggression rather than how to cope with offense-dominant technology and the security dilemma.

To see the prime cause of wars as stemming from the aggressive tendencies of some states is not automatically to dismiss the danger of crisis instability. Even if the adversary is highly aggressive, a mutually undesired war could come about through the reciprocal fear of surprise attack. To put the point more generally, even if the degree of conflict between the two sides is quite high, there is still room for some cooperation (that is, the first postulate of arms control can still hold). Indeed, even during World War II there were some restraints (on bombing cities at the start of the war and on not using poison gas throughout), although these may have been abetted by one side or the other miscalculating its own interests. Once nuclear weapons come on the scene, furthermore, the area of common interests expands because both sides need to avoid all-out war. Nevertheless, if one or both sides is highly aggressive, the range of applicability of the second postulate must be questioned. In many areas, some military policy will not be good arms control, and the attempt to render Soviet forces vulnerable might be an example.

The belief that the main cause of war is aggressive states is often linked to the claim that aggressiveness is correlated with, if not caused by, domestic repression. Although for years dismissed if not ridiculed by many arms controllers, this argument receives more than a little support from recent events. It is not likely to be an accident that unprecedented progress in arms control occurred at the same time that the Soviet system first liberalized and then disintegrated. Obstacles which were enormous when Leonid Brezhnev and his predecessors were in power have vanished with Mikhail Gorbachev and the subsequent revolution. This is not to say that all dangers have passed, or that nothing would have been possible without extensive changes within the Soviet Union and its successors, but it does appear that the success of arms control has been driven less by technological breakthroughs, intellectual ingenuity, and shifts in the balance of power than by internal changes which reconstructed the Soviet and post-Soviet polity.

Interests, Doctrines, and Stability

Those who argued that the United States should have extensive counterforce capability pointed out that not only can wars start through aggression, but also

[14] The billiard ball analogy comes from Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, 4–19.

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that although avoiding war is the central American interest, it is not the only American interest. The most obvious other American interest that could be threatened by invulnerable Soviet nuclear forces is Western Europe. The United States needs to deter against attacks on allies—"extended deterrence." The problem arises because of what Glenn Snyder has called the "stability-instability paradox."[15] If there is great stability at the strategic nuclear level, then there is little credibility in either side's threat to launch an all-out attack in response to anything other than an unlimited strike against it.[16] The straightforward inference is that, in Colin Gray's words, "The United States cannot afford the crisis stability that precludes first use of strategic nuclear weapons."[17]

It seems intuitively obvious that if there is crisis stability, neither side can credibly threaten to start an all-out war in response to a limited provocation. But this misstates the situation. It would be an accurate formulation if levels of violence were hermetically sealed off from each other, if undesired escalation were impossible.[18] In fact, most statesmen realize that whenever violence is set in motion, no one can be sure where it will end up. Because events can readily escape control, limited responses carry with them some probability that the final, although unintended, result will be all-out war. A state that begins a confrontation or responds to one invokes what Schelling called "the threat that leaves something to chance."[19] What then brings pressure to bear on the adversary—and on the state as well—is less the immediate product of the action than the fear of where both states could end up.

[15] Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Terror and the Balance of Power" in Paul Seabury, ed., *The Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), 184–201. Similarly, Schelling and Halperin say: "If one of the things that prevents local wars is the fear of both sides that it will spiral to total war, then agreements which make it less likely that this will happen may end up making local war more likely. On the other hand this could be a reasonable price for greater insurance that local war will not go to total war." Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, 62–63.

[16] In this discussion I will put the latter possibility aside, both because it is hard to imagine the circumstances which could lead to such a Soviet attack and because the problem is analytically parallel to that of extended deterrence. I will also assume that the conventional balance in Europe would permit the Soviets to conquer the continent if nuclear weapons were not used, and that both sides realize this is the case. In fact, this is hotly disputed.

[17] Colin Gray, "Strategic Stability Reconsidered," *Dædalus* 109 (Fall 1980): 147.

[18] There is an important link between crisis instability and events getting out of control, although this connection was not explicitly drawn even by those who developed the concepts. When offensive advantage is slight (i.e., when even striking first will lead to disaster) it is hard to see how an all-out nuclear war could start. Thus, Herman Kahn argued that while crisis instability could be troublesome, "I have put this possibility low on the list of possible cause of war . . . because of the belief that as long as decision makers are consciously in control of events, they are very much more likely to draw back from pressing buttons and accept any resulting risks, than to do something which would make war inevitable—particularly, if this war were to occur at a time and under circumstances not of their choosing." But as Kahn recognizes, a great deal rides on the proviso that "decision makers are consciously in control of events." Herman Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," *Dædalus* 89 (Fall 1960): 760.

[19] Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, 187–203.

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The fact that the limited response would not automatically lead to all-out war means that the state can rationally carry it out under some circumstances, and that the threat to do so can be credible; the fact that the outcome could be mutual suicide means that the pressure generated is considerable. During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, both sides feared that the confrontation, although managed extremely carefully, could escalate to nuclear war. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy's sense of urgency toward the end of the crisis was "based on fear, not of Krushchev's intention, but human error, of something going terribly wrong down the line."[20] Indeed, the incident that convinced the president that the situation was too dangerous to be permitted to continue was the shooting down of the U-2 over Cuba, which we now know actually represented an instance of these mechanisms because it was carried out by a local Soviet military officer against the wishes of Moscow.[21]

There are two implications for arms control. First, crisis stability need not leave allies dangerously exposed to threats. The fact that nuclear war could grow out of a conventional one means that even if the Soviets believed that they could win the latter, they could be deterred by the possibility of the former, whose occurrence would not depend on the vulnerability of their forces. Second, effective counterforce targeting is not necessary for deterrence. Arms controllers can argue for the virtues of mutual invulnerability without arguing against an effective military policy; the second arms control postulate is not invalidated by the state's need to protect its allies.

Importance of Doctrine

But if the need for extended deterrence need not disturb arms control, military doctrine can. The applicability of the fundamental arms control postulate is questionable if American leaders believe that in order to be secure, the United States must be able to insure that the adversary could not gain a military lead over the United States in any kind of limited warfare. It can be argued that, even if unfortunate, deterrence indeed does impose such a requirement: during the cold war many people claimed that if the United States were not able to match Soviet military power at all levels, the Soviet Union could be tempted to start a limited war. The stability-instability paradox would hold escalation in check; advantage at lower levels of violence could be turned into meaningful victory in war or coercion in peacetime. This view of military affairs is heavily zero-sum. Soviet and American security would be incompatible because only one side could have military superiority and only that side could be secure.

[20] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 529. For more extended discussion of these fears and why they were well grounded, see Jervis, *Implications of the Nuclear Revolution*, 82–95.

[21] Richard Bernstein, "Meeting Sheds New Light on Cuban Missile Crisis," *New York Times*, 14 October 1987.

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At the highest levels of violence, strong counterforce doctrines similarly conflict with the possibility, if not the desirability, of crisis stability. As long as both sides believe that all-out war would result in mutual devastation, first-strike incentives are negligible and crisis stability is relatively easy to attain. This is not true, however, if decision makers believe that there are real advantages to be gained by destroying more of the adversary's strategic forces than the state is losing. Because of multiple warheads, and, even more, because of the vulnerability of command and control facilities, a first strike will almost surely be advantageous in purely counterforce terms. A state that is preoccupied with counting surviving warheads, especially those with counterforce capability, will have significant incentives to strike first. While these incentives would not likely be high enough to be a menace in times of calm, they could be sufficient to create instability in periods of heightened tension and perceived likelihood of war. Theoretically, this need not be true, even if both sides adopted counterforce targeting. In principle, weapons and command systems could be so invulnerable that attacking would use up more warheads than it would destroy. But it appears that while the vulnerability of command and control systems can be reduced, it cannot be eliminated. In practice, then, it is probably true that the only thing worse than starting a counterforce war would be having to fight one after receiving the first blow.

To the extent that either or both sides believe that wars are only—or even are best—deterred by having a counterforce capability superior to that of the adversary, arms control is pointless or even dangerous. A status quo power with extensive commitments could seek crisis stability only if it had the ability to defend its allies on the nonnuclear level. But crisis stability itself would be hard to achieve because of the offensive advantage in a counterforce war. By contrast, if what deters is the risk of escalation and the threat that leaves something to chance, then both arms control postulates have a great deal of validity.

This perspective also reveals the limits of arms control. While both sides have an interest in eliminating extreme crisis instability, they need to see that there is some chance that events could get out of control once violence is employed because this is the main generator of caution and the primary means of exerting pressure on the other side. Given the complexity of large-scale military organizations and the unpredictability of human affairs, it is doubtful that arms control could succeed too well and produce arrangements that would drive the danger of undesired escalation close to zero. Furthermore, decision makers would probably ensure that this does not happen. That is, if crisis stability seemed to greatly reduce risks, it would permit, if not require, statesmen to take bolder actions during a crisis in order to produce the desired level of danger.[22] Similarly, if decision makers believed confrontations were quite safe, they would feel freer

[22] For further discussion, see Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, 96; and Barry Nalebuff, "Brinkmanship and Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 9 (Spring 1986): 19–30.

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to provoke them (that is, to challenge the adversary's important interests). If crisis management were seen as easy, there would be less pressure on leaders to try to prevent crises from arising in the first place. (It is striking that we have gone more than a quarter of a century since the last major superpower crisis—this is longer than the main rivals stayed at peace in most of the prenuclear era.) If security is linked in part to the danger of inadvertent war, then too much stability could make the world safe for coercion and violence. Successful arms control is, then, at a certain distant point, self-limiting.

Unless and until this point is reached, however, the fundamental and secondary arms control postulates are compatible with the role of force and threats with the nuclear age. But this does not mean that they meet the greatest dangers of war. The focus on vulnerability and first-strike incentives is excessively mechanistic. States start wars for political objectives, not because they see an opportunity or fear that the other side does. Indeed, it is hard to find even a single war that was inadvertent in the sense that, immediately after it started, both sides would have preferred to return to peace on the basis of the status quo ante. Of course the question is not one of either/or. Crisis instability can interact with political conflict; arms controllers never suggested that the former in the absence of the latter would yield war. They did not worry that British forces were vulnerable to an American, or even to a French, attack; but by concentrating on the dangers of offensive advantages and assuming rather than examining the political context, they may have both exaggerated the danger of crisis instability and generated excessive hope that technical arms control could bring peace, if not cooperation. There is much validity to the old Soviet criticism of American arms control as preoccupied with the military causes of war at the expense of considering the broader relations between the two countries. If relations remain extremely bad, war can occur even if strategic weapons are not vulnerable; if relations greatly improve, vulnerabilities will not be a major source of danger.

Wars are caused predominantly by conflicts of political interests. Clashing security requirements are not the only and, perhaps, not the most important sources of such conflicts. Incompatible desires for territory and dominance, hostile nationalisms and other ideologies, and assorted calculations that fighting can be of benefit are common causes of wars that lie beyond the ameliorative reach of arms control. As I noted earlier, crisis instability is an extreme and fast-acting example of the security dilemma. When the offense is dominant, states cannot make themselves secure without menacing—or even attacking—the adversary. But arms control theorists did not build on this insight and raise the question of whether American military and foreign policy was unnecessarily decreasing Soviet security and heightening Soviet-American conflict, probably because they shared the prevailing belief that the Soviet Union was driven more by the desire to expand than by the fear that the West would attack it. Concentrating on the danger of preemption and immediate desperation, arms control paid less attention to a preventive war which could be produced by the perception that the other side is steadily eroding the state's security.

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The standard formula for crisis stability focuses on the size of the gap between the payoffs for striking first and for striking second. But this neglects the expected evaluation of a world in which war does not occur, which is irrelevant only when war is judged to be completely certain. As long as the state believes that there is a chance that war can be avoided, its decisions will be strongly influenced by how well it thinks it will do if peace is maintained. Thus, a state which is satisfied with the status quo and is optimistic about its future prospects will seek to preserve the peace and may refrain from striking even in the face of crisis instability. By contrast, a state which is highly dissatisfied and/or which believes that its position is likely to deteriorate badly if current trends continue can rationally strike even when the offense has only a slight advantage.[23] Furthermore, one side's misguided military policy can contribute to the other's sense of threat and belief that its future fate is bleak unless it fights. While the fundamental and second arms control postulates still apply, the focus on military instability is too narrow, if not misleading.

When the costs of war are enormous, it is hard to see how one can start unless one or both sides believe that war is inevitable and that striking first is preferable to striking second. The theory that underlies most American arms control thinking then has a large measure of validity. But it excludes the broad political considerations which usually play such a large role in decisions to fight. Both the danger of aggression and the possibility of long-run spirals of hostility and fear have been more potent causes of war than has crisis instability.

Arms Control after the Cold War

How relevant are the principles of Soviet-American arms control in the post-cold war and post-Soviet era? Definitive answers are not possible, but I think it is sensible to ask whether the security dilemma in general and crisis instability in particular are likely to cause future wars.

Some might argue that with the end of the cold war the danger of armed conflict throughout the globe has greatly decreased. This conclusion follows from the commonly held view that the Soviet-American rivalry helped spread international violence. I expect that, however, the cold war dampened conflicts in the Third World more than it created them.[24] Of course, even if this is correct, it does not automatically follow that Third World security will decrease. Perhaps the United States and Western Europe will act to prevent wars even in areas outside of their vital interests. But unless this can be counted on, the Third World countries will have to worry more about their own security, and the chance for

[23] Under these circumstances, leaders may also exaggerate the chances that war will bring victory. See Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

[24] For a further discussion, see Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" *International Security* 16 (Winter 1991–1992).

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wars among them will increase. Because the security dilemma and crisis instability can exacerbate if not create conflicts, potential enemies will have an interest in developing arms control arrangements.

The recent nonproliferation agreement between Argentina and Brazil, designed primarily to reassure each of these rivals that the other is not getting ahead of it, shows the relevance of traditional arms control and may well be replicated in other regions or on other military issues. India and Pakistan, for example, may give at least serious consideration to such an agreement. The end of the cold war increases the reasons for them to do so. Now that India can no longer count on support from Russia and Pakistan's importance to the United States has declined, these countries are likely to worry more about each other (and India, presumably, will have to worry more about China also). But this very fear and the realization that there is an increased chance of war may lead them to give greater consideration to the possibility of gaining mutual security through arms control and confidence-building measures.

The United States and the European Community could play useful roles by providing information to both sides. They can be "honest brokers" of data, provide satellite photography if not more sensitive sources of intelligence, and facilitate mutual inspections. They could also help interpret each side's moves to the other and convey reassurances. This help would not require pledges to provide assistance in case of armed attack and so would be compatible with the European or American desire to avoid deep entanglements in third countries' disputes. Even this restricted role, however, could be powerful because the costs to a country of lying to the developed countries would be greater than that of deceiving their neighbors. The gains of tricking a rival could well outweigh the costs since the advantage produced could be the lasting elimination of the rival. But also lasting would be the memory of the developed states that the regional power manipulated them. Future assistance and support would thus be endangered.

I suspect that the role of arms control within Western Europe will be relatively slight because these countries have few reasons to fight and many to stay at peace.[25] The danger of conflict is much greater in the Eastern half of the continent. Here the question is not whether there are sufficient sources of friction to produce bloodshed but, rather, whether they are of the kind that are amenable to arms control: are the states driven by fear and the desire for security or by extreme dissatisfaction with the status quo and hopes for expansion? The prevalence of ethnic and territorial disputes, as well as the possibility of the formation of regimes that are unstable, highly nationalistic, and militaristic, means that the latter possibility cannot be dismissed. But neither can the former, especially as long as domestic regimes remain relatively moderate. Indeed, a benign international environment and the absence of major conflicts with neighbors may be

[25] See ibid. and the literature cited therein.

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necessary conditions for the survival of such regimes. They therefore have a stake in maintaining tolerable relations in the region. Arms control agreements may then be more important in facilitating the development of tolerable relations within Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union than in preventing the outbreak of war should relations become bad.

Additional problems are created by the fact that these potential conflicts are set in a multipolar context. In the cold war each superpower knew that only the other could threaten its vital interests. But each country in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union could be faced by a hostile coalition or could hope to be part of a large coalition itself, one which could defend it or join in attacking another state. Arms control is then made more difficult, or at least more complex. Even if the defense has significant advantages over the offense, crisis stability is not ensured by each country having an army roughly as big as any other because a coalition could dominate any single state. There is, however, a hopeful side: states are almost certain to realize that they cannot guarantee their security through unilateral military policies. During the cold war it was possible for the United States and Soviet leaders to believe that their interests were best provided for by essentially unilateral behavior. It took fifteen years for them to learn that this approach was not wise. The countries of the former Warsaw Pact not only have the advantage of the past thirty years of arms control; they also cannot hope to make themselves secure without paying heed to the security needs of others or asking themselves how their policies are likely to impinge on many others. Of course, this guarantees neither that arms control is an appropriate response nor that, even if it is, it will be accepted. Traditional balance of power policies, after all, thrived in a multipolar world that had little place for general agreements for mutual security.

If states do not want to return to this world, one challenge will be to develop a way of building security among countries that could form multiple coalitions. Here, too, there is an obvious possible role for the United States and the European Community. But it is questionable whether merely providing information and reassurances would be sufficient. In principle, these "great powers" could provide security guarantees, promising to come to the aid of any country that was the victim of unprovoked aggression. But the political objections to such arrangements are obvious, and it would be foolish for the countries in potential conflict to neglect the need to develop arrangements that would dampen the security dilemma.

It is unlikely that such arrangements can be as narrowly military as were the arms control measures of the cold war. As long as many states fear the formation of large hostile coalitions, it will be extremely difficult to establish a size for each state's armed forces which will give many of them a sense of security and reduce the level of potential or inadvertent menace. But it still may be possible to increase the degree of crisis stability if the states of the former Warsaw Pact can agree to configure their armies and defense postures in ways that could reduce the incentives to strike first.

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But probably more important than typical arms control would be political arrangements that would seek to reduce conflicts, give states reason to expect support in the face of unprovoked threats, and encourage them to define their interests to be compatible with those of their neighbors. While some of the potential causes of war are likely to lie within the military arena, there is little reason to believe that they will be the most potent ones. Measures can be taken to ameliorate the security dilemma, but they must be pursued as an adjunct to, not a substitute for, ways of dealing with the sources of conflict and methods for managing disputes.[26]*

[26] Although it focuses on Soviet-American relations, very useful in this regard is Alexander George, ed., *Avoiding War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).

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The 1992 Republican "Tent": No Blacks Walked In

LOUIS BOLCE
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During the spring of 1990 there was considerable speculation among journalists and political commentators that George Bush might attract unprecedented numbers of black voters to his Republican presidential candidacy in the 1992 election. Bush's approval rating of 56 percent among blacks in March 1990—the highest for a Republican since Dwight Eisenhower—led Republican pollster (and later Bush-Quayle campaign chairman) Robert Teeter to suggest that Republicans might double their share of the African-American vote to about 20 percent.[1]

Twenty percent was the threshold that GOP strategists, including the then National Chairman Lee Atwater, believed would establish Republican dominance in American politics—not only in presidential elections but at the congressional level as well. To become a majority party, Atwater argued, Republicans had to attract just a fifth of black voters—the most loyal component of the Democratic coalition—into what he called the Republican "big tent" and the "G.O.P. Rainbow."[2]

[1] Fred Barnes, "Black Backing," *New Republic*, 28 May 1990, 11-13; Tom Wicker, "Bush and the Blacks," *New York Times*, 16 April 1990; Jessica Lee, "GOP Under Bush Attracts New Look from Black Voters," *USA Today*, 18 June 1990.

[2] Alan Hertzke, "Populist Mobilization and Strategic Party Assimilation: The Lessons of Jackson and Robertson" (Unpublished ms., University of Oklahoma, Spring 1989); Fred Barnes, "Party of Lincoln," *New Republic*, 20 March 1989, 10-12; Barnes, "Black Backing"; Lee Atwater "Toward A G.O.P. Rainbow," *New York Times*, 26 March 1989.

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In 1988 George Bush had won 10 percent of the black vote—the same level of support that Republican presidential candidates had averaged over the six presidential elections since 1964. Republican candidates averaged 58 percent of the white vote since Johnson-Goldwater, ranging from 47 to 68 percent; whites gave Bush 58 percent of their votes in 1988. While Republicans made significant inroads into core Democratic constituencies such as white Catholics, blue collar workers, and white southerners, black voters had become more loyal to the Democrats.

The possibility of a Republican 20 percent solution led us to analyze the extensive exit poll sample of black voters surveyed by ABC News in the 1988 presidential election to assess its prospects.[3] The study focused on those segments of the black electorate that conventional wisdom suggested might be open to a Republican message—higher socioeconomic status blacks, those who were politically and culturally conservative, and entrepreneurs.

There was precious little in the 1988 election data that pointed to "any segment of the black community that could be successfully mined for Republican votes."[4] Bush did garner majorities among some black groups—the tiny fraction (6 percent) who were either self-identified Republicans, among whom he beat Michael Dukakis 74 to 24 percent, or those who were both politically conservative and wealthy or elderly (both less than 2 percent of all blacks). Bush beat Dukakis 66 to 34 percent among black conservatives making $50,000 or more a year and 56 to 44 percent among black conservatives over age 60. Bush did take 29 percent of blacks who called themselves conservative (18 percent of blacks), but no other meaningful social category of blacks gave Bush 20 percent of its vote. Particularly telling was the invariantly low levels of Republican party identification among blacks—6 percent in the 1988 and 1984 elections.[5]

The ABC News exit poll data graphically demonstrated that for blacks race was *the* variable explaining their vote, with demographics, socioeconomic status, and attitudes on issues and candidate qualities having at best marginal effects. With a handful of minor exceptions, African Americans overwhelmingly voted Democratic both for president and for Congress.

Bush's relatively high approval ratings among blacks eighteen months (and nearly three years) into his administration did not appear likely to translate into higher levels of black support in the 1992 election, since approval ratings a year before a presidential election had been unreliable predictors of voting behavior in the past; there was no reason to believe that George Bush represented a departure.

Nonetheless, some Republican optimism regarding inroads among African Americans seemed justified as the 1992 primary election approached; in late

[3] Louis Bolce, Gerald De Maio, and Douglas Muzzio, "Blacks and the Republican Party: The 20 Percent Solution," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 (Spring 1992): 63–79.

[4] Ibid., 77.

[5] In July 1991, 10 percent of blacks called themselves Republican. *New York Times*, 14 July 1991.

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October 1991, 43 percent of blacks nationally approved Bush's job performance. Though down 34 points from the height of Bush's black popularity in the aftermath of the Gulf War in March 1991, Bush's approval among blacks was more than double the highest levels attained by Ronald Reagan.[6] The nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court as well as Bush's signing the 1992 Civil Rights Act can be viewed as attempts to secure a larger share of the black vote (or as attempts to reassure his followers that he and they were not racists).

In the 1992 presidential and congressional elections was there an erosion of the black Democratic monolith? Did the existence of a substantial and highly visible third party candidate siphon off potential black support from George Bush (or Bill Clinton)? Did the absence of Perot candidates in House and Senate races affect the distribution of black and white voters at the congressional level? What impact did socioeconomic status, ideology, partisanship, economic perceptions, issues, and candidate qualities have in the voting decisions of blacks and whites? Which whites walked out of the Republican tent in 1992?

The Data

On 3 November 1992, George Bush received 10 percent of the black vote—exactly what he had received four years earlier—according to exit polls conducted by Voter Research and Surveys (VRS), the consortium established by ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC after the 1988 presidential elections. VRS conducted a national exit poll of 15,490 voters leaving 300 polling places around the nation on election day; it also conducted 50 individual state polls with samples ranging from 459 in South Dakota to 2,268 in California. The national black sample was 1,539; the national white sample, 13,031. The sample sizes for the different attitudinal, demographic, and socioeconomic indicators vary, because respondents could omit answers on any individual question.

Exit polls have several qualities that make them valuable. One is their large sample size. The 1992 VRS exit polls, like those by ABC in 1988, permit extensive subgroup analysis about segments of the black community that standard data sets and pooled samples do not allow—for example, upper middle income (with annual incomes between $50,000 and $75,000) black conservatives. VRS's 1992 black sample is as large as the National Opinion Research Center's and Center for Political Studies' entire national samples.

Another advantage of exit polls is the immediacy of the survey to actual voting. Exit polls query real voters, thus eliminating response bias, particularly the recall problem, in which respondents polled at some remove from election day report their electoral behavior with some inaccuracy. For instance, 70 percent of respon-

[6] ABC News/*Washington Post* poll, 24–29 October 1991, Jeffrey Alderman, ABC director of polling, personal communication; Everett Carll Ladd, *The Ladd Report*, 4th ed., vol. 1 (New York: Norton, 1991), 13.

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dents in the 1988 Center for Political Studies (CPS) National Election Study said that they had voted in the presidential election that year, when in fact the turnout had been 51.4 percent.[7] Still another benefit of VRS data is that the network consortium surveys representative state samples,[8] thus permitting state level analysis, such as the distribution of white and black Perot voters in the New York U.S. Senate race.

1992: Blacks Remain in Democratic Camp and Whites Pull Up Republican Stakes

The 1992 story was much the same as 1988; the 1992 black presidential vote was almost entirely Democratic. Demographic, socioeconomic, residential, attitudinal, and behavioral factors were only loosely related to black partisanship and voting behavior. And this was true not only at the presidential level but was also reflected in the black vote for U.S. senators and representatives and governors. Blacks gave 87 percent of their votes to Democratic Senate candidates, 89 percent to Democratic House candidates, and 92 percent to Democratic gubernatorial candidates. In 1992, race was once again *the* predictor of the black vote. Whites were far more discriminating, giving a 54 to 46 percent margin to Democrats running for governor, a 51 to 49 edge to Democratic Senate candidates, and evenly splitting their House vote.

The presidential vote of whites is structured by ideology, partisanship, socioeconomic status, and issues, but this is rarely the case for blacks (see Tables 1 and 2). Republican party affiliation is the only characteristic that translates into substantial black support for Bush and other Republican candidates. But even here the association is far weaker than for white voters. While the percentage of black self-described Republicans increased slightly from 6 percent in 1988 to 8 percent four years later, black Republicans gave Bush only 55 percent of their vote—13 percent less than their vote for Republican House candidates and 19 points less than they gave Bush in 1988. By contrast, 73 percent of white Republicans went for Bush in 1992, 17 percent voted for Ross Perot, and 10 percent for Bill Clinton. Nevertheless, Bush's white support tumbled even farther from four years earlier—19 points—and with profound consequences, since whites cast 87 percent of all votes for president.

Even among self-described conservative blacks Bush fared poorly. From this group, which constituted 18 percent of all black voters in both the 1988 and 1992 elections, Bush received only 29 percent of the vote in 1988 and 26 percent

[7] Michael M. Gant and Norman Luttbeg, *American Electoral Behavior* (Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1991), 84–86; Brian Silver, Barbara A. Anderson, and Paul Abramson, "Who Overreports Voting," *American Political Science Review* 80 (June 1986): 613–624; Stanley Presser, "Can Changes in Context Reduce Vote Overreporting in Surveys?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54 (Winter 1990): 586–593.

[8] Herber Asher, *Polling and the Public* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), 99.

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TABLE 1

1992 Presidential Vote by Race
By Income, Education, Employment Status, Ideology, Party ID

	Bush		*Clinton*		*Perot*	
	Black	*White*	*Black*	*White*	*Black*	*White*
Total:	*10%*	*40%*	*83%*	*39%*	*7%*	*21%*
Income						
<$15,000	4%	27%	92%	52%	4%	21%
$15–29,999	10	38	83	40	7	22
$30–49,999	11	41	80	37	9	22
$50–75,000	11	43	81	37	8	20
>$75,000	24	50	67	34	9	16
Education						
<High school	5	31	91	48	4	21
High school grad	8	38	84	50	8	22
Some college	11	40	83	37	6	23
College grad	7	44	87	35	6	21
Post grad	15	37	79	48	5	15
Employment						
Full time	11	41	82	36	8	23
Part time	15	36	85	42	0	23
Homemaker	17	47	78	33	5	20
Retired	4	38	90	48	6	14
Unemployed	6	29	87	48	6	24
Ideology						
Liberal	8	14	85	66	7	20
Moderate	5	34	87	44	8	23
Conservative	26	67	69	15	5	19
Party ID						
Democrat	5	11	92	74	4	15
Republican	54	73	29	10	17	17
Independent	15	37	67	36	19	32

in 1992. Bush did not retain his 1988 black base; among blacks who said that they had voted for Bush in 1988 (20 percent of 1992 black voters), nearly half (49 percent) voted for Clinton in 1992. Another 13 percent voted for Perot. Only 38 percent remained with the president. By contrast, three in five whites who said that they had voted for Bush in 1988 (57 percent of 1992 white voters) stuck with the president; the rest split their votes between Clinton and Perot.

Economic well-being clearly influenced the white vote choice; it was far less salient for blacks. Bush received increasing pluralities of whites, as income rose from $30,000 a year; Clinton got pluralities of those making less than $15,000 and between $15,000 and $30,000 annually, doing best among the least well off.

If there is any segment of the black electorate with whom a Republican strategy might have had a chance of success, conventional wisdom suggests that it was with higher socioeconomic status blacks. High status blacks should have been

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TABLE 2

Issues that "Mattered Most" by Race by Presidential Vote, 1992

		Blacks				*Whites*		
		Bush	*Clinton*	*Perot*		*Bush*	*Clinton*	*Perot*
Economy/jobs	(48%)	5%	88%	6%	(42%)	27%	48%	26%
Health care	(27)	5	94	2	(18)	21	64	16
Education	(22)	7	90	3	(12)	27	55	18
Family values	(14)	19	78	4	(15)	70	18	12
U.S. deficit	(12)	9	72	19	(23)	28	33	39
Taxes	(12)	21	73	6	(15)	60	22	18
Abortion	(5)	33	59	8	(13)	57	35	8
Environment	(3)	20	80	0	(6)	14	72	14
Foreign policy	(2)	36	48	16	(9)	88	8	5

Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages of those assessing the issue as mattering most to their vote.

substantially more likely than lower status blacks to have identified as conservative and Republican and to support Republican candidates, because the GOP is widely seen as favoring economic and social policies more consistent with the class interests of more affluent and conservative voters. The reality appears to be otherwise in 1992 as it was in 1988. More than four-fifths of black voters in all income categories, except those earning in excess of $75,000 a year, voted for Clinton. And among the highest income blacks, Clinton got two-thirds of their vote, with Bush nearly a quarter. Perot did not receive double digit support among any black income group.

High income (those making over $75,000 a year) black Republicans (only one percent of blacks surveyed) went for Bush 53 to 21 percent over Clinton, with Perot getting 26 percent of that vote. Meanwhile, black conservatives (8 percent of blacks) while giving Bush 32 percent of their vote, gave Clinton nearly twice as much—58 percent. Like 1988, no other meaningful subgroups of the black electorate gave Bush 20 percent of their vote (see Table 1). Upper middle class ($50,000 to $75,000) black conservatives were more than four times more likely to vote for Clinton than Bush—74 to 17 percent. By contrast, upper middle income white conservatives went for Bush with a 60 to 25 percent margin over his Democratic opponent. In sum, upscale blacks overwhelming supported Clinton, while their white counterparts similarly backed George Bush.

Education and employment status influence white voting patterns but, again, appear almost inconsequential for blacks (see Table 1). Clinton won pluralities of the less and most educated whites, while Bush garnered pluralities of college attendees and graduates. At least four in five blacks at all education levels voted for Clinton. Bush won pluralities of white full-time workers and homemakers, while Clinton captured pluralities among white part-time workers, retirees, and the unemployed. Blacks gave Clinton a minimum of four-fifths of their votes

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irrespective of employment status. Indeed, Bush captured nearly three times the percentage of unemployed white voters than black voters who worked full time.

The Democratic bias of African-American voters and their differences with white voters are further demonstrated by examining retrospective voting patterns on economic matters. Voters cast their ballots retrospectively when they base their vote choice on their evaluation of past performance of the party/candidate controlling/occupying the White House. Retrospective voting occurs when those who have benefited economically vote for the incumbent party/president, while those who have suffered vote for the challenger. It is the most common form of issue voting.[9] As in 1988, this expectation is borne out by white voters in 1992 but only marginally by blacks. VRS asked those leaving the polls whether they were better off financially than four years earlier, worse off, or about as well off. A third of whites said that they were worse off; 57 percent of those went for Clinton, 28 percent for Perot, and only 16 percent for Bush. Among the quarter of whites who said that they were better off, Bush won 64 percent of their vote, Clinton 21 percent, and Perot 15 percent. Whites whose financial situation was unchanged marginally went for Bush (44 percent compared to 37 percent for Clinton and 19 percent for Perot). For whites, at least, the guiding motto of the Clinton campaign – "It's the economy, stupid" – proved in harmony with retrospective voting.

Blacks, no matter what their financial situation compared to 1988, cast more than two-thirds of their votes for Clinton. Those whose financial situation deteriorated did give Clinton his highest share (89 percent) and Bush his lowest (5 percent). But the 14 percent who were financially better off gave Clinton 69 percent, Bush just 26 percent, and Perot 5 percent. The 37 percent who saw no change in their financial situation went 79 percent for Clinton, 13 percent for Bush, and 8 percent for Perot.

Voter perception of the state of the economy as being in poor shape worked in Clinton's favor among white and black voters, but, again, whites displayed far more variability. The nearly one-third (32 percent) of whites who thought that the state of the economy was poor gave Clinton 60 percent of their vote, while the near majority (48 percent) of blacks who held that view gave Clinton an overwhelming 91 percent. Whites who saw the economy as "not good" (48 percent) gave Clinton and Bush equal percentages of their vote (39 percent with Perot getting 22 percent). African Americans again overwhelmingly supported Clinton. Four-in-five (81 percent) of whites who saw the economy as "good"/"excellent" (20 percent of all white voters) went for Bush while the 8 percent of blacks who evaluated the economy positively still gave Clinton 53 percent of their votes.

Issues were far less meaningful as determinants of voting for blacks than for whites. VRS gave respondents nine choices of issues that "mattered most in

[9] Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

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deciding how you voted" (see Table 2). Among white voters, issues made a difference in their presidential choice. Whites choosing economy/jobs, health care, the environment, and education gave majorities or pluralities to Clinton; those citing the deficit gave Perot a plurality; and those naming taxes, foreign policy, and family values gave Bush majorities. Blacks, on the other hand, gave Bill Clinton a majority, irrespective of what issue was important in deciding their vote. The lone exception was foreign policy where the 2 percent citing it gave him a near majority.

Abortion, though not a central concern of most voters, provides further evidence that stands on issues make little difference on black presidential voting but clearly structure white vote choice. Blacks, irrespective of their position on VRS's 4-point abortion scale, voted overwhelmingly for Bill Clinton: 85 percent who thought abortion should always be illegal voted for the Democratic candidate; 86 percent of blacks who believed that abortion should always be legal voted for Clinton. White voters were far more sensitive to the candidates' abortion stands as it related to their own positions on abortion. They divided along the "hard"/"easy" lines defined by social scientists.[10] Pro-choice voters (who want abortions "always" or "mostly" legal) went for Clinton (49 percent, with Bush at 29 and Perot at 22 percent). Those who wished to outlaw or at least substantially restrict abortion (making abortion "mostly" or "always" illegal) supported Bush (61 percent with 21 percent for Clinton, and 18 percent for Perot).

As with issues, the qualities of the candidates were far more influential with white voters than among the black electorate (see Table 3). Blacks gave majorities of their votes to Clinton irrespective of the candidate qualities that "mattered most" in deciding their vote. The only qualities that did not produce majorities that were overwhelming for Clinton were among the small proportions for whom "hav[ing] the right experience," "would have good judgment in a crisis," and, to a lesser degree, being "honest and trustworthy" mattered. White voters were again far more discriminating. Bush got overwhelming majorities among those who felt that experience, crisis judgment, and honesty were important, as well as a large plurality among those who believe that "ha[ving] strong convictions" was important. Clinton garnered majority support from whites who valued "car[ing] about people like me," "bring[ing] about needed change," "hav[ing] the best plan for the country," and "choice of vice president."

Blacks voted as they had since 1964—overwhelmingly Democratic. There was no 20 percent solution in 1992. But not getting the votes of one-in-five African Americans did not cost George Bush the presidency; what did was the defection of white voters from the president.

[10] Donald Granberg, "Pro-life or Reflection of Conservative Ideology? Analysis of Opposition to Legalized Abortion," *Sociology and Social Research* 52 (April 1978): 414–425; Louis Bolce, "Abortion and Presidential Elections: The Impact of Public Perceptions of Party and Candidate Positions," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28 (Fall 1988): 815–829.

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TABLE 3

Candidate Qualities that "Mattered Most" by Race by Presidential Vote, 1992

	Blacks				*Whites*			
		Bush	*Clinton*	*Perot*		*Bush*	*Clinton*	*Perot*
Bring change	(50%)	2%	92%	6%	(35%)	5%	64%	31%
Best plan	(26)	5	90	6	(24)	18	54	28
Cares about me	(22)	8	88	4	(12)	11	59	30
My party candidate	(9)	11	89	0	(5)	48	50	2
Strong convictions	(9)	13	77	13	(15)	47	24	30
Honest/trustworthy	(8)	22	58	20	(15)	65	11	24
Right experience	(7)	45	52	3	(20)	85	5	10
VP choice	(6)	5	92	2	(8)	14	84	2
Handling crises	(5)	47	53	0	(17)	89	7	4

Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages of those assessing the candidate quality mattering most to their vote.

Many whites walked out of the Republican tent in 1992. George Bush's share of the white vote declined from 58 percent in 1988 to 41 percent four years later. These defectors included members of groups that had become mainstays of the Republican presidential coalition for the last quarter century. Perhaps most striking, especially after the Houston nominating convention, which was widely seen as inordinately influenced by religious conservatives, was the erosion of white born-again Christian support for President Bush. In 1988, white born-again Christians comprised 14 percent of the white electorate, and George Bush won 81 percent of their vote. White born-agains made up an even larger percentage of the vote in 1992 (19 percent) and although they were still among Bush's most supportive groups at 62 percent, nearly one in four abandoned the president. Bill Clinton did slightly better than Dukakis by winning 23 percent, with Ross Perot capturing 15 percent.

In the 1980s, the movement of born-again Christians to the Republican party was widely discussed in both the popular and scholarly press. A number of academic studies examining the relationship between conservative Protestant denominationalism and partisanship cautioned against identifying evangelicals and fundamentalists with the Republican party.[11] The 1992 election results underscore the need to qualify the identification of religious conservatism with support for Republican candidates.

[11] Corwin Smidt, "Born-Again Politics: The Political Behavior of Evangelical Christians in the South and Non-South" in Tod A. Baker, Robert Steed, and Lawrence W. Moreland, eds., *Religion and Politics in the South* (New York: Praeger, 1983); Stuart Rothenberg and Frank Newport, *The Evangelical Voter* (Washington, DC: Free Congress Research & Education Foundation, 1984); Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, "Partisanship and Group Support Over Time" in Richard G. Niemi and Herbert W. Weisberg, eds., *Controversies in Voting Behavior*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993).

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Protestants, generally, defected from Bush's electoral coalition. In 1988, ABC found that "non-Catholic Christians" made up 56 percent of the white electorate, and Bush won 68 percent of them. In 1992, VRS categorized non-Catholic Christians into "Protestants" and "Other Christians," who comprised 44 and 13 percent, respectively, of the white vote. Bush won pluralities of 47 and 45 percent of these groups. Clinton was not the beneficiary of these non-Catholic Christian defectors, winning 34 percent of Protestants and 29 percent of other Christians, compared to Dukakis's 34 percent share of non-Catholic Christians in 1988. Perot captured 19 percent of white Protestants and 26 percent of the "other Christians." Perot's presence in the race gave these non-Catholic Christians a place to go and they went.

Catholics also moved away from Bush and the Republicans. In 1988 Bush and Dukakis split the white Catholic vote; in 1992 Clinton got 42 percent, while Bush got 37 percent, and Perot 22 percent. There has been debate among students of American electoral behavior over the drift of white Catholics in presidential contests. John Petrocik has argued that a decline in the Catholic contribution to the Democratic coalition can be traced to 1968, while Robert Axelrod sees the 1972 election as a turning point, as do Harold Stanley and Richard Niemi view the 1980 contest. Other scholars, such as Andrew Greeley and Henry Kenski, still view Catholics as disposed toward Democrats.[12] In 1992 white Catholics appear to have retained a loyalty to Democratic candidates, though not in the same proportions as elections of a generation ago.

President Bush's difficulties among the white electorate are underscored by several other groups that had been crucial to Republican electoral victories in the past: white independents, moderates, and conservatives. The pivotal independent vote—one-fourth of the white electorate in 1992—went to Clinton by a narrow margin (36 percent to 33 for Bush and 31 for Perot). In 1988 Bush won a clear majority (54 percent) of the independent white vote. Bush suffered among ideological moderates and conservatives as well. In 1988 Bush nearly split the white moderate vote with Dukakis winning 47 percent. In the three-candidate race in 1992, Clinton won a plurality with 44 percent to Bush's 34 percent. Ross Perot garnered more than a fifth of the white moderate vote. While white conservatives were among Bush's best groups (67 percent), he received more than four-fifths

[12] Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952–1968," *American Political Science Review* 66 (March 1972): 11–20; John R. Petrocik, *Party Coalitions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 90–97; Andrew M. Greeley, *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Andrew M. Greeley, "Catholics and Coalitions: Where Should They Go?" in S. M. Lipset, ed., *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978); Henry C. Kenski and William Lockwood, "The Catholic Vote from 1980–1986: Continuity or Change?" in Ted G. Jelen, ed., *Religion and Political Behavior in the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1989); Stanley and Niemi, "Partisanship and Group Support," 352–356; Martin Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952–1984* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

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four years earlier. Here again, Ross Perot was a factor, capturing one-fifth of the white conservative vote.

A major problem for Bush and the Republicans in the 1992 elections was the substantial decline in the proportion of whites who described themselves as conservatives. In 1988, the modal ideological group was conservative (46 percent); in 1992 most whites called themselves moderate (41 percent). White conservatives, a core of the Republican electoral base, declined by more than a third from 1988 (from 46 to 31 percent). The drop among self-identified conservatives is particularly noticeable among whites in various SES and partisan categories. In 1992, unlike four years earlier, ideology was not related to income, education, or employment status. In 1988, more than half of whites earning in excess of $50,000 annually called themselves conservative; four years later, only 30 percent did. There was also a precipitous (40 percent) decline among white college graduates adopting the conservative label. Since conservatives are more likely to vote Republican than moderates or liberals, the 14 percentage point drop (64 to 50 percent) of white Republicans who identified as conservative in 1992 added to the erosion of the white conservative base and meant that Bush had a smaller pool to attract supporters from than he had in 1988. This sharp decline among self-described white conservatives in 1992 may be partly attributed to the connotations the label "conservative" took on with the rhetoric heard at the Republican convention in Houston.[13]

First-time voters are clearly essential to any future alignment of the parties. One in ten voters was casting a first ballot in 1992. Ross Perot made an impact among white first-timers, capturing one quarter of their vote. Clinton managed a plurality, winning 41 percent to Bush's 34 percent. Black first-time voters (17 percent) reflected vote choices virtually identical to those who had voted before (82 versus 84 percent for Clinton). Among whites who had previously cast ballots, Bush and Clinton were virtually tied (40 versus 39 percent).

Blacks in House and Senate Elections

It is the congressional not the presidential level that Atwater had in mind in his 20 percent solution for a new Republican majority. In 1992 Republicans maintained their fourty-three seats in the Senate and added nine House seats. Nearly nine-tenths of blacks (89 percent) voted for Democratic House candidates. As at the presidential level, no social, economic, ideological, or issue dimension with the exception of party identification mattered for blacks. All of these factors influenced the white vote, which split 50-50 between Democrats and Republicans.

Black Republicans—though two-and-a-half times more likely to vote for Democratic House candidates than white Republicans—cast 68 percent of their votes

[13] John B. Judis, "The End of Conservativism," *New Republic*, 31 August 1992, 28–30; "The Wilderness Year," *New Republic*, 31 August 1992, 3; Joshua Muravchik, "Why the Democrats Finally Won," *Commentary*, January 1993, 17–22.

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for GOP House candidates. Black Democrats as well as independents and those who preferred "other" parties overwhelmingly supported Democratic House candidates: 96, 80, and 77 percent, respectively.

Economic factors were of virtually no consequence in the House voting of African-Americans. Blacks, irrespective of their perceptions of their own financial situations, the state of the national economy, and who had different employment statuses, voted for Democratic candidates. Regardless of whether they saw their financial situation as better, worse, or the same during the Bush presidency, African Americans voted Democratic by better than four-to-one. Full-time black workers were almost as likely to support a Democrat as the unemployed, 85 to 92 percent.

The white vote for House, as for president, was structured by economic considerations. Financial situation was clearly related to voting, with Republicans winning 69 percent of those who saw their finances improving under Bush, 53 percent of those whose situation remained the same, and 31 percent of those whose personal finances deteriorated. Republican House candidates carried white full-time workers and homemakers, while the Democrats scored among white part-time workers, the unemployed, retirees, and students. (White unemployed voters were over two-and one-half times more likely to support Republican candidates than black full-time workers: 39 to 15 percent.)

Every black income and education group gave Democrats four-fifths or more of their votes. Among whites, income was linearly related to voting; whites who earned $30,000 annually and above voted Republican in increasing proportions. Education was curvilinearly related to white congressional voting, with Democrats doing best among the least and most schooled. The impact of ideology on black House choices was minimal; even self-described conservatives went for Democrats by 3 to 1. Ideology clearly informed the white vote: 79 percent of liberals went Democratic; 75 percent of conservatives voted Republican; moderates voted marginally Democratic, 54 to 46 percent. The same racial patterns held for Senate contests.[14] Race is as important to black voting in congressional elections as it is for president. It is determinative for blacks; for whites, race is only one among many influences.

The Perot Factor

A pervasive question throughout the 1992 presidential election campaign was "Whom was Perot hurting?" VRS asked exit poll respondents, "If Ross Perot

[14] In the hotly contested Pennsylvania and New York Senate races, both Arlen Spector in Pennsylvania and Alphonse D'Amato in New York did substantially better among African Americans than did President Bush. D'Amato got 17 percent of New York's black voters while Bush got 10 percent; Spector got 30 percent, nearly four times Bush's level of black support (8 percent) in Pennsylvania. But D'Amato and Spector would have won (albeit by razor-thin margins) had they received the same proportion of the black vote as Bush did in their states.

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had not been on the ballot today, who would you have voted for?" White Perot voters would have divided evenly between Clinton and Bush, with 39 percent each, and Bush would have maintained his slim lead over Clinton among all white voters. Black Perot voters would have overwhelmingly gone for Clinton (58 to 16 percent), upping Clinton's share of the total black vote from 83 to 87 percent.

Not surprisingly, Perot's candidacy was particularly attractive to political independents and moderates. A plurality (39 percent) of white Perot voters described themselves as independents, as did one-third of black Perot supporters. White Perot supporters were marginally more Republican, while black Perot voters called themselves Democrats by two-to-one. Ideologically, majorities of both white and black Perot voters were moderates. However, white Perot voters were slightly more likely to call themselves conservative rather than liberal (27 to 21 percent); blacks were two-and-a-half times more likely to call themselves liberals.

At the congressional level, similar patterns hold. White Perot voters went marginally Republican in House contests, casting 52 percent of their ballots for Republicans and 48 percent for Democrats. Black Perot voters overwhelmingly voted for Democratic House candidates, 70 to 30 percent. The aggregate national Senate vote also shows white Perot voters giving Republicans a slight (51 to 49 percent) edge, while their black counterparts went strongly Democratic (64 to 36 percent). The Republican tilt among white Perot voters and the unremitting loyalty to Democrats by black Perot supporters is clearly seen in individual Senate races (those states which had significant black electorates). Majorities of white Perot supporters voted for Republican senatorial candidates in New York, Illinois, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, South Carolina, and in both California contests. In none of these states did the Republican garner a majority of black Perot supporters. Indeed, in all but Ohio, where black Perot voters gave Republican Michael DeWine 48 percent of their votes, blacks went for the Democratic candidate in landslide proportions. In Pennsylvania, both black and white Perot supporters split their votes between Arlen Spector and Lynn Yaekel. Only in Maryland did the Democratic candidate get lopsided majorities of both black and white Perot voters: Barbara Mikulski got 69 percent of black and 67 percent of white Perot voters against a black Republican opponent.

Since voting behavior in congressional elections can be used as a barometer of partisanship, the 1992 VRS election data indicate that below the presidential level white Perot voters were at least marginally Republican, while black Perot voters retained strong commitments to Democratic candidates.

No 20 Percent Solution (The Republicans Never Really Tried)

In our earlier study of blacks and the Republican party, we predicted that it was most "unlikely that the outcome of the 1992 election will turn on the number of black votes George Bush receives." We added that even "should Bush win

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one in five black voters, there is no reason to believe that such support will be extended to Republican Senate and House candidates and into state executive and legislative races."[15]

The 1992 election did not turn on the number of black votes George Bush received. It was decided by the huge defection of white voters to independent Ross Perot. In 1988, George Bush had garnered 58 percent of the white vote (87 percent of all voters) compared to 41 percent for Mike Dukakis. This was enough to give Bush a 7.5 million vote margin over Dukakis despite Dukakis's winning 88 percent of the black vote (8 percent of all voters). In 1992, George Bush's share of the white vote (again 87 percent of all voters) had plummeted to 41 percent with 38 percent for Bill Clinton. Indeed, Bush would have needed to win over 70 percent of all black voters in order to compensate for his loss of whites to achieve a national popular vote plurality. Tellingly, Bush needed to have increased his share of the total white vote by 6 percent (conservatively assuming that all of the gain came from Perot's white voters) to have beaten Clinton in the popular vote. Blacks (again 8 percent of voters) can be seen to have made the difference for Clinton in the popular vote; his 82 to 11 percent margin over Bush provided Clinton with a nearly six percentage point total edge over Bush. Clinton won the popular vote by five percentage points.

Since the president is not elected by the popular vote but by an electoral vote majority, what might have been the outcome had Bush attracted 20 percent of the black vote in key electoral vote states? Of the ten largest electoral vote states in 1992—California (54), New York (33), Texas (32), Florida (25), Pennsylvania (23), Illinois (22), Ohio (21), Michigan (18), New Jersey (15), and North Carolina (14)—Bush won Texas, Florida, and North Carolina with only 10 percent or less of the black vote.[16] Of the Clinton states, two—Ohio and New Jersey—would have moved into the Bush column had African Americans given as much as a fifth of their vote to the president. Had Bush received 17 percent of the black vote, rather than the 7 percent he actually garnered in Ohio, and had he gotten a 21 percent share of the black vote in New Jersey, instead of the 11 percent of black ballots that were actually cast for him, he would have captured those states' thirty-six electoral votes. In the remaining Clinton top ten states, Bush would have had to have won extraordinary shares of the black vote—45 percent in Michigan (he actually got 7 percent), 55 percent in Illinois (actually 5 percent), 92 percent in New York (actually 8 percent), an impossible 107 percent in Pennsylvania (actually 10 percent), and 133 percent in California (actually 9 percent).[17]

[15] Bolce et al., "Blacks and Republic Party," 78.

[16] Blacks made up 6 percent of the electorate in California, 10 percent in New York, 13 percent in Texas, 7 percent in Florida, 5 percent in Pennsylvania, 14 percent in Illinois, 10 percent in Ohio, 9 percent in Michigan, 10 percent in New Jersey, and 15 percent in North Carolina.

[17] These hypothetical "necessary for Bush to win" black vote shares somewhat overstate the Republican candidate's prospects, for it was assumed that all his increased black vote came exclusively from Clinton. The size of the black electorate and the black share of the electorate figures are drawn from the 1992 VRS presidential exit poll; the actual state votes used in the calculations are from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 November 1992, 3552.

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Two other Clinton states with large black electorates would have gone to Bush—Georgia (thirteen electoral votes, 20 percent black) and Louisiana (nine electoral votes, 27 percent black)—if Bush had gotten 11 percent rather than 9 percent in Georgia and 16 percent instead of 7 percent in Louisiana, for a total of 58 electoral votes. Had all four of these switches occurred, Bill Clinton would still have been elected president, albeit with a smaller, though still fairly comfortable, 312–226 (as opposed to a 370–168) majority.

Bush did worse, sometimes far worse, among black voters in 1992 than 1988 in eight of the ten largest electoral vote states. (In 1988 Bush won nine of these states, New York being the lone deviation.) The two exceptions were in Texas where he upped his share of the black vote from 6 to 10 percent and in Ohio where he went from 5 to 7 percent of the black vote. His decline in the other states ranged from a 23 to 10 percent drop in Florida and a 19 to 9 percent slide in California to one percentage point decreases in New York (9 to 8 percent) and in Michigan (8 to 7 percent).

But, again, Bush lost key electoral states in 1992 that he won four years earlier because whites deserted the Republican party; the voting behavior of the black electorate had nothing to do with Bush's change of fortune. In the six large states that Bush carried in 1988 but lost in 1992, Clinton's share of the white vote was virtually identical to Dukakis's four years earlier, deviating by only four percentage points in New Jersey, three in Ohio, and one point in the others. Bush's white support dropped substantially from 1988—20 points in California and Ohio, 19 points in Illinois and Michigan, 18 in New Jersey and 17 in Pennsylvania.

The 20 percent solution did not happen, in part because it was never tried and would not have worked since Bush's white base had so extensively eroded. The only serious Republican attempt to woo black voters was the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. Such lack of effort is quite understandable; it didn't require political seers to argue that "It is almost inconceivable that the Republican party would attempt to outbid the Democrats for the support of blacks since the G.O.P.'s central electoral strategy since 1964 has been to win over racially conservative Independents and Democrats."[18] Indeed, the central message of the 1992 Republican convention, particularly in the speech by Pat Buchanan, was that the Republican tent was an exclusive one. Milton Bins and Faye Anderson, the chairman and executive director of the Council of 100, National Organization of Black Republicans, contend that black Republicans and independents who were receptive to Bush's message before the convention subsequently tuned out the president and his message because they "were offended by the racism and bigotry personified by Pat Buchanan." They find hope in the fact that the president was able to hold 10 percent of the black vote despite a "stalled economy, the divisive and alienating rhetoric of the party's right wing

[18] Bolce et al., "Blacks and Republic Party," 78–79.

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and single issue groups and the electorate's overwhelming desire for change." They also see positive signs in the strong showing of black Republican challengers in a number of congressional races and the fact that black voters were in part responsible for Republican Senators Alphonse D'Amato of New York and Arlen Spector of Pennsylvania narrowly retaining their seats. The fact that Clinton received a smaller percentage of the black vote (82 percent) than did Dukakis in 1988 (86 percent), Mondale in 1984 (90 percent), Carter in 1980 (85 percent) and Carter in 1976 (83 percent) offers them some small hope. Nonetheless, it is not at all clear whether the Republican party is ready to abandon its strategy of "add[ing] to the base by subtracting," which Bins and Anderson decry.[19] It is equally unclear whether the Republican candidates "need" black voters at the presidential and congressional levels.*

[19] "Black Republicans and 'The Speech,'" *Washington Post*, 17 November 1992; see fn. 14 for a view that differs from Bins and Anderson.

* The data used in this analysis are from the 1992 Voter Research and Surveys exit polls and the 1988 ABC News exit polls. The authors wish to thank Jeffrey Alderman, director of polling at ABC News, and Gary Langer, senior polling analyst at ABC, for access to the VRS and ABC material, as well as Tom Halper for his insightful comments. Muzzio gratefully acknowledges the released time support of the School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Baruch College.

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Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa

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This article puts forward ideas on violence and leadership in Africa. It does not ask what causes violence in Africa and it does not systematically explore the consequences of violence, although consequences are discussed. Rather, an argument is made here that violence in Africa is a function of leaders trying to stay in power in systems where institutions are weak. Because the struggle for power takes place in a context where the resources most easily at hand to be mobilized are ethnic ones, conflict is often ethnic conflict. What differs from context to context are the amounts and kinds of resources available for competition and the structures through which people compete. It is the form of the struggle and the relative weight of factors that lead us to describe conflict as class or communal.[1]

In Africa it is easier for elites to organize around communal ties (ethnic/geographic) than it is to organize around class ties (income and occupational). That African societies remain easier to organize on communal rather than class bases is not a subject taken up here. The elements of an answer have to do with cultural and value systems, institutions, patterns of scarcity, growth, and conflict.[2]

[1] Henry Bienen and Michael Danielson, "Urban Political Development," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 289.

[2] These are all subjects that David Apter, among others, has had interesting things to say about. But I restrict myself here to commenting on leadership, violence, and in a limited way, change. David Apter, "Political Religion in New State" in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies in New States*

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African politics demonstrates a number of patterns that at first glance seem incongruous. In some countries an individual leader may stay in power for an extensive period, die or be removed, or sometimes die on removal, and then leadership change comes fast and furiously. Examples of leadership stability followed by frequent change include Ethiopia after Haile Selassie until the consolidation of power by Mengistu Haile Mariam; Chad after Ngarta Tombalbaye; Mauritania after Mokhtar Ouldaddah; Upper Volta-Burkina Faso after Sangoulé Lamizana. There are also examples of frequent leadership turnovers followed by a consolidation of power of a leader who stays for a long time. Examples are Togo until Gonassinghe Eyadema; Zaire until Sese Seko Mobutu; Somalia until Siad Barre; Sierra Leone until Siaka Stevens; Dahomey-Benin until Mathieu Kerekou.

Of course, some countries have had no especially durable leader since independence. Yakubu Gowon lasted nine years in Nigeria, so far the record; Marien Ngouabi has been the most durable leader in Congo-Brazzaville at eight years. As of mid-1993, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Gambia, Sao Tome, and Zimbabwe continue to have their first leader since independence.

Thus African states exhibit both rapid leadership turnover and remarkably durable leaders within one country.[3] Comparing African countries we see both stable systems of personal rule and highly unstable ones. If we consider the broader question of regime stability and not merely leadership change, we can find leaders who have been in power for a much longer time than leaders of most western countries; but they have ruled countries that are unstable by most measures other than leadership turnover at the highest level. Zaire is a clear example. Mobutu has been in power since 1965. During this time, Zaire has seen insurrections, invasions, and violence from below as well as state mandated violence against political opponents and targeted groups. Furthermore, Zaire illustrates that an African leader's maintenance in power may be over a narrow realm of people, territory, and processes or at least a realm narrower than society as a whole or the territory that the state ostensibly rules over. The ruler's writ in the African context may not carry all that far.

Uganda's Idi Amin had eight years in power but with a narrowing political base. He used more and more force to stay in power, relying increasingly on ethnic relationships inside the armed forces. He was willing to wreck the state's

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(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), 57–144; *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); *Choice and the Politics of Allocation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); *Ghana in Transition* (New York: Atheneum, 1963).

[3] An exploration of African patterns of leadership durability, which is part of a wider study of developing countries that employs both life table analysis and hazard models to evaluate patterns of risk, is Henry Bienen and Nicholas Van de Walle, "Of Time and Power in Africa," *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989): 19–34.

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civilian apparatus and his own military force to stay in power. The armed forces ceased to be an institution of the state and became a gang of thugs bound to the leader by ties of personal loyalty, communal association, and desire for plunder. Yet, Amin was able to stay in power, although he hardly governed, until he was displaced in 1979 by Tanzanian troops aiding Ugandan rebels.

Africa unfortunately provides examples of despotic leaders who were able to maintain themselves for fairly long times at the apex of power. But Africa has had no monopoly on despotism and the use of violence to coerce. What is striking about the African pattern compared to Latin American or Middle Eastern examples, where leaders and their coteries used large-scale force against counter elites or masses of their own population, is that the Idi Amins, Jean-Bedel Bokassas, Macias Nguemas, who between them ruled for thirty-one years, seemed to have no social or political agenda other than maintaining themselves in power and perhaps bolstering an ethnic group. Most African despots seem to be aberrant personalities with few social and economic goals other than self-enrichment, unlike Argentinian or Chilean generals, who have tortured and killed in the name of stability and anticommunism and even departicipation; unlike Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran, who acted in the name of Islamic fundamentalism; or Hafiz al-Assad who enforced "Hama rules" of destruction in Syria in the name of secularism, modernization, and antifundamentalism. This does not, perhaps, describe Mengistu in Ethiopia, and one might get a debate on the assertion if applied to Mobutu in Zaire.

Part of the explanation for African particularism is that social classes have been more weakly developed in Africa than in Asia or Latin America or the Middle East. Leaders have been less tied to social constituencies other than ethnic ones and thus have spoken less for classes or representatives of class interests. They have also been less constrained by economic formations. Institutions have been weak also. Even the armed forces (not to say parties) that have operated as categorical elites, that is elites of the state whose interests and actions cannot be deduced from those of classes, can be reduced to personal loyalty groups.[4] The armed forces' institutional character, special recruitment, autonomy, and socialization procedures can be undermined because they are so fragile. True, this is much more difficult to do in large countries than in smaller ones and in countries where social formations are more developed such as Kenya or Nigeria. Zaire, however, is an example of a large country where the institutions of the state have been undermined, markets have become more constricted, people have returned to subsistence life, and the state functions to provide a living and give prebends to those with access to its perquisites.[5]

[4] On the military as an elite in and of itself, see Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[5] See Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Patrick Boyle, "A View from Zaire," *World Politics* 40 (January 1988): 269–87.

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Many observers called attention to the weaknesses of African institutions in the 1960s.[6] Samuel Decalo specifically argued that African militaries were often idiosyncratic entities where personal leadership stamped their operation more than functional requisites or their special structure.[7] Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg argued that personal rule was a distinctive political system where leaders tried to stay afloat in an unrestrained way.[8] In his revisions to the *Gold Coast in Transition*, David Apter commented that the alternatives to an institutionalized parliamentary democracy in Ghana were totalitarian democracy or neotraditionalism.[9] However, what emerged in the Ghana of Jerry Rawlings was less totalitarian democracy than a populist military regime with a diffuse base of support where the leader's foibles and predelictions stamp the politics of the regime.[10] The leader can swing from attacking established domestic and external institutions to doing business with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and trying to enforce a thorough stabilization program. The very looseness of ties that Rawlings had initially to political groups such as to the June Fourth, the New Democratic, and the Pan African Youth movements in addition to the Peoples Revolutionary League, the African Youth Command, and the Social Democratic Front enabled him to have political space and to move toward or away from particular groups or trade unions.

If Apter did not foresee the breakdown of institutions and the far-reaching implications of personal rule in the context of heightened ethnicity and weakly developed economic groups, he did call attention to the dangers of political cynicism. But for what Africans have witnessed and suffered in too many countries, the term political cynicism does not convey enough horror.

Africa since independence gives us examples of durable leaders who have operated systems of personal rule, while their societies have in many respects not been governed from a central locus of authority. They have been governed narrowly, unpredictably, and intermittently from that locus. Moreover, while the late 1980s witnessed the rebirth or birth of democracy on almost every continent and startling increases in the possibilities of political participation in as authoritarian a polity as the Soviet Union, democracy has been elusive and hard to sustain in the 1990s for most African countries.[11]

[6] See, for one, Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[7] Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

[8] Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[9] David E. Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (New York: Atheneum, 1963).

[10] I have commented on populist military regimes in Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Liberia in Henry Bienen, "Populist Military Regimes in West Africa," *Armed Forces and Society* 11 (Spring 1985): 357–78.

[11] For a discussion of transitions from authoritarian rule, see Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, "Authoritarianism and Democracy in Africa" in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., *Comparative Political Dynamics* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 211–232.

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TABLE 1

African Leaders in Power 20 or More Years

Haile Selassie	1930–74	(44)	Ethiopia
Felix Houphouet-Boigny	1960–92	(32)	Ivory Coast
King Hassan II	1961–92	(31)	Morocco
Habib Bourguiba	1956–86	(30)	Tunisia
Kamuza Banda	1964–92	(28)	Malawi
William Tubman	1944–71	(27)	Liberia
Kenneth Kaunda	1964–91	(27)	Zambia
Dawda Jawara	1965–92	(27)	Gambia
Mobuto Sese Seko	1965–92	(27)	Zaire
Sekou Touré	1958–84	(26)	Guinea
Julius Nyerere	1961–86	(25)	Tanzania
Leabua Jonathan	1961–86	(25)	Lesotho
Ahmadou Ahidjo	1960–82	(22)	Cameroon
Leopold Senghor	1960–80	(22)	Senegal

Have durable leaders been especially prone to violence in Africa? The longest-lasting ones provide a mixed record (Table 1). If we take leaders who stayed in power for twenty or more years since independence, we get through mid-1992: two leaders had natural deaths in office (Touré and Tubman); two retired voluntarily (Nyerere and Ahidjo), although Ahidjo tried a comeback; five were still in office in 1992. It is striking that of these leaders only Touré and to a lesser extent Mobutu and Banda are associated with large-scale violence against opponents. Those leaders who have been associated with large-scale violence against their opponents or masses of people fall more into a category of medium-term rule: Amin (8); Milton Obote (8), (4 on taking power a second time in Uganda); Macias (10) in Equatorial Guinea; Mengistu (14) in Ethiopia; Bokassa (13) in Central African Republic; Ngouabi (8) in Congo; Samuel Doe (10) in Liberia; Gaffar Nimeiri (15) in Sudan.

Violence directed by leaders or set loose deliberately by leaders has not usually been in the name of social change. Of the leaders mentioned above, only Mengistu has tried to alter rural and urban social and economic structures. (Nyerere tried with relatively little violence in Tanzania.) Touré came to power with commitments to social change, but his use of violence was to intimidate opponents rather than to enforce new patterns of collectivized agriculture or to change class relations. Violence associated with African leaders has been seemingly aberrant or has served with varying degrees of planning and organization to intimidate and remove opponents.

As Ted Gurr has pointed out, African states have shown high rates of growth of public consumption compared to private consumption in the 1960s and 1970s. Part of this public consumption was powered by concessional and some commercial borrowing; thus the 1980s figures of public consumption growth are not as buoyant as they were earlier. But private consumption probably has declined

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more than public consumption in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus Gurr's judgment stands that African governments have been effective in extracting surplus from poor economies and using it to maintain themselves and the state apparatus.[12]

All observers of Africa have been aware of the expansion of the state sector in size, if not efficiency. But we have been so fixed on the state's inability to mobilize resources for development that we have perhaps not emphasized enough the state's inability to maintain consumption for its inhabitants.[13]

Since there have been more claimants to enter the state service than could be accommodated without lowering salaries for those already in, a rationing of positions is required even while expansion occurs. Some violence has occurred simply because the "outs" want in. Immediate fixes such as expropriating Asians' assets in Uganda or Belgian assets in Zaire do not work well, because they lead to an overall decline in the pie to be distributed. Intra-elite violence is part of the rationing system. In the hands of certain leaders who are personally unconstrained individuals, the violence can become far-reaching as it was in Uganda. Moreover, given the perception by nonelites of the ethnic implications of elite struggle, such struggles spill over quickly into mass violence. This was the pattern at the outset of the Nigerian civil war from 1967–1969.

Communal violence may be direct and not require elite infighting to trigger it. Elite formulas for defining national integration are likely to be consequential in setting the terms for communal struggle, as for example when Nigerians expel Ghanaians or when elites insist on highly centralized formulas for defining national integration or employ only members of their own group.[14] But we cannot see communal antipathies only as derivative of elite struggles or somehow as the false consciousness of masses. Large-scale conflict can break out as groups struggle for land or water rights or jobs in urban areas.

It is hard to quantify violent deaths in Africa, and most large-scale conflicts have involved more than one factor. Nonetheless, most violence in Africa has had a strong communal component. The Nigerian civil war; struggles between southerners and northerners and among southerners in the Sudan; civil war in Chad, Angola, and Ethiopia; and conflict in Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Zaire—all have had a communal basis. Of course, we can find civil-military relations

[12] Ted Robert Gurr, "Theories of Violence and Revolution in the Third World: Some African Implications and Applications" (Paper prepared for the Seminar on Violence in Africa, African Studies Program, forthcoming in Patrick O'Meara, ed., *Violence in Africa*, Indiana University Press).

[13] From the left, Issa Shivji has attacked the state bureaucratic class in *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (London: Heineman Educational Books, 1976). Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 40, notes that Afro-Marxist regimes have not behaved differently from others. The state sector has expanded to consume. From independence to the early 1970s there was a tenfold expansion of people employed by the state agricultural service in Congo-Brazzaville. By 1971, salaries of the agricultural service exceeded the total cash income of 600,000 peasants. Six hundred and thirty-six of the 1,677 extension workers lived in Brazzaville.

[14] See Henry Bienen, "The State and Ethnicity: Integrative Formulas in Africa" in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., *States Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 100–126.

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and internal military breakdown consequential in some of these conflicts. The interventions of outsiders have been important in many of them. Less important have been factors that even loosely could be grouped under class. Class and ethnicity have intersected to create bloody elite struggles in Liberia and in Zaire. Class components have not been entirely absent in other conflicts. But rarely, if ever, have they been the causal factors. There have been relatively brief peasant *bunts* or outbreaks against administrators enforcing tax collection such as the *Agbekoya* struggles in Western Nigeria in 1968–1969 and violence in the 1960s in Kwilu Province in Zaire, which pitted people against relatively urbanized and educated "others."[15]

Islamic fundamentalist outbreaks against constituted authority in northern Nigerian cities had class elements as the Maitatsine movement of Muhammadu Marwa, sometimes called the Yan Tatsine, lashed out against materialism and privilege. The movement was supported by recent migrants to Kano and Yola and by refugees from Chad and Nigeria. They were in turn seen as dangerous lumpenproletariat in northern cities.[16]

It is striking how little rural-urban violence has existed in Africa since independence. It is equally striking how few peasant revolts there have been. In Goran Hyden's terms, following Albert Hirschman, peasants have left markets more than given voice to grievances, retiring, sometimes physically from these markets and retreating from the state into forests rather than fighting the state.[17] Nor has there been large-scale urban violence between those in the informal sector and those in established working-class or middle-class positions. Trade unions have not led violent working class struggles that have sustained action against private property owners or against a state bourgeoisie.

Urban violence has occurred over the state's bulldozing of squatter settlements and over cuts in subsidies of foodstuffs and transport. Usually, these outbreaks have been short lived. Leaders have backed down only to reimpose the consumer subsidy cuts later on. Strikes and violence over consumer subsidy cuts in combination with growing resentment against Nimeiri in the Sudan on communal and many other political and economic issues helped bring him down in 1985. Rice riots helped undermine the weakening Tolbert regime in Liberia in 1979. North African leaders sustained power against sharp reactions to consumer subsidy cuts in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Nigeria has successfully raised fuel and transport prices; Zimbabwe has cut urban food subsidies. But, Zambia's leaders

[15] In Yoruba *Agbekoya* means farmers who reject injustice. See Christopher Beer, *The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria* (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press, 1976). Also, for the Congo, see Benoit Verhaegen, *Rebellions Au Congo*, vol. 2, (Bruxelles: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, 1970).

[16] See Michael Watts and Paul Lubeck, "The Oil Boom and the Popular Classes" in I.W. Zartman, ed., *The Political Economy of Nigeria* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

[17] Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929).

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were unable to implement their subsidy cuts. However, urban reactions to government imposition of structural adjustment policies and stabilization policies have not been marked by a good deal of violence in Africa; nor has the violence that occurred been highly consequential in most countries.[18]

It is not clear that organized violence sponsored by trade unions has grown in Africa since the 1960s. Trade unions have had their independence undermined in almost all African countries. Recent migrants have felt better off in African urban areas than in the rural ones from whence they came. Urban would-be counter-elites have been unable to organize disparate coalitions of students, workers, migrants, and radical dissidents. Students have become less able to challenge regimes over time. Only when a significant element of the military has made common cause with urban dissidents have strong challenges to regimes appeared as in Kenya in 1982 with violence in Nairobi, or in Liberia in 1979. When a military-urban coalition has appeared, the military has moved rapidly to coopt or destroy independent movements of urban workers or students as it did in the Ethiopian revolution.[19]

Demonstrations, riots, political strikes, urban terrorism, and other kinds of upheaval in cities in developing countries are commonly associated with political instability and the possibility of regime change. Perceptions about the relationship between urban upheaval and instability are strongly influenced by how instability is defined. Urban violence and upheavals are themselves often seen as indicators of instability when instability is defined as system, regime, or leadership change brought about rapidly, unpredictably, or through violence. When instability is defined as a process of civil disorder, urban upheavals are simply equated with instability. Urban violence in Africa not only has not brought about regime change, but it has not usually brought about leadership change. Urban violence has not been persistent at high levels. Civil disorder has marked systemically African urban societies, although urban crime probably increased in the 1980s.

Obviously, I am not arguing that violence in Africa has been absent or has had no consequences. Violence hastened or brought about the end of white rule in a number of countries.[20] Guerrilla struggle in Namibia was not militarily decisive, but it made South Africa pay a price that affected that country's calculus of costs and benefits. And domestic violence in support of change is becoming consequential in South Africa. Military guerrilla struggle was determining in Rhodesia's change to Zimbabwe but not in Kenya. Guerrilla fighters were absorbed in both countries, but issues of landlessness, ethnic tensions, and relative

[18] Henry Bienen and Mark Gersovitz, "Consumer Subsidy Cuts, Violence and Political Stability," *Comparative Politics* 19 (October 1986): 25–44; Henry Bienen and Mark Gersovitz, "Economic Stabilization, Conditionality and Political Stability," *International Organization* 39 (Autumn 1985): 729–54.

[19] See Marina and David Ottoway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* (New York: Africana, 1978).

[20] See Robert Rotberg, ed., *Rebellion in Black Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

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privilege, including that of whites, were not solved by violent struggles. Ethiopia's struggles against Italian aggression heightened sentiments for a sense of Ethiopian sovereignty, but they were no guarantee of Ethiopia's territorial integrity years later; nor were they a bulwark against factious tendencies within the empire.

It remains to be seen whether guerrilla movements in Angola and Mozambique will be able to force a change in the composition and orientation of ruling groups in these countries. In Angola, a reasonably well organized Unita with strong outside support was able to hold territory and try to force political concessions. It continues to prosecute a civil war against the ruling MPLA government. It has an ethnic base for its support, but its long-term policy goals are unclear. In Mozambique, social banditry was evident, and Renamo, too, received outside support and benefits from the incompetence of the ruling Frelimo group.

Both Angola and Mozambique, ex-Portuguese colonies, were held out as examples that would support Frantz Fanon's propositions that individuals and peoples would become whole again and would have a political rebirth by participating in violent politics. These arguments had both psychological and organizational components. Group and individual transformations were to occur as violence cleansed colonial mentalities. Violence was to be instrumental in creating new societies also because individuals would forge new ties expressed through revolutionary organizations.[21] These arguments had an old pedigree that preceded Fanon and have been echoed subsequent to him.[22]

It may well be that experience in violent protest binds many individuals into groups. It may even be that experience in violent struggle helps to fuse an elite when it must operate in new contexts. Observers of China once claimed this for the Chinese military-Communist party elite. We were told that it was a more consensual elite than the Bolsheviks, because of its Long March and military-administrative experience against both the Japanese and the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai shek. But this same elite engaged in a great deal of internal violence during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976.

It may well be that for groups who are very unlikely to come to power violence and protest continue to bind the community and to keep it radical. For groups that must operate in a new context of rule after they have won an anticolonial struggle or have been victors in a civil war, there is little or no evidence that the elite has been especially cohesive or has acquired organizational abilities that have served it well for the new tasks of rule. Certainly, on the African continent, Algeria, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, or as yet Zimbabwe do not illustrate the functionality of violence for either elites or masses. To the contrary, it is difficult to absorb losers or even military men who have fought on your side. In many African countries, violence disrupted physical stock and often swelled urban areas too quickly for migrants to be absorbed or

[21] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1966).

[22] See Henry Bienen, *Violence and Social Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); also see Aristide Zolberg, "A Gospel for the Damned," *Encounter*, November 1966, 56–63.

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receive social services. In South Africa, violence yet may turn out to be necessary to force a change in political and economic power. But it also splits black African groups, creating tensions among classes and heightening ethnic tensions.

Examining the impact of violence on the psychology of individual leaders or on elites and masses obviously involves difficult and delicate analyses. More prosaically, we can look at the impact of violence on other and more accessible cases of African life.

Attempts at secession usually have not been successful in Africa. Despite large-scale civil war, Biafra did not separate from Nigeria. Katanga did not secede from the Congo. The southern Sudan after two decades has not been able to win and hold major concessions. Bloody struggles in Eritrea, which spread to Tigre and other provinces in the north of Ethiopia, ended the Mengistu regime, will lead to Eritrea's secession, and may yet result in the breakup of the empire. Whether Somalia stays intact remains to be seen. Still, the territorial map of Africa remarkably has remained unchanged since independence. Frequently, external actors in the form of the United Nations or the great powers or middle powers have intervened and continue to intervene. The weight of these interventions has been to maintain the existing state system.[23] Without outside intervention, Somalia might cease to be a state.

Ethnic status reversal has sometimes brought about or accompanied large scale violence. In both Rwanda and Burundi, the end of colonialism saw violent attempts to change Hutu-Tutsi ethnic status and power relations. These attempts were successful in Rwanda, but not in Burundi, and led to large movements of peoples and the swelling of refugee populations as has occurred since in other parts of Africa where violence has been prevalent.

Violence has not settled issues in Africa beyond the period of the anticolonial struggle. And, even during that period, violence was usually not critical to the outcome with a few exceptions, notably Zimbabwe. It may turn out to be crucial in South Africa; but violent struggle creates its own dilemmas. Rarely in Africa have whole ethnic communities been eliminated through violence, although huge population movements have come about during communal conflict, and ethnic status reversal has occurred in both local situations and at the national level. Rwanda is an example of the latter. Ibo influence has to some extent recovered, although not to its fullest, at the national level in Nigeria. In areas such as Port Harcourt, Ibo influence has not recovered.

Violence has led to the elimination of particular leaders through assassinations or violent coups and less frequently through riots. But rarely has violence eliminated a dominant class in Africa once independence occurred. The Doe coup in Liberia, which physically eliminated part of the Americo-Liberian elite and

[23] For an argument concerning the importance of international norms and institutions for the maintenance of the African state system as is, see Carl Rosberg and Robert Jackson, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 25 (October 1982): 1024.

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led to an ethnic shift, was hardly decisive for class relations in that country. The old elite partially reasserted itself. And, new individuals filled old roles, albeit in a military regime. The civil war in Liberia and Doe's assassination have not led to a new consolidation but so far only to chaos and widespread hardships. In Ethiopia more than any other place, a social revolution of sorts did occur.[24] The ancien regime was shattered and not restored. The killing off of relatives of the emperor was designed to perform the same function that killing of the tsar's family accomplished in the Russian Revolution. No claimants to the throne were left; opposition was intimidated. Certainly a new regime arose in Ethiopia. But after many more years of struggle, ethnic violence continues. The center has barely held, but probably not for much longer. The revolution of the 1970s was not institutionalized.

Violence has not created new men in Africa, somehow purer or more highly motivated than others. It has not helped forge strong organizations nor overcome backwardness. Violence is positively correlated with poor development performance. Even if we allow for time lags between violent episodes and economic levels, countries that have large amounts of violence are usually doing poorly ten years later.

Agricultural production especially has suffered in countries with large amounts of violence. Farmers cannot plant or transport their crops to market; input distribution systems breakdown. Some of the worst performers in total agricultural production between 1973–1984 were Uganda, Ghana, Zaire, Somalia, Chad, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe. I have not systematically correlated agricultural performance and levels of violence. To do so accurately would entail taking account of weather and commodity prices, too. Looking at various *World Development Reports*, we do see that average annual growth rates have been weak in agriculture for most African countries, as have been average indices of food production per capita.

Some countries with relatively little violence, like Senegal, have not exactly had sterling agricultural records either, and no doubt drought weighs heavily on agricultural performance. Still, Sudan is the only African country with high levels of violence in the late 1970s and 1980s to do reasonably well in GDP annual average growth rates between 1973–1984. After 1984 the fighting intensified in the southern Sudan and the economy has been a disaster area.

Where a society has been truly shattered, its civil service partially destroyed, and its army turned into a rabble, as in Uganda, it is hard to put Humpty Dumpty together again. Trust, predictability, and information all suffer when violence is high. As Apter pointed out, the use of coercion reduces information in a system.[25] He posited an inversive relationship between information and coercion.

[24] John Harbeson, *The Ethiopian Transformation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), assesses the nature of the Ethiopian revolution.

[25] Concern with the relationship between information and coercion is a major theme in many of Apter's works.

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African leaders already have a difficult time acquiring good information; statistics are poor as are communication systems. Anything that reduces the flow of information is likely to prove harmful to governance and development.

Political leaders are extremely vulnerable at the outsets of their rules. They become more secure with the passage of time, but there are thresholds they must get across as they build political networks and power bases. They may move quickly to eliminate opposition leaders, but early violence is often restricted to use against limited elite targets. However, in Africa, if one removes opponents, especially violently, their ethnic cohorts are mobilized. Moreover, information dries up, and a spiral of violence may occur. This pattern was sharply etched in Nigeria after Ibo junior officers killed Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and other northern and a few Yoruba leaders. In January 1966, the coup makers may not have been motivated by ethnic grievances, but the perception of their acts was crucial. A train of events was set off that eventuated in massive pogroms in the north against Ibos and eventually in the Nigerian civil war.

There is not yet a systematic analysis of the point in leaders' periods of rule in which the largest scale violence occurs, although a quick look suggests that it is rarely at the end of very long periods and more likely after some consolidation of rule takes place for leaders who may be between their third and eighth years. They have some networks in place, but they have also made enemies, may be in difficulty, and have a restricted flow of information. The stage is often set for violence as leaders try to consolidate their rule or to hang on if life is already very bumpy. And, in Africa, it has been bumpy indeed.

It may well be that pathological individuals came to power in particular African countries. But as we continue to explore the structure of violence, its causes and consequences, we should look first to everyday patterns of life and governance, and less to the psychopathology of leaders to understand what we see around us.*

* This essay is in appreciation of David Apter, teacher and friend.

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Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950

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Richard Hofstadter concluded his 1949 assessment of the previous year's Dixiecrat revolt with the claim that the Democratic party "finds itself in the anomalous position of being a party of 'liberalism,' whose achievements are subject to veto by a reactionary fraction."[1] The same year, V. O. Key published the landmark study, *Southern Politics*. His chapters on "Solidarity in the Senate" and "The South in the House" remain the best starting point for considering Hofstadter's claim. Key's questions were these: "Is the South actually united in Congress? If so, on what issues? We have the popular characterization of the South as 'reactionary' and as 'conservative.' Does the record support such epithets?"[2] Aside from controversies about race, he answered in the negative. Who was right, Hofstadter or Key?

Much is at stake in adjudicating these claims. Southern political elites con-

[1] Richard Hofstadter, "From Calhoun to the Dixiecrats," *Social Research* 16 (June 1949): 150.
[2] V. O. Key, Jr. with the assistance of Alexander Heard, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 346.

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trolled the national Democratic party from the debacle of 1896 to the start of the New Deal.[3] While Democrats managed to obtain only about 40 percent of the popular vote in congressional and presidential contests outside the South in this period, within the region votes for Democrats never fell below 86 percent.[4] As a result, some two in three Democratic members of Congress were southerners who stood on a common platform devoted to the preservation of the southern racial order and the adjustment of gross interregional inequalities.[5] The Democratic party's landslide victories in 1932, 1934, and 1936 converted it from a regional to a genuinely national force and remade it into an instrument of governance. For the first time since the demise of the Knights of Labor, an agrarian-industrial alliance that could effectively challenge the prerogatives of capital became a possibility, but not without immense risks for the South's segregated racial civilization. Now a minority faction in a majority party, the South no longer defined the party's policy agenda. The election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the emergence of a strong nonsouthern Democratic bloc of consequence in Congress forced southern representatives to embark on a great balancing act that sought at once to secure the party's new majority, enhance national state capacity to aid southern economic development, and protect white privilege. What was not clear was whether these goals could be advanced simultaneously.

Notwithstanding the altered situation of the South, the region remained well placed to defend the interests of its economic and political elites. During the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, southerners never composed less than 40 percent of the Democrats in Congress and they chaired approximately half

[3] Defining the South is not a straightforward matter. For obvious reasons, many historians and social scientists, including V. O. Key, treat the South as consisting of the eleven ex-Confederate states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia). The Census Bureau defines the South as these eleven states plus five more—Delaware, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Maryland, and West Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia. We treat the South as the ex-Confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma for two reasons. First, this usage was in vogue during the 1930s and 1940s, as, for example, in the most important New Deal study of the region (U.S. National Emergency Council, *Report on Economic Conditions of the South* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938]). Second, *The Congressional Quarterly Almanac* uses this thirteen-state demarcation, and it has become the standard for most congressional studies. By adopting this definition, we slightly bias our material in the direction of softening regional differences in congressional voting.

[4] For data on election returns and discussion of the role of southern Democrats in Congress, see David Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Barbara Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment, 1925–1978* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), especially the useful table on regional composition on p. 19.

[5] A thoughtful discussion can be found in Erik N. Olssen, "Southern Senators and Reform Issues in the 1920's: A Paradox Unraveled" in Bruce Clayton and John A. Salmond, eds., *The South is Another Land: Essays on the Twentieth Century South* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). Also see David Burner, *The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918–1932* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), esp. chap. vi.

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the committees.[6] Their most impressive resource was the rock solid stability of regional representation. Between 1933 and 1952 there never were fewer than 115 southern Democrats in the House, yet never more than 118; by contrast, the nonsouthern Democratic cohort ranged from 217 in 1937 to just 73 members in 1947. Thus, even at the height of the New Deal, the Democratic party required the acquiescence of southern representatives, who as potential coalition partners for Republicans could, if they chose, block the national program. After the electoral shifts to the Republicans in the 1942 and 1946 congressional elections, the South even more clearly commanded veto power over Democratic party initiatives. Moreover, the filibuster in the Senate and control of the Rules Committee in the House provided a set of institutional filters for determined southerners bent on obstructing the Democratic party's majority preferences.[7]

Liberal initiatives, in short, could not pass without southern congressional support. Which measures survived this test? Which did not? Did southern policy inclinations change during the course of the 1930s and 1940s? By reconsidering the southern veto in Congress, we can trace the implications of the hybrid regional qualities of the Democratic party for the policy content and limits of American liberalism at the pivotal moment in the making of the modern Democratic party.

The touchstone of our analysis is Key's *Southern Politics*. The section titled "Political Leadership: The One-Party System in the Nation," which probes the "legend" of southern solidarity, analyzes 873 congressional votes: 598 Senate and 275 House roll calls.[8] "Perhaps," he mused at the outset of his consideration, ". . . the legislative record would show that southern solidarity contains elements other than a dominant attitude toward the Negro?" But he concluded otherwise: "In an earlier day perhaps a common interest in the tariff cemented southern states together in national affairs; nowadays—apart from the indubitably potent habit of voting Democratic—about all that remains to promote southern solidarity is the Negro."[9]

We find otherwise. Southern Democrats, we show, did not split with their party only on civil rights votes. In spite of their willingness to support an assertive role for the national state in economic affairs with approximately the same degree of enthusiasm as nonsouthern Democrats, southern members also broke ranks on labor-centered questions—whether to facilitate the establishment of a genuinely

[6] Between 1933 and 1952, southern Democrats commanded 48 percent of the chairmanships and ranking minority positions in the Senate, and 51 percent in the House. See Brady, *Critical Elections*.

[7] An excellent summary discussion can be found in Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), chap. 8.

[8] Key, *Southern Politics*, 315, 346. For the Senate, Key included virtually all the votes cast during the seven odd year sessions between 1933 and 1945 (that is, he skipped every other year); for the House, he analyzed almost all the roll calls in the four House sessions of 1933, 1937, 1941, and 1945. He excluded votes that were nearly unanimous, when those who dissented constituted no more than 10 percent of the majority, as well as votes for the election of the president pro tempore of the Senate.

[9] Key, *Southern Politics*, 345, 315.

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national labor market and create a favorable climate for trade union organization. This policy schism became more pronounced during the course of the 1940s when union mobilization threatened to undermine the relationship between labor markets and race relations in the South. The division between southern and nonsouthern Democrats on labor questions occurred at the crucial time when the character of post-New Deal liberalism was being shaped in a complex negotiation between conflicting interests and ideologies within the Democratic party. The content and timing of the southern veto on labor issues, we argue, played a central role in establishing post-New Deal liberalism's qualities and limits.

Unfortunately, methodological decisions taken by Key and other students of congressional issue voting have obscured the complex association between race and labor in the Democratic party and its effects on the formation of congressional policy coalitions during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. By taking a fresh look at this historical record, we demonstrate the emergence during the 1940s of three distinctive alliances: a bipartisan civil rights coalition linking nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans; a party-based liberal coalition joining nonsouthern and southern democrats on welfare state, fiscal, regulatory, and planning issues; and a cross-party conservative coalition coupling southern Democrats and Republicans in the single area of labor policy. Like Key, we locate race at the center of the distinctive regional interest of the South; but unlike Key, we discover a pattern in the legislative record that points to a vital, but underexposed imbrication of the issues of race and labor.

Studying the Southern Veto

To pursue this inquiry, we have analyzed eighty-nine Senate and sixty-one House roll calls between 1933 and 1950 concerned with civil rights, planning, regulation, fiscal policy, the welfare state, and labor. We focus on these areas to evaluate Key's assertion that the southern veto was limited to racial questions and Hofstadter's contention that southern obstruction vitiated the more social democratic aspects of the New Deal. Throughout, we compare the voting behavior of southern Democrats, nonsouthern Democrats, and Republicans. To discover patterns of change, we also subdivide this period into the three sets of New Deal, wartime, and postwar Congresses. Unlike most studies of Congress, we have combined our Senate and House roll calls into a single data set of 150 votes. Our focus is on sectional solidarity and the role of the southern Democratic party faction rather than on institutional differences between the legislative chambers, and our units of analysis are votes by members of the three blocs in specific policy domains.[10]

[10] Of course, Congress is not a single institutional location; members either are senators or representatives whose votes are shaped by the size and character of constituencies, party discipline, and each institution's norms and procedures. We have examined Senate and House votes to see whether we are justified in combining the roll calls from each chamber. On the various measures we report

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Congressional policy studies depend on the identification of a universe of votes and their placement in issue categories. With respect to selection, we proceeded inductively by reviewing all the roll calls between the 73rd (1933–1935) and 81st (1949–1951) Congresses to choose the most significant bills and amendments. We did not set the threshold so high so as to include only landmark legislation; neither did we set it so low to include the trivial or merely procedural. Rather than adopt an inclusive strategy that makes no distinction between more and less important roll calls or apply a threshold test of significance,[11] we winnowed our universe by judging the content of proposed legislation. Our aim has been to discover the substantive bases for controversy, stress, and the appearance of coalitions by searching the relevant roll calls irrespective of their outcome.

Categorization matters. For the past two decades, the most influential classification for congressional policy voting has been that of Aage Clausen, who divided congressional roll calls into five categories, of which three are directly relevant to this paper: government management of the economy, social welfare, and civil liberties.[12] This classification has been widely adopted.[13] Unfortunately, its overaggregation obscures critical variations because it joins together policy areas about which there should be no a priori assumption of covariance.

We have partitioned Clausen's groupings into more specific and coherent components to reflect alternative policy tools more accurately. For his single government management category, we have substituted the policy areas of planning, regulation, and fiscal policy.[14] Likewise, we have separated welfare state and labor votes, which Clausen combined under the rubric of social welfare. Finally,

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below, the results are sufficiently similar that it would be redundant to report them separately. The most significant differences are a more left-liberal tilt to southern voting in the Senate on labor and civil rights questions and in the House on fiscal, planning, regulation, and welfare state issues.

[11] For examples, see William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies" in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959), 377–384; Richard Franklin Bensel, *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880–1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 31–38; and Key, *Southern Politics*, chaps. 16 and 17.

[12] Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

[13] Often, even in important studies, the usage of his categories has been remarkably unreflective. Examples include Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment*; Mack C. Shelly II, *The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1983); Herbert B. Asher and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Voting Change in Congress: Some Dynamic Perspectives on an Evolutionary Process," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (May 1978); and Mary Alice Nye, "The U.S. Senate and Civil Rights Roll-Call Votes," *Western Political Quarterly* 44 (December 1991).

[14] Politicians and state managers plan when they purposefully direct and combine capital, land, and labor with the view that self-interested decisions taken by private actors alone cannot benefit the collective interest. Regulations set standards and enforce conduct in industries and markets. Fiscal interventions "turn on the financial taps and regulate the flow while leaving the response contingent upon the autonomous and self-interested decisions of private actors." Ronald King, "Wartime and Postwar Economic Planning in the United States" (Unpublished manuscript, 1984).

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we distinguish among votes on race relations, civil liberties, and internal security, which Clausen lumped together under the heading of civil liberties. Here, we focus exclusively on those votes from this domain that concern civil rights for blacks.

In sum, we probe the southern veto by inspecting congressional behavior in the policy areas of planning, regulation, fiscal policy, the welfare state, labor, and civil rights. In each, we trace the voting patterns for southern Democrats, nonsouthern Democrats, and Republicans to investigate the following puzzles:

How solid was the South? To assess the degree of bonding of southern representatives as a voting bloc, we score the roll calls by making use of the index of cohesion first proposed by Stuart Rice and adopted by V. O. Key in his discussion of southern solidarity.[15] We find that southern Democrats were characterized by high intragroup cohesion; so, however, were the other two blocs of nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans. The most cohesive bloc, in fact, was not the solid South, but the Democratic solid north. The relatively low cohesion score for southern Democrats is accounted for almost entirely by significant splits among southerners on labor issues.

How "reactionary" was the South? To probe this question we first trace the percentages of votes cast by members of the three blocs for the liberal position in each policy area (which we identify as the Roosevelt or Truman administration's stance). Apart from civil rights and labor questions, we find that southern and nonsouthern Democratic voting behavior was virtually indistinguishable. We also ascertain similarities and differences between the three voting blocs of nonsouthern Democrats and southern Democrats, southern Democrats and Republicans, and nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans in the discrete issue domains by applying Rice's index of likeness, a measure of the degree to which any two voting blocs behave similarly on a given vote.[16] On this basis, we are able to identify highly distinctive civil rights, liberal, and conservative coalitions, with the latter limited to the policy domain of labor.

How did the Democratic congressional coalition change over time, and why? To find out, we have organized our data not only by region and party, but by period. We have partitioned the roll calls from the 73rd Congress through the 81st into New Deal, wartime, and postwar spans of three Congresses each, cov-

[15] This index provides a measure of the cohesiveness of a given bloc by tallying the difference between the percentage of affirmative votes and the percentage of negative votes within the group. Unanimity is tallied as 100; an even split as zero. Rice's measure of cohesion was first proposed in Stuart A. Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups: A Method of Measurement," *Political Science Quarterly* 40 (March 1925); and elaborated in his *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928). They are usefully discussed in Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 179–82.

[16] A likeness score is arrived at by subtracting from 100 the difference between the percentages of positive votes that are cast by each bloc. This measure was also first developed by Stuart A. Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups: A Method of Measurement"; and elaborated in his *Quantitative Methods in Politics*.

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ering 1933–1939, 1939–1945, and 1945–1951. This analysis proves revealing. The civil rights and liberal alliances remained durable throughout, but an anti-labor conservative coalition appeared for the first time in the wartime congresses. We shall see that during the heyday of the New Deal, southern Democrats were inclined to support the administration's major labor-related initiatives, albeit with reservations and only after they secured protection for their regional interests. During the war and postwar Congresses, however, there was a decided southern tilt against trade unions and attempts to organize a national labor market. As a result, the liberal coalition was precluded from broadening into a social democratic alliance.

We have approached this analysis with caution; so should the reader. Each roll call is treated as an equivalent unit; this, of course, is an artificial imposition that flattens the vastly different significance of individual votes. Further, much of the substantive legislative work took place in committees, beyond this article's ken. This point cuts two ways. On the one hand, southern control over the agenda in key committees created a bias in favor of cross-region roll call consensus, for the bills that came to the floor often had been tailored to accommodate regional interests. As a result, our discussion risks exaggerating southern left-wing propensities. On the other hand, precisely because southerners possessed the capacity to shape a good deal of legislation at the committee stage, the issue areas where Democratic cohesion failed to hold are even more noteworthy.[17]

The Solid South

"Just how 'solid' is the 'Solid South'?" V. O. Key posed this question as the first step in a quest to discover the essentials of southern unity by identifying "those issues clothed with a compulsion toward solidarity." He discovered, by a small margin, that the average cohesiveness of southerners was higher than that of Republicans, nonsouthern Democrats, or all Democrats combined.[18] Applying Rice's index of cohesion, Key found southern Democratic senators to have had an average cohesion score of 60; nonsouthern Democrats, 52; and Republicans, 56.[19]

We utilize the same measure of cohesion. Recall that we focus on civil rights plus what might be called the core of the social democratic agenda: votes on

[17] The committee system, we further note, was a very porous filter. Substantial amending activity continually forced Democrats to confront potentially divisive issues on the floor and challenged southerners to defeat again measures that already had been eliminated at the committee stage. For a tightly reasoned discussion of how congressional committees shape and constrain the policy agenda, see James M. Snyder, Jr., "Committee Power, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Roll Call Votes," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (February 1992).

[18] Key, *Southern Politics*, 346–347, 348, 370.

[19] Key treats Senate and House votes in separate chapters. We have recalculated his data to combine his roll calls into a single data set in which we have given equal weight to each vote.

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TABLE 1

Congressional Bloc Solidarity, 1933–1950: Index of Cohesion Scores of 70 and Above[a]

Votes (N)	*Southern Democrats*	*Nonsouthern Democrats*	*Republicans*
All (150)	45%	55%	45%
Non-civil rights (121)	40	58	41
V. O. Key's *Southern Politics* (873)[b]	45	30	39

[a] Index of cohesion measures the difference between the percentage of affirmative votes and the percentage of negative votes within the bloc.

[b] The period covered by this book is 1933–1945. For a discussion of Key's data set, see footnote 8.

alternative ways to structure the relationship between political authority and markets in capital and labor. On this set of issues so central to the qualities of Democratic party liberalism, our findings differ in a number of significant ways from Key's. We, too, detect three internally cohesive voting blocs, but their ordering is dissimilar. Southern Democrats recorded a cohesion score, 60, identical to the one reported by Key. Republicans scored 62. Our unforeseen result concerns nonsouthern Democrats, who proved the most cohesive group, with a score of 67.[20] At the core of the social democratic reform agenda, the standard representation of a solid South must be supplemented by an even more valid image of a united Democratic nonsouth.

Key was not content with overall cohesion scores; neither are we. With his summary findings in hand, he utilized his data to ask how often each of the blocs voted with cohesion above a threshold score of 70 (that is, one that reflected a positive or negative vote of 85 percent or more), and he sought to discover the properties of these highly solid votes. Applying this measure, he found the gap between southern and nonsouthern Democrats to be greater than that indicated by mean cohesion scores. Key's southern Democrats displayed very high togetherness 45 percent of the time, compared to just 30 percent for the nonsouthern Democrats, and 39 percent of the Republicans.[21]

Our findings differ. When we apply Key's approach to our six policy areas, we discover that each bloc voted with this level of high cohesion more of the time: 45 percent for southern Democrats, 45 percent for the Republicans, and a considerable 55 percent for the nonsouthern Democrats. Moreover, when we exclude the civil rights category to focus exclusively on the state-economy votes at the core of the social democratic agenda, the nonsouthern Democratic frequency

[20] These cohesion scores as well as the likeness scores reported give equal weight to each of our six issue areas rather than to each vote. When we exclude civil rights and only consider votes that directly concern government-market relationships, the nonsouthern Democratic score rises to 69 while that of the southern Democrats falls to 56 and the Republicans drop to 60.

[21] These figures represent the results we obtained when we combined Key's House and Senate votes into one data set, counting each vote equally. Key, *Southern Politics*, 370.

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increases to 58 percent. In short, we have identified issues in which high cohesion voting was more common than usual; these policy votes united nonsouthern Democrats to an uncustomary extent. It seems reasonable to conclude that throughout the 1930s and 1940s, these Democrats constituted a steady core of support for social democratic policies. Thus, the fate of such initiatives depended on two factors: the relative size of this cohort and their capacity to find allies outside their ranks, especially in the southern wing of the party. Indeed, as the the nonsouthern Democratic bloc contracted in size as a result of significant electoral setbacks in the 1942 and especially in the 1946 congressional elections, the structural privileges of the South as a one-party unit within the Democratic party became increasingly significant.

Key examined more closely those Senate votes where southern Democratic cohesion was exceptionally high and in opposition both to their Democratic colleagues and to the Republicans.[22] He found only nine of 598 Senate roll calls that met this test to represent "southern solidarity in its most extreme form." Of these, seven were civil rights votes. The other two concerned whether the Works Progress Administration should pay locally prevailing wage rates. Key concluded that this quite small number of issues "on which the South stands solidly against both Republicans and nonsouthern Democrats . . . reflect[s] a common determination to oppose external intervention in matters of race relations."[23]

Unfortunately, Key did not examine votes characterized by unusually low southern cohesion, yet these departures from the norm are equally instructive: when was the Dixie bloc most divided? In order to see where the South was fragmented, we have applied the threshold test of a cohesion score of 70 to each issue area. Not surprisingly, we too find that high southern Democratic cohesion was most frequent on civil rights votes. In this policy domain, southern representatives achieved very high solidarity 69 percent of the time. However, in no other policy area did the southerners match the nonsouthern Democrats' high solidarity. Southern Democrats proved significantly less united than the nonsouthern Democrats in all areas but civil rights, and least united of all on labor questions, voting cohesively at the 70 plus level least often on questions that concerned unions and labor markets. This outlier status demands explanation just as much as the civil rights votes to which Key devotes so much attention.

Because Key searched exclusively for evidence of southern solidarity, the region's low cohesion on labor issues escaped his gaze. The relative lack of southern togetherness in this policy area indicates significant cross-pressures of party and constituency. Southern Democrats initially had no interest in supporting the pro-business, anti-labor impulse of most Republicans. They understood that labor issues were terribly important for the national party, and many southern

[22] Key, *Southern Politics*, 349–55.

[23] Ibid., 351–52. Key notes that "it is conceivable that in their opposition southern senators were moved by race considerations: Negroes on the WPA were thought to be receiving too much money."

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TABLE 2

Policy Area Bloc Solidarity, 1933–1950: Index of Cohesion Scores of 70 and Above

Policy (N)	*Southern Democrats*	*Nonsouthern Democrats*	*Republicans*
Civil rights (29)	69%	41%	62%
Fiscal (11)	45	73	55
Planning (27)	59	70	44
Regulation (22)	36	41	45
Welfare state (24)	42	50	46
Labor (37)	24	59	30
All votes (150)	45	55	45

representatives, like other members of the party, resented business resistance to New Deal and Fair Deal initiatives. At the same time, the growth and extension of unions and ongoing efforts to nationalize labor markets posed very significant challenges to the South. If, as Gavin Wright argues, all the distinguishing differences between the South and the rest of the United States—racial segregation, low wage rates, farming methods, and the region's political economy—"have their roots in the separateness of the southern labor market,"[24] then southern representatives had to weigh their interest in a successful Democratic party coalition against threats to the integrity of that insular market.

Was the South a Reactionary Faction?

We first explore this question by examining the percentage of votes cast by southerners in favor of planning, regulation, expansive fiscal policies, welfare state programs, a national labor market and union prerogatives, and civil rights. In the first four of these policy domains the southern bloc proved nearly as supportive as nonsouthern Democrats. Not only was there no southern veto, the South voted by large margins to expand the role of the national state in economic affairs and to redress existing patterns of economic distribution in the direction of more equality. At the same time, southern congressional Democrats sought to restrict the political and economic capacities of two of the most important have-not groups in American life—African-Americans and the working class.

In light of the South's long history of asserting the rights of states against Washington, we had anticipated that southern Democrats would be much less inclined to favor planning proposals, because of the powers they confer on bureaucrats, and more inclined to favor business regulation, welfare state programs, or expansive macroeconomic policies. This expectation was not borne out. Southern Democrats backed planning as much or more than the other three types

[24] Gavin Wright, *Old South New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 8.

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TABLE 3

Average Left Bloc Voting by Policy Area, 1933–1950

Policy (N)	*Southern Democrats*	*Nonsouthern Democrats*	*Republicans*
Civil rights (29)	10%	72%	77%
Fiscal (11)	81	87	22
Planning (27)	81	89	32
Regulation (22)	68	77	25
Welfare state (24)	73	84	30
Labor (37)	42	85	26
All votes (150)	54	82	37

of market interventions by the central state. Overall, they voted on the liberal side in these four categories by a mean percentage yes vote of 75 (a level of support close to the nonsouthern Democratic percentage of 84). By contrast, Republicans opposed these measures just about as strongly as southern Democrats endorsed them. Southern antipathy to national state authority focused very specifically on interventions into the region's race relations and labor markets. Otherwise, the region's representatives favored by significant margins virtually all the fiscal, regulatory, planning, and welfare state measures of the New Deal and Fair Deal. If it comes as no surprise that southern Democrats resisted civil rights legislation, it is their anti-labor voting that is most striking.

Bloc voting is coherent, Key rightly insisted, only when it is considered in relationship to the voting patterns of other blocs. To discover how alike the voting patterns were of the three possible bloc pairings in our six issue areas, we utilize Rice's measure of likeness. These scores help us not only to reevaluate the Republican-southern Democratic coalition, but to better identify those policies that united the regional wings of the Democratic party.

Treating each issue area equally, we find that southern Democrats and Republicans possessed a mean likeness score of 53, just four points higher than the likeness score of 49 for non-southern Democrats and Republicans. Southern Democratic and nonsouthern Democratic likeness was very much higher than either of these, with a score of 69. Overall, the wings of the Democratic party displayed relatively high similarity across the divide of region, notwithstanding the conventional claim of a Republican-southern Democratic, conservative coalition.

Our most striking findings result when we identify those policy areas where an overall likeness score of at least 70 appeared. With six policy areas and three voting blocs, there were eighteen such prospects, but only six instances of strong coalition voting. Four of these cases of high likeness joined southern and nonsouthern Democrats: roll calls concerned with planning, regulation, fiscal issues, and the welfare state.[25] The Democratic party voted virtually as a single unit on

[25] In fact, the likeness scores were remarkably high, in each case over 80.

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TABLE 4

Congressional Coalitions by Policy Area, 1933–1950: Index of Likeness Scores[a]

Policy (N)	*Southern Democrats and Republicans*	*Southern Democrats and Nonsouthern Democrats*	*Nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans*
Civil rights (29)	32	38	[73]
Fiscal (11)	41	[89]	35
Planning (27)	49	[89]	42
Regulation (22)	52	[87]	47
Welfare state (24)	56	[82]	47
Labor (37)	[73]	56	39
All votes (150)	53	69	49

[a] Index of likeness subtracts from 100 the difference between the percentage of positive votes cast by each bloc.

these state-economy questions; its collective likeness score for these issues was an extraordinary 87.The legislative capacities of this liberal coalition depended on the balance of forces between the major parties.

By contrast, regional splits within the Democratic party took on strategic significance in the two other policy areas of civil rights and labor. Nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans achieved a 70 plus likeness score on race questions, the only issue arena to exhibit this kind of cross-party regional division. Because they could not muster majorities against this civil rights coalition, southerners dealt with their defensive quandary by controlling the legislative agenda and by utilizing the filibuster. Labor votes displayed their own distinctive coalition pattern, marked by high likeness for southern Democrats and Republicans. Over the entire period, the storied conservative coalition was confined to labor roll calls. Especially during the wartime and postwar congresses, this anti-labor coalition was able to make union organization more difficult and inhibit the development of a single national labor market.

In short, congressional voting was characterized by three coalitions—liberal, civil rights, and conservative—each of which was issue specific. In fact, in most of the contests that involved the three factional alignments, southern Democrats were the prevailing faction; their preferences were pivotal to the outcome; and in the single instance where they stood alone against northern Democrats and Republicans, their strategic positions within Congress gave them a series of procedural vetoes. Together, the liberal, conservative, and civil rights coalitions established the congressional foundations for postwar American politics and policy.

Unlike Key, who downplayed the existence of a conservative coalition, Hofstadter did not conduct a study of congressional voting to buttress his claim of a reactionary South. Thus, to provide an empirical surrogate for Hofstadter, we turn to the work of John Robert Moore, who arrived at conclusions similar to Hofstadter's on the basis of empirical research.

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In fact, Key and Moore utilize an identical coalitional criterion. Both use a straightforward measure to identify conservative coalition votes as votes when more than half of the Republicans joined more than half of the southern Democrats to oppose the preferences of more than half of nonsouthern Democrats. Key found that just under 10 percent (54) of his Senate votes met the coalitional test. He also applied a more stringent guideline that required at least 70 percent of the southerners to join a majority of Republicans against a majority of nonsouthern Democrats; this measure further reduced the number of coalitional votes to 4 percent (26 roll calls). He utilized not only the low number of such votes but also their character to debunk the notion of a conservative alliance.[26]

Moore, in turn, argued that Key's inclusive universe of roll calls had the effect of underappreciating the extent and significance of the conservative coalition. Moore hypothesized that a focus on significant roll calls would reveal a higher incidence of coalitional, as opposed to party alignment, voting. To test this claim, he restricted his attention to 182 "significant" votes in the Senate from 1942 through 1945.[27] Of these, 24 percent displayed the coalition; and, of these, eight in ten secured Key's threshold of 70 percent southern voting cohesion.[28] "The [conservative] coalition," he concluded, "operated most frequently and most effectively on roll calls dealing with states' rights, agricultural interests, regulation of business, social welfare, labor, public works and resources development, taxation, education, and civil rights."[29]

This claim is very much at odds with our finding that a Republican-southern Democratic alliance appeared on labor questions exclusively.[30] We therefore replicated Key's and Moore's test of the stoutness of the coalition; that is, we examined the appearance of majority Republican and southern Democratic voting on the same side of an issue against the opposite voting pattern of the majority of nonsouthern Democrats, both for our universe of 150 roll calls and separately for each policy domain. Our aggregate findings are much closer to Moore's than to Key's: thirty-one roll calls, or 20 percent of our total, qualify as coalitional

[26] Key did not break his votes into policy categories. Rather, he claimed conservative coalition votes were a compound of diverse parts in which southern regional interests coincided with Republican preferences. By assimilating labor votes into the more inclusive and less focused category of agrarian interests in order to demonstrate the absence of a planter-big business basis for a conservative coalition, he marginalized the distinctive significance of roll calls on labor issues.

[27] John Robert Moore, "The Conservative Coalition in the U.S. Senate, 1942-1945," *The Journal of Southern History* 33 (August 1967). He defined these votes as those that achieved a midpoint score of at least .5 on William Riker's test for determining the significant value of congressional roll calls. Riker's measure identifies the significance of a roll call by a numerical coefficient arrived at from both the degree to which members of Congress participate in a given vote and by the degree to which the vote proves controversial. Riker, "A Method for Determining."

[28] When Moore included all the votes in his data set, as did Key, he found that coalition votes appeared 15 percent of the time.

[29] Moore, "Conservative Coalition," 375.

[30] Moore lists examples of coalition votes, but provides no systematic analysis of the content or frequency of the different issue categories.

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TABLE 5

Southern Democratic-Republican Coalition, 1933–1950: Roll Calls with Majorities of Southern Democrats and Republicans in Agreement in Opposition to Nonsouthern Democratic Majority

Policy	*New Deal*	*Wartime*	*Postwar*	*All Roll Calls*
Civil rights (29)	29% (2)	8% (1)	11% (1)	14% (4)
Fiscal (11)	0	0	14 (1)	9 (1)
Planning (27)	0	0	11 (1)	4 (1)
Regulation (22)	0	0	14 (1)	5 (1)
Welfare state (24)	0	21 (3)	25 (1)	17 (4)
Labor (37)	11 (1)	60 (6)	67 (12)	51 (19)
All votes (150)	7 (3)	20 (10)	31 (17)	20 (30)

votes. Of these, however, nearly two in three (20) were labor votes. The next highest category was the welfare state, where just 16 percent of the votes qualified. Outside the domain of labor, the coalition appeared only 7 percent of the time, which is less frequently than Key found to be the case across his entire universe of roll calls.

The conservative coalition was issue specific. Aside from labor questions, southern representatives did more than reject conservative Republican positions; they joined their nonsouthern colleagues to support much of the party's social democratic agenda with a level of enthusiasm appropriate to a poor region with a heritage of opposition to big business and a history of support for regulation and redistribution. But with their resistance to civil rights, southerners perpetuated a "progressive" coalition that was inherently racist; and their negative tilt on labor questions precluded a social democratic breakthrough for the Democratic party.

From a Structural to a Behavioral Veto

In the 1930s and 1940s, southern representatives possessed a structural veto over Democratic party policy aims. Over the course of the New Deal, wartime, and postwar congresses, their utilization of this potential increased steadily. Just 10 percent of the cases of conservative coalition voting, focusing mainly on labor issues, occurred from the New Deal 73rd through 75th Congresses, 35 percent from the wartime 76th through 78th Congresses, and 55 percent in the postwar 79th through 81st Congresses.[31] In the first period, just 9 percent of the labor roll calls produced coalitional votes. The proportion of instances increased to 58 percent in the middle period, and jumped further to 67 percent in the postwar Congresses. How might we best describe and understand this dramatic shift?

[31] During the first span, there were only three instances of coalitional voting, or just 7 percent of all the period's roll calls. The number of such votes jumped to 19 percent (11) in the middle period, and to 31 percent (17) in the last.

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With the exception of a small number of visible obstructionists, southern members supported the New Deal's programs to stimulate economic growth and development. In turn, President Roosevelt and congressional leaders tailored New Deal legislation to southern preferences. They reached an implicit modus vivendi: southern civil society would remain intact and southern representatives would support the key elements of the administration's program. There would be no attempt to build a mass biracial base in the South; nor would even the most heinous aspects of regional repression, such as lynching, be brought under the rule of law. Further, sponsors fashioned key bills to avoid disturbing the region's racial civilization by employing two main policy instruments: the exclusion of agricultural and domestic labor, the principal occupational categories of blacks, from legislation, including the National Recovery Act, the Wagner Act, Social Security, and the Fair Labor Standards Act; and decentralized administration.[32]

This formula collapsed during the wartime Congresses. Southern pro-labor voting stopped. Southern representatives now joined Republicans to limit the rights of unions and restrict the scope of federal control over labor markets. Two factors account for this shift. First, war mobilization devalued the economic significance of the South. The region had little to offer the war effort at a time when both capital and labor in the North, including black labor, were critically important to military production. Accordingly, southern political elites understood their bargaining position had eroded. Second, wartime labor shortages and military conscription facilitated labor organizing and civil rights agitation. In this more uncertain moment of rapid economic and central state expansion, the South redrew the line between those aspects of the New Deal it would tolerate and those it could not, and it rejected even those arrangements that had permitted the South to vote with the national party in pre-1938 labor votes.

World War II and the role of black soldiers within the American military radically transformed the possibilities for civil rights initiatives by linking them directly to the imperatives and demands of national citizenship. As the war raged in Europe, in August 1940, some seventeen months before Pearl Harbor, Senator Robert Wagner of New York proposed to amend the enlistment section of the Selective Compulsory Service Act by prohibiting discrimination based on race, creed, or color. Apart from the South, Wagner's amendment secured virtually unanimous support. Two years later in August 1942, Congress took up the question of voting by members of the armed forces. The Senate considered two

[32] In 1930, 26 percent of all American workers and 51 percent of black workers labored in agriculture or domestic employment. The respective figures for the South (limited, in this instance, to the eleven states of the Confederacy) were 48 percent and 62 percent. Thus, it is clear that there was an important class as well as racial bias signaled by these exclusions from the purview of the New Deal's key legislative enactments. Detailed state-by-state data based on the 1930 Census appears in Robert C. Lieberman, "Race and the Organization of Social Policy" (Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1992).

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amendments to a bill that provided for armed forces absentee voting. Aiming at the southern white primary system, the first of these amendments, proposed by a Connecticut Republican, John Danaher, proposed to extend its provisions to primary elections. The second, sponsored by Illinois Republican C. Wayland Brooks, sought to eliminate the poll tax from absentee voting. As in the Selective Service debate, in both of these instances southern opposition (8 of the 11 present voted no on the primary and 9 of 11 on the poll tax) was overcome to produce majorities for passage (28-25 for the Danaher amendment and 33-20 for the Brooks amendment). Likewise in the House in October 1942, southern opposition (76-14) to a bill to outlaw the requirement of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting or registering to vote in federal elections was overwhelmed by the rest of the House, as the southerners who voted negatively were joined by only four other Democrats and four Republicans. The bill's supporters treated it as wartime legislation intended to prevent the disunity of citizens at a time of crisis. By contrast, most southerners saw it as an indirect attempt to transform the character of southern representation and the racial civilization of the South itself. While the bill subsequently failed to overcome a filibuster in the Senate, its near passage shook the South.

The next time the poll tax was taken up in the House, in May 1943, southern members accused organized labor of being the nefarious behind-the-scenes actor stimulating support for the legislation. This meddling, Mississippi's Jamie Whitten cautioned, will "make it much more difficult for us who consider ourselves liberals in the South as we struggle to free the poor people in the South and admit them to the economic life of the region and to a participation in its political processes."[33] Such anti-labor demonology was stimulated by the multiracial character of many (especially CIO) unions, their support of civil rights bills, and by the wartime growth in southern labor union membership.

During the 1930s, trade unions began to make inroads in the South, with the establishment of significant labor strongholds in a number of industries, including meat packing, oil refining, the docks, and metal mining, as well as steel and coal. Nonetheless, compared to the rest of the country, the growth of the CIO in the South was relatively modest. Southern union membership remained concentrated mainly in AFL unions and railway brotherhoods. By decade's end, the AFL had fewer than 400,000 southern members, and the CIO had done poorly as well, with under 150,000 members, plus another 100,000 miners in West Virginia. In the newer industries of automobile, rubber, and oil production, where the federation had great success elsewhere, it managed to enroll fewer than 25,000 southerners.

Against this backdrop, World War II had a galvanizing impact. Southern manufacturing jobs grew from 1,657,000 at the outbreak of the war to 2,836,000 at the wartime peak in 1943. With a newly tight labor market and with the

[33] *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, 25 May 1943, 4883.

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protection and encouragement provided by the Fair Employment Practices Committee and the National War Labor Board, union organizing became easier and wage differentials between blacks and whites grew less stark. Signs of bracing and threatening change now could be found in the most unlikely places. The Textile Workers Union of America, a CIO affiliate, succeeded in organizing the immense Dan River, Virginia plant; this, the country's largest cotton mill, had been the site of many bitter defeats. By the end of the war, one in six members of the population of Gadsden, Alabama belonged to a CIO union.[34] To be sure, these various union gains should not be exaggerated. When World War II concluded, there were still considerable gaps between North and South; in 1946, only 20 percent of the South's workers in textile plants, the region's largest industry, were in unions compared with 70 percent in the North. But the direction of change and the potential for union gains in the future challenged the isolation of the southern labor market and provoked southerners in Congress to battle organized labor.[35]

Under these conditions, the anxieties of southern representatives heightened, and the tacit understandings that had governed southern-New Deal relations with respect to votes on labor during the New Deal Congresses could not be sustained. Southern members now adamantly refused to support pro-labor bills, and they began to vote to restrict the newly secured rights of unions. In this second period, the fault line between the South and the rest of the Democratic party widened as labor market and race relations trends and issues conjoined.

If conservative coalitional voting with the Republicans now became characteristic of southern behavior on labor roll calls, the extent and depth of Democratic party cohesion in the other policy areas should not be gainsaid. During the wartime and postwar Congresses there were no issues apart from civil rights and labor where the likeness scores of southern and nonsouthern Democrats dipped below the high threshold of 70. In votes on the welfare state, regulation, planning, and fiscal matters, cross-regional Democratic similarity remained remarkably high.

Postwar Liberalism

How should we judge V. O. Key's rejection, apart from race, of Richard Hofstadter's charge that the South composed a reactionary faction? Hofstadter was too expansive in his portrayal of what he called southern conservatism, but Key too narrowly limited the southern veto to civil rights by failing to recognize the special significance of labor questions.

[34] This discussion draws on F. Ray Marshall, *Labor in the South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 182-243.

[35] Union successes during the war motivated many southern states to pass constitutionally dubious legislation to restrict them. These initiatives were unenforceable in light of provisions of the Wagner Act, but they did set a precedent for right to work laws passed by the various states under the protective umbrella of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. During the war many southern states also passed laws requiring the registration of unions. See ibid., 241-243.

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TABLE 6

Congressional Coalitions by Policy and Period, 1933–1950: Index of Likeness Scores

Congress	Policy	Southern Democrats and Republicans	Southern Democrats and Nonsouthern Democrats	Nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans
New Deal	Civil rights	35	40	65
	Fiscal	18	[98]	16
	Planning	31	[92]	26
	Regulation	47	[94]	47
	Welfare state	40	[93]	44
	Labor	69	[70]	40
	All votes	45	[79]	44
Wartime	Civil rights	32	41	[79]
	Fiscal	31	[92]	40
	Planning	51	[89]	48
	Regulation	[77]	[90]	[78]
	Welfare state	61	[79]	51
	Labor	[77]	48	51
	All votes	55	68	58
Postwar	Civil rights	29	32	[70]
	Fiscal	49	[87]	36
	Planning	60	[87]	46
	Regulation	46	[73]	28
	Welfare state	59	[76]	35
	Labor	[74]	54	33
	All votes	56	64	41

After the successive crises of the Great Depression and World War II, relationships between the state and the economy and between the state and its citizens were redesigned in most western countries within the framework of a new international political economy in the hope that formulas could be discovered to combine liberty and prosperity, democracy and capitalism. This burst of institutional creativity sought effective space between the classical liberal order that had collapsed and the anti-liberal formulas of fascism and communism. It drew on a finite repertoire of options for the organization of markets and the definition of citizenship under the rubrics of planning, regulation, the welfare state, fiscal and monetary policy, corporatism, and representation by different types of interest groups and political parties. So, too, in the United States. In this period, the complex and diverse legacies of the New Deal were sorted out in a context of massively enhanced state capacity. In the Untied States, the war had provoked a fiscal revolution and bureaucratic growth to create a potent central state apparatus; abroad, the United States was incontestably dominant in economic and geopolitical affairs. In this setting, the United States possessed a range of plausible alternatives for constructing ties between the state, economy, and society.

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The period's European social democratic movements privileged the linkage between left-wing political parties and unions. They promoted policy formulas that permitted labor movements to trade the costs of austere wage gains for recognition by and within the state as a fundamental social class and for politically guaranteed social benefits. In the United States, the Democratic party in the 1940s proved incapable of brokering this kind of social democratic bargain. As a consequence, a labor movement that appeared to aspire to the status of such arrangements in the late 1930s and early 1940s reduced its ambitions to those of an interest group (albeit a very important one) in national politics. It pushed for expansive fiscal policies to underpin the collective bargaining goals of securing high wages and strong fringe benefit packages in lieu of a social wage, an integrated labor market, incentives to organize the unorganized, and an institutionalized corporatist role. In the near term, at a time of American economic hegemony and of robust growth in large manufacturing industries, labor prospered. In longer perspective, it is now clear that the place crafted for labor in the 1940s has produced a fateful, perhaps fatal contraction for the labor movement.

"The American Liberal today," D. W. Brogan observed in 1957 from the distance of Cambridge University, "is confronted first of all by the memory of something that did not happen": the development of coherent social democratic programs and organizations. Elsewhere in the West, he observed, the democratic Left had created parties committed to strong political control over capitalist development, labor movements insistent on being recognized on a par with business in corporatist bargaining structures, and coalitions of workers and farmers as bases of political mobilization. The American situation was different in each respect. "The American Liberal has not enough belief in the state to want it to run the economy or in the businessman to want him to run it uncontrolled." The labor movement had reduced the scope of its national political ambitions, and, instead, was giving priority to aggressive collective bargaining in large industries; "the powerful unions have largely contracted out of the state system." And a potential alliance between workers and farmers was distorted by sectionalism and race. "Here," Brogan noted, "the Liberal conscience is most deeply touched and his political behavior seems (to the unfriendly outsider) most schizophrenic. The representative Liberal is a Democrat, or an ally of the Democrats, but in the ranks of 'the Democracy' are most of the most violent enemies of the integration of the Negro into the American community. This is no doubt accidental; it arises from the localization of the most acute form of the colour problem in the region where the Democratic party is traditionally strongest. The necessity for holding the party together makes for strange bedfellows and strange deals."[36]

Focusing on these strange bedfellows and strange deals has proved helpful to understanding why in the late 1940s the American labor movement turned away from the public realm and why the Democratic party was able to coalesce in

[36] D. W. Brogan, "American Liberalism Today" in H. C. Allen and C. P. Hill, eds., *British Essays in American History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), 320, 323, 326.

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support of a liberal but not a social democratic program. The key to both traits was the Democratic party's inability to find a politically acceptable role for the labor movement as a national policy actor. The disappearance of southern tolerance for policies to promote labor organization and develop a national framework for labor markets impelled the more social democratic American options to the political periphery. Instead, the excision of labor thrust the combination of relatively noninterventionist fiscal policies and interest group pluralism to the political center.

The contours of postwar American politics and the unrealized social democratic tendencies of the New Deal and Fair Deal have been accounted for by most scholars either by invoking durable features of American political development, such as the constraints of Lockean ideology and institutional fragmentation and the limits these have imposed on an activist state, or by short-term situational analyses of such matters as presidential tactics or the results of this or that congressional election. By elaborating on what Hofstadter called the southern veto, we have highlighted a critical factor accounting for the resolution of the period's options: the limited place for labor in the American postwar settlement. Our approach thus joins two quite different time lines by exploring how the division between North and South that has been so fundamental in American history became an integral part of the encounter between competing visions of how the state should be linked to the society and to the economy during and especially after the New Deal. In joining structural and contingent elements, our account treats purely situational and ad hoc approaches as inadequate and rejects the idea that all roads in American history necessarily led to the postwar reassertion of American exceptionalism.

The South's veto, we discovered, neither was an all-inclusive rejection of liberalism in favor of conservatism, nor was it limited to questions of civil rights. Rather, the choices made by southern Democrats in the issue area of labor account not only for why the Democratic party's social democratic impulses were thwarted and the importance of the labor movement in politics reduced in scope; but they also provide a basis for understanding why the party was able to find a coherent policy stance of the kind described by Brogan. The South's veto did more than divide the Democratic party from time to time. It also specified the basis on which a party alliance could be forged. If the South was prepared to block the national party on some issues, principally those that concerned race and labor, solidarity between the regions nonetheless could be achieved on terms more acceptable to the South. By discovering just such common ground, the Democratic party in the 1940s defined the landscape and moral geography of postwar American liberalism.*

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APPENDIX

Date	Bill No.		Category	Subject
4/21/33	H.R. 4606	H	Social welfare	Expand work-relief eligibility
4/25/33	H.R. 5081	H	Planning	TVA
5/17/33	H.R. 5081	H	Planning	TVA/Conference Report
5/26/33	H.R. 5755	H	Planning	NIRA
6/8/33	H.R. 5755	S	Labor	Limit implications of NIRA
6/9/33	H.R. 5755	S	Planning	NIRA
5/4/34	H.R. 9323	H	Regulation	Regulate securities market/S.E.C.
5/12/34	S. 3420	S	Regulation	Regulate securities market/S.E.C.
3/21/35	H.J.R. 117	S	Regulation	Restores antitrust laws under NIRA
4/19/35	H.R. 7260	H	Social welfare	Social Security Act
4/19/35	H.R. 7260	H	Social welfare	Social Security Act/increase appropriations
4/26/35	S. 24	S	Race	Anti-Lynching Bill
5/1/35	S. 24	S	Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to adjourn
5/9/35	H.R. 7617	H	Regulation	Regulate banking
5/16/35	H.R. 1958	S	Labor	Wagner Act/add anti-intimidation clause
6/7/35	S.J.R. 113	H	Planning	Transfer NIRA powers to FTC
6/7/35	S.J.R. 113	H	Planning	Extend NIRA
6/11/35	S. 2796	S	Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/"death sentence"
6/11/35	S. 2796	S	Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/divestment procedure
6/11/35	S. 2796	S	Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/passage
6/19/35	H.R. 7260	S	Social welfare	Social Security Act
7/2/35	S. 2796	H	Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/enacting clause
7/2/35	S. 2796	H	Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/recommittal
7/2/35	S. 2796	H	Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/passage
8/24/35	S. 2796	H	Regulation	Public Utilities Holding Act/conference report
4/5/37	H.R. 4985	S	Labor	Disapprove of sit-down strikes
4/12/37	H.R. 125	H	Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to discharge from Rules Committee
4/15/37	H.R. 1507	H	Race	Anti-Lynching Bill
5/12/37	H.R. 6551	H	Social welfare	Expand CCC eligibility
7/31/37	S. 2475	S	Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/recommittal
7/31/37	S. 2475	S	Race	Amend Fair Labor Standards Act/Anti-Lynching
7/31/37	S. 2475	S	Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/passage
8/13/37	H.R. 8202	H	Social welfare	Create Department of Welfare
12/17/37	S. 2475	H	Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/recommittal
1/27/38	H.R. 1507	S	Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to impose cloture
2/16/38	H.R. 1507	S	Race	Anti-Lynching Bill/to impose cloture
5/24/38	S. 2475	H	Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/recommittal
5/24/38	S. 2475	H	Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/passage
6/1/38	H.J.R. 679	S	Planning	National Resources Committee/increase appropriations
6/2/38	H.J. Res. 679	S	Fiscal	Increase work relief appropriations
6/14/38	S. 2475	H	Labor	Fair Labor Standards Act/conference report
3/31/39	H.J.R. 246	H	Social welfare	Reduce work relief appropriations
7/10/39	H.R. 6635	H	Social welfare	Liberalize SSI benefits
7/11/39	H.R. 6635	S	Social welfare	Increase welfare appropriations
7/11/39	H.R. 6635	S	Social welfare	Increase Social Security appropriations
7/12/39	H.R. 6635	S	Social welfare	Encourage states to provide old-age benefits
7/13/39	H.R. 6635	S	Social welfare	Mandate states to provide minimum old-age benefits
7/26/39	S. 2009	H	Regulation	Unify ICC regulations/recommittal

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APPENDIX, *continued*

Date	*Bill No.*		*Category*	*Subject*
7/28/39	S. 2864	S	Social welfare	Extend work-relief eligibility
1/10/40	H.R. 801	H	Race	Anti-Lynching Bill
2/6/40	H.R. 7922	S	Planning	National Resources Committee/decrease appropriations
2/6/40	H.R. 7922	S	Planning	National Resources Committee/appropriation
3/28/40	H.R. 9007	H	Social welfare	Increase appropriations for NYA
4/12/40	H.R. 7922	H	Planning	National Resources Committee/increase appropriations
5/9/40	S. 2009	H	Regulation	Unify ICC regulations/recommittal/reduce rates
5/27/40	S. 1970	S	Labor	Eliminate oppressive labor practices
6/7/40	H.R. 9195	H	Labor	Amend NLRA/weaken board and enforcement
6/19/40	H.R. 10039	S	Fiscal	Reduce government expenses
8/26/40	S. 4164	S	Race	Prohibit discrimination in draft
9/7/40	H.R. 10132	H	Planning	Require firms to produce war materiel
1/31/41	H.R. 2788	H	Fiscal	Reduce government appropriations
5/19/41	H.R. 2476	S	Regulation	Reduce antitrust enforcement appropriations
6/13/41	H.J.R. 193	H	Social welfare	Extend work-relief eligibility
6/19/41	H.J.R. 193	S	Labor	Prevent centralization of work relief administration
7/10/41	S. 1524	H	Labor	National defense labor disputes/strike arbitration
8/5/41	S. 1579	H	Planning	Presidential requisition of war materiel
11/28/41	H.R. 5990	H	Planning	Price controls
12/3/41	H.R. 4139	H	Labor	Amend Vinson Anti-Strike/restrict right to strike
1/27/42	H.R. 5990	S	Planning	Price controls
4/7/42	H.R. 6868	S	Regulation	Strike profit limit on Defense contracts
6/11/42	H.J.R. 324	H	Social welfare	Limit relief appropriations/share burden with states
6/26/42	H.R. 7181	S	Social welfare	Continue CCC appropriations
6/30/42	H.R. 7181	H	Social welfare	Continue CCC appropriations
8/25/42	H.R. 7416	S	Race	Armed Forces absentee voting in primaries
8/25/42	H.R. 7416	S	Race	Prohibit poll tax in Army absentee voting
9/30/42	S.J.R. 161	S	Planning	Wage and price controls
10/13/42	H.R. 1024	H	Race	Prohibit poll tax in presidential voting
11/23/42	H.R. 1024	S	Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill/to impose cloture
5/4/43	S. 796	S	Labor	War labor disputes/restrict executive control over
5/5/43	S. 796	S	Labor	War labor disputes/strengthen WLB
5/25/43	H.R. 7	H	Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
5/27/43	H.R. 1762	S	Planning	Nat'l Resources Planning Board/increase appropriations
5/27/43	H.R. 1762	S	Planning	Nat'l Resources Planning Board/decrease appropriations
6/4/43	S. 796	H	Labor	War labor disputes/Labor Dept. certifies strike
6/4/43	S. 796	H	Labor	War labor disputes/Gov't operates plants
6/18/43	H.R. 2968	H	Planning	Only businessmen in OPA
6/25/43	S. 796	S	Labor	War labor disputes/override veto
6/28/43	H.R. 2935	H	Social welfare	Continue NYA appropriations
7/1/43	H.R. 2935	H	Social welfare	Expand NYA eligibility
10/20/43	S. 637	S	Race	Prohibit discrimination in spending of fed. education funds
1/18/44	H.R. 3687	S	Fiscal	Restrict mineral depletion allowances
3/24/44	H.R. 4070	S	Race	Retain FEPC funding
5/15/44	H.R. 7	S	Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill/to impose cloture
6/20/44	H.R. 4879	S	Race	Strike FEPC funding
6/20/44	H.R. 4879	S	Race	Provide for FEPC appeals
6/20/44	H.R. 4879	S	Race	Limit black FEPC employment

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APPENDIX, *continued*

Date	*Bill No.*		*Category*	*Subject*
3/13/45	H.R. 1984	S	Planning	Public Works planning/increase appropriations
6/11/45	S.J.R. 30	S	Planning	Extend price control
6/12/45	H.R. 7	H	Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
6/26/45	H.R. 3199	S	Labor	USES/increase appropriations
6/28/45	S.J.R. 30	S	Planning	Extend price control
6/30/45	H.R. 3368	S	Race	Retain FEPC funding
6/30/45	S.J.R. 30	H	Planning	Extend price control
9/19/45	S. 1274	S	Labor	USES/return uses to states
9/28/45	S. 380	S	Fiscal	Full Employment Act
12/11/45	H.R. 407	H	Labor	Consider repeal of War Labor Disputes Act
1/29/46	H.R. 4437	H	Labor	USES/return uses to states
2/6/46	S. 380	H	Fiscal	Full Employment Act/conference report
2/7/46	H.R. 4908	H	Labor	Fact-finding boards in labor disputes
2/21/46	H.R. 3370	H	Race	Prohibit lunch funds to segregated schools
2/26/46	S. 962	S	Social welfare	Reduce school lunch program appropriations
3/6/46	H.R. 4761	H	Regulation	Regulate real estate speculation
6/25/46	H.R. 4437	S	Labor	USES/disallow fed. operation of state USES offices
6/25/46	H.R. 4437	S	Labor	USES/disallow fed. discretion over USES
7/1/46	H.J.R. 371	H	Planning	Extend price control
7/12/46	H.J.R. 371	S	Planning	Extend price control
8/1/46	H.J.R. 390	S	Social welfare	Reduce FSA maternal and child appropriations
3/21/47	H.R. 2157	S	Labor	Increase minimum wage
5/7/47	S. 1126	S	Labor	Taft-Hartley/restrict industry-wide bargaining
5/8/47	S. 1126	S	Labor	Taft-Hartley/oversight of union welfare funds
5/9/47	S. 1126	S	Labor	Taft-Hartley/strike closed shop provisions from NLRA
6/17/47	H.R. 1	H	Fiscal	Override veto on Tax Reduction Bill
6/20/47	H.R. 2030	H	Labor	Taft-Hartley/override veto
6/23/47	H.R. 2030	S	Labor	Taft-Hartley/override veto
6/30/47	H.C.R. 49	S	Labor	Reorganization Plan No. 2/transfer USES to Labor
7/12/47	H.R. 3950	S	Fiscal	Cyclic tax planning
7/21/47	H.R. 29	H	Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
12/18/47	S.J.R. 167	S	Regulation	Strike exemptions from antitrust laws
2/24/48	S. 2182	S	Regulation	Remove rent controls in certain areas
3/16/48	S. 2182	S	Regulation	Rent controls/strike enacting clause
3/16/48	H.C.R. 131	S	Labor	Reorganization Plan No. 1/transfer USES to Labor
6/7/48	S. 2655	S	Race	Exempt servicemen from poll tax
8/4/48	H.R. 29	S	Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill/to adjourn
3/22/49	H.R. 1731	S	Regulation	Allow cities to decontrol rents
4/21/49	S. 1070	S	Planning	Public housing projects' referenda
4/21/49	S. 1070	S	Race	Prohibit discrimination in public housing
6/30/49	S. 249	S	Labor	Subordinate state labor law to federal
7/26/49	H.R. 3199	H	Race	Anti-Poll Tax Bill
7/27/49	H.R. 4177	S	Fiscal	Increase BoB appropriations
7/27/49	H.R. 4177	S	Fiscal	Increase CEA appropriations
8/16/49	S.R. 147	S	Social welfare	Reject creation of Dept. of Welfare
8/17/49	S.R. 151	S	Labor	Disapprove transfer of USES to Labor
8/30/49	S. 653	S	Labor	Minimum wage exemptions
9/29/49	H.R. 1689	S	Fiscal	Balance budget by 1950

continued

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APPENDIX, *continued*

Date	*Bill No.*		*Category*	*Subject*
10/3/49	S. 2116	H	Planning	Public Works Planning
10/14/49	S. 1000	H	Regulation	FTC/recommittal
2/23/50	H.R. 4453	H	Race	Prohibit employment discrimination
6/12/50	S. 3181	S	Regulation	Extend rent controls
6/20/50	H.R. 6000	S	Social welfare	Include needy disabled under Social Security
8/21/50	S. 3936	S	Planning	Price and wage controls

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Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe

MICHAEL BERNHARD

With the collapse of communist regimes across the former Soviet bloc, reforms of one sort or another are now taking place throughout the eastern half of Europe. Progress towards democracy in the region seems unambiguously underway only in the area of East Central Europe—the former German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In discussions of this democratization, the reemergence of civil society is often noted as a significant development. The first purpose of this account is to clarify the meaning of the term "civil society." Its second and central purpose is to try to understand the relationship of civil society to democratization in the East Central European context and on a general theoretical level.

Modern democracy, as well as the limited forms of representative government that preceded it, have only existed in conjunction with a civil society. It constitutes the sphere of autonomy from which political forces representing constellations of interests in society have contested state power. Civil society has been a necessary condition for the existence of representative forms of government including democracy. One question that I will try to answer is whether it is, or can be, more than this. Before turning to a discussion of contemporary East Central Europe I will first discuss the concept of civil society in historical and conceptual terms.

Civil Society

The contemporary notion of civil society is a relatively recent development. According to John Keane, before the eighteenth century the term roughly corres-

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ponded to that of the state.[1] Civil society defined in contrast to the state appears in political philosophy in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century. It is part of the vocabulary of both Scottish Enlightenment thought, for example, Adam Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*,[2] and of German Idealism. The concept of a civil society juxtaposed to the state figures prominently both in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and in Marx's critique of Hegel and the Hegelians, particularly in *On the Jewish Question*.

Civil society as an historical phenomenon first began to take shape in late medieval-early modern Europe. It refers to social groups who were emancipated from restrictions placed upon them by feudal and absolutist systems. Historically, these elements developed in emerging commercial towns and cities. Certain urban elements, notably forerunners of the bourgeoisie such as merchants and guildsmen, were granted representation as an estate, privileges of local rule, and economic autonomy within the feudal system. After many of these political rights and privileges were nullified by absolutism, these social groups began to reassert themselves as a critical constituency of the increasingly public rule of the monarchy. By the late eighteenth century certain political forces within civil society became strong enough to successfully challenge the power of monarchies.[3]

In this process of emancipation, a sphere of autonomy for social actors emerged. This new public space came to be situated between the official public life of the monarchy, the state, and the nobility, and that of private and/or communal life. Over time a range of associations, organizations, parties, movements, and the like came to populate this public space. These included political groupings such as modern political parties, various associations (professional, cultural, social, union, etc.), social movements, as well as the press and publishing.

These forces were able to autonomously organize themselves outside the dominant official political sphere and to compel the state through political struggles to recognize and respect their existence. With time they were able to use this autonomy from the state to institutionalize influence over the official political sphere and radically alter it.

A critical component of the creation of this civil society was the establishment of legal boundaries that protected the existence of an independent public space from the exercise of state power, and then the ability of organizations within it to influence the exercise of power. The most important historical agent of these

[1] John Keane, "Despotism and Democracy, the Origins and Development of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State, 1750–1850" in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State, New European Perspectives* (London: Verso, 1988), 35–36.

[2] Keane stresses that Ferguson saw a danger that the civil society of his time was preparing the ground for despotism. Ferguson advocated a new type of civil society as the way to avoid this. His normative prescription for public-spiritedness and civic association prefigures a modern liberal notion of what civil society should be. Ibid., 42–44.

[3] Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), chaps. 3, 4, esp. 77–85.

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changes, at least in the West, was the bourgeoisie. In other parts of Europe, an important role was also played by an autonomous intelligentsia.

In time, other parts of society thoroughly excluded from political life were able to assert themselves and extend citizenship throughout society. In particular, the proletariat organized in Labor and Social Democratic parties, and the women's suffrage movement[4] was able in some states to struggle for enfranchisement.

This capsule account is in certain ways too general. It attempts to condense important themes in the rise of modern Europe very schematically. Furthermore, individual national patterns differed in important ways. Yet this rough notion of civil society in an historical sense provides the basis for a structural and institutional definition. This exposition has yielded a notion of a public space structurally located between official public and private life and populated by a range of different autonomous organizations. Thus civil society has concrete structural boundaries and is populated by a diverse set of agents. However, civil society requires more than this. For these agents to constitute a civil society they need the sanction of the state; the public space must be guaranteed as a realm of freedom from the state by the state itself. Thus civil society, as well as the private sphere, must be legally separated from the state by law, and the actors within it must be guaranteed specific personal and group liberties so that they may pursue their broadly conceived interests. Barring this, a liberated public space would be but an anarchy of competing interests.

Within Europe, how autonomous civil society became and how much influence it was able to exert upon the state varied from state to state. The work of the Hungarian historian Jeno Szucs on the emergence of three distinct developmental areas in Europe (Western, East Central, and Eastern) provides a good starting point to discuss these distinctions. He traces the origins of these regions back to different responses to the "First Crisis" of feudalism (1300–1450). The western response was "the emergence of 'absolutism' and its threefold solution: preserving whatever was preservable from feudalism, preparing for capitalism, and forming the framework of the nation-state system." The Russian (Eastern) response was to bind the society in a much tighter relationship with the monarchy (that is, second serfdom, service requirements for the nobility, etc.). While these were both absolutist solutions Szucs demonstrates that they had very different results. In the West society was subordinated to the state but was able to preserve certain autonomies and later to reassert itself. In the East society was "nationalized." While the western response prepared the way for capitalism, the eastern variant consolidated feudalism in a new and stronger form.[5]

Szucs also notes that there was no uniform pattern of response to the crisis in the intermediate region, East Central Europe. Instead, states reacted in singular

[4] Agnes Heller makes this neglected point in "On Formal Democracy" in Keane, *Civil Society*, 31. For an excellent discussion of how civil society was limited by gender see Carol Pateman, "The Fraternal Social Contract" in ibid.

[5] Jeno Szucs, "Three Historical Regions of Europe" in ibid., 311–12, 318.

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ways that combined elements of the eastern and western solutions to the crisis with varying results (Prussia and Austria were clearly more effective in their responses than the Polish Commonwealth or the Kingdom of Bohemia).[6] While Szucs concludes his analysis well before the modern era, these patterns had important ramifications for the emergence of civil society and representative government in subsequent eras. While the boundaries of these historic regions have fluctuated over time, it still can be argued that these three distinct historical regions exist.

Only in Western Europe did the emergence of civil society coincide to a significant degree with the idealized account presented above. Here, this process culminated in the late nineteenth century in the creation of full parliamentary democracy. Political parties representing constellations of interests became the means through which competing forces in civil society contested state power.

East Central Europe included the lands of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern monarchies. Thus it encompassed present day Germany, Austria, Hungary, much of Poland, the northern parts of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Transylvania. Here the process fell short of the fuller development of civil society achieved in Western Europe. In these areas, civil society was able to carve out limited areas of autonomy from the ruling dynastic states. However, the monarchies were also able to maintain a great deal of autonomy from civil society. Critically, parliaments were constrained with respect to the monarchy, and governments were not fully responsible to parliament. The press was subjected to greater censorship than in the West, and certain ethnic groups were subjected to legal discrimination.

The pattern of political development in this region can be summed up under the rubric of *Rechtsstaat*—a state of law. Boundaries between the state and civil society were regulated by law. Exercise of political power was codified in a well defined system of law but at the same time fell short of fully developed parliamentary democracy.

With the collapse of European empires at the end of World War I, numerous successor states were created. For a time during the ensuing interwar period civil society achieved its most elaborated development in the region, at least until the present era. Initially the press, political parties, and other organizations enjoyed a greater measure of relative freedom than before or after the two great wars. At the beginning of this period, most successor states experimented with parliamentary rule. Czechoslovakia, however, was the only country where democracy lasted for an appreciable length of time. In most of the other states, democratic experiments collapsed into dictatorship. Yet in some of these states, the structures of civil society were not subjected to the leveling (*Gleichschaltung*) that was so frightfully practiced by Stalin and Hitler.

Even in the petty dictatorships of Józef Piłsudski in Poland and Miklos Horthy in Hungary, civil society was able to maintain and defend some of its autonomy.

[6] Ibid., 322–329.

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Both countries enjoyed a fairly lively press, albeit subjected to censorship, but nevertheless not an official press in the Soviet and Nazi sense. While elected by less than fair franchise[7] and subject to limits on their ability to freely organize and in their power over the government, in both cases parliaments and political parties continued to play an important role in the system. These were dictatorships, but not dictatorships capable of inspiring the term "totalitarian" as in Germany or the Soviet Union. In the period that followed World War II, except for a short period of coalition governments from 1945–1948, civil society in those parts of East Central Europe that came under Soviet control was suppressed by the imposition of Stalinist institutions.

Szucs confines his discussion of Eastern Europe to the Russian Empire. In the Romanov dominions, the pattern of feudal society and absolute monarchy survived well into the modern era. In Russia per se there were some stirrings of the emergence of civil society. These included the *Zemstvo* (rural self-government dominated by the nobility) movement, the emergence of a *Duma* (legislature) with fairly broad power for a short period of time after the revolution of 1905, the birth of modern political parties and a modern press, and the development of councils during the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Such stirrings were definitively and ruthlessly squashed by Stalin's revolution from above.

The areas of Southeastern Europe, which remained under Ottoman domination into the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, might be understood as akin to the Eastern European pattern, particularly with reference to development of civil society. While Ottoman political and economic development differed greatly from Romanov, it also strongly retarded the development of civil society.[8] Ultimately, the autonomous social organization that did emerge in the Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was destroyed, except in Greece, when the region fell within Stalin's sphere of influence.

From Dissidence to Opposition

During the 1970s, some opponents of the communist system in East Central Europe changed their resistance strategy from what has been described as dissidence to what I will term opposition. It is the difference between these two

[7] For details on the electoral process in Poland and Hungary, see Andrew C. Janos, "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe," *World Politics* 41 (April 1989): 343; and Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 63–64, 69–72.

[8] For accounts of Ottoman organization in the Balkans and its long-term political and economic effects, see Robert Brenner, "Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe in Light of Developments in the West" in Daniel Chirot, ed., *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press); Fikret Adanir, "Tradition and Rural Change in Southeastern Europe During Ottoman Rule" in ibid.; Gail Stokes, "The Social Origins of Eastern European Politics" in ibid.; Ivo Banac, "Political Change and National Diversity," *Daedalus* 119 (Winter 1990); and George Schöpflin, "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe," *Daedalus* 119 (Winter 1990).

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strategies and their practical achievements that made the reconstruction of civil society under communist rule possible. Dissidence emerged as a response to the collapse of the revisionist project of creating socialism with a human face in both Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the stark conservatism of the Brezhnev era that followed.

In the USSR the varieties of dissidence were typified by three outstanding figures: Aleksander Solzhenitysn (traditional, religious, and nationalist in orientation); Andrei Sakharov (liberal and civil libertarian in orientation); and Roy Medvedev (in-party and appealing for a return to a "true" Leninist orientation). In a number of countries there were important dissident revisionists. In Hungary the Budapest School of Humanist Marxism was quite influential, until several of its important thinkers emigrated and younger activists switched to an oppositional mode of politics. In Yugoslavia the Praxis Group continued in this vein as did Rudolf Bahro and Robert Havemann in East Germany. In Bulgaria and Rumania harsh repression stymied almost all attempts at resistance. In Poland and Czechoslovakia dissenters remained on the defensive in the wake of post-1968 repression until the emergence of opposition revivified resistance in both countries.

Dissidence was in essence a form of moral suasion; it addressed grievances to the party-state, chastising it as to how it should act.[9] After revisionism failed to bring the party-state under the control of reformers, some critical Marxists continued to struggle for a more humane socialism. However, after 1968, dissident Marxists were marginalized within ruling parties or forced to leave them. At this juncture, revisionist Marxism lost its rationale and would become increasingly irrelevant with the shift to oppositional resistance strategies. Other dissidents made their appeals from outside the framework of the party and Marxism, most often on the basis of liberal or traditional values.

For dissidence as a strategy to have succeeded, ruling elites would have had to heed the suggestions of dissidents. In retrospect, considering the ultraconservative nature of the rule in the region at this time, the prospect of dissidence bringing about real change was clearly limited. Ultimately, it was reduced to the articulation of an agenda of change without any concrete program to implement it, except a hope that those in power would listen.

The change from a dissident to an oppositional resistance strategy was marked by a shift of focus. Oppositionists ceased to be preoccupied with telling the party-state authorities how to act and concentrated their efforts on society as the basis for resistance. One of the earliest theorists to advocate this new position was the exiled Polish philosopher, Leszek Kolakowski, who was still quite influential in intellectual circles in Poland. In his essay, "Hope and Hopelessness," he

[9] Janos Kis and Gyorgy Bence, writing under a pseudonym, observed that, "Even those people who have criticized the policies of the apparatus in the name of the working class have in fact addressed themselves to the apparatus and not to the working class itself." Marc Rakovski, *Towards an East European Marxism* (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), 105.

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broke with the prevailing pessimism about the possibility of democratic political change in Eastern Europe after the Soviet normalization of Czechoslovakia. Given Poland's relation to the USSR, the prospects for democratic political reform seemed almost hopeless, yet Kolakowski found hope in the path of reform because he felt Soviet-type systems were entangled in a web of unresolvable contradictions.[10] Because the existing system was only able to maintain itself by preventing resistance on the part of society, Kolakowski believed that the system could be reformed by countertendencies of social resistance that exploited these contradictions. Thus he held out hope for a "reformist orientation in the sense of a belief in the possibility of effective, gradual, and partial pressures, exercised in a long-term perspective of social and national liberation."[11]

This thread was picked up from Kolakowski by certain members of the opposition in Poland in the mid-1970s, notably Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik, who developed this gradual long-term strategy even further. Both of them were important activists in the first group that effectively translated this new strategy into a practical politics, the Workers' Defense Committee [Komitet Obrony Robotników] (KOR). Though others had similar theoretical insights—philosophers Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis in Hungary [12] and Vaclav Havel and others associated with the Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia[13]—nowhere did the strategy have such practical success as in Poland.

This shift in orientation from dissidence to opposition is dramatically illustrated in the political development of Jacek Kuroń. In the mid-1960s, he and Karol Modzelewski advocated a program of self-managing socialism in which workers and peasants, not the party, would exercise the key role in political and economic decision making. Yet they articulated their thoughts in a famous "Open Letter to the Party" and not to workers and peasants themselves.[14] Later Kuroń in his "Reflections on a Program of Action" would advocate change effected by social movements exerting pressure from below.[15]

Michnik succinctly summed up this shift to society in his highly influential essay "The New Evolutionism":

[10] Leszek Kolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," *Survey* 17 (Summer 1971): 42–48.

[11] Ibid., 49.

[12] In particular, their chapter "The Intellectuals" on the possibility of a *samizdat* "counter-public sphere" created by critical intellectuals was an important contribution. Rakovski, *Towards an East European Marxism*, 39–72.

[13] Vaclav Benda coined the notion of a "parallel polis" alongside the existing system. It was adopted by others such as Havel in his essay "The Power of the Powerless." See Steven Lukes, "Introduction" and Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless" in Vaclav Havel, et al., *The Power of the Powerless* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 11–12, 78–81.

[14] See Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski, *List otwarty do partii* [Open Letter to the Party] (Paris: Instytyt Literacki, 1966), 76–89.

[15] Jacek Kuroń, "Myśli o programie działanie," [Reflections on a Program of Action] *Polityka i Odpowiedzialność* (London: Aneks, 1984), 124–142.

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> Such a programme of evolution should be addressed to independent public opinion and not just to the totalitarian authorities. Instead of acting as a prompter to the government, telling it how to improve itself, this programme should tell society how to act. As far as the government is concerned, it can have no clearer counsel than that provided by social pressure from below.[16]

In Poland the emergence of a range of social movements in the late 1970s marked the emergence of the first opposition in the Soviet bloc. Those efforts would later culminate in the birth of Solidarity and the reconstruction of a civil society in Poland.

Democratization and the Reconstitution of Civil Society

As a result of the radical reforms and revolutions of 1989–1990 in East Central Europe, new elites throughout the region have committed themselves to democratizing political life in their countries. Clearly the reconstitution of civil society as a step in creating forms of authority dependent on societal consent is an essential part of this process. Civil society is a necessary condition for democratic government.

In order to understand the relationship of civil society to democratization and whether it is or can be more than a necessary condition for democracy I will comparatively analyze the differing roles that the reconstitution of civil society played in the democratic breakthroughs in the four countries of East Central Europe. The case of Poland is a particularly striking one. Here the reconstitution of civil society preceded that of the other countries in the region by ten years and remains the only East Central European case of the self-liberation of civil society.[17]

The Polish Case

The first step in the self-liberation of civil society in Poland was the successful implementation of an oppositional rather than a dissident resistance strategy in response to the crushing of the workers' strikes of June 1976.[18] The most important social actor in the creation of this opposition was the Workers' Defense

[16] Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," *Survey* 22 (Summer/Autumn 1976): 274.

[17] There is evidence that similar self-liberations have occurred under a rather different set of circumstances in the Slovenian and Croatian republics of multinational Yugoslavia. For details see Paul Shoup, "Crisis and Reform in Yugoslavia," *Telos* 79 (Spring 1989): 141–43; and Tomaz Mastnak, "Civil Society in Slovenia: From Opposition to Power," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 23 (Autumn/Winter 1990): 305–14. I am grateful to Paul Shoup for alerting me to the significance of these events. Whether recent events in a number of the former Soviet republics can be seen in a similar light cannot be discounted.

[18] For details on this strike movement, see Michael Bernhard, "The Strikes of June 1976 in Poland," *East European Politics and Societies* 1 (Fall 1987): 363–92.

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Committee (KOR). It was founded specifically to help those repressed by the party-state in the aftermath of the strikes.[19] KOR began the work of carving out public space in Poland by maintaining itself outside the official structure of party-state political life. In waging an amnesty campaign for the repressed, KOR also played the definitive role in creating an underground or *samizdat* press with a regular circulation.

KOR's foundation and practice inspired others in Poland to form organizations and to contest state policy. Some of these organizations belonged to the larger milieu of the KOR movement and benefited from direct support by the committee. Additionally, other oppositional groups with different political or ideological orientations competed with KOR. Opposition grew to a respectable size, then quite unprecedented in the Soviet bloc, in the period prior to the strike wave of July–August 1980. This broader movement became highly differentiated in terms of the functions played by different organizations, their political orientations, and their social composition. By the end of the 1970s, the proliferation of various organizations and movements, their geographic dispersion, the growing participation of society in their activities, and the broad dissemination of the underground press liberated the public space in Poland, and the actors arrayed within it were positioned as a potential basis for a reconstituted civil society.[20]

Furthermore, this array of social movements, organizations, and initiatives had developed a self-defense capability that forced the party-state to tolerate their existence. This was critical in establishing the boundaries of the public space and in enforcing the state-society separation critical to reconstitution of civil society. The opposition also developed capabilities to apply pressure upon the party-state to compel it to change certain unacceptable policies. This development marked the beginning of the process of curtailing state autonomy from interests in society.

While these developments were important landmarks in the self-liberation of civil society in Poland, they still fell short of a full reconstitution of civil society. This was because the Polish party-state had still made no de jure recognition of the opposition, its right to exist, or the boundaries of the public space it had carved out. The fact that the existence of these movements was based on their ability to defend themselves and the public space in the face of a hostile state makes these developments something less than the reconstitution of civil society.

Still, from the perspective of the late 1970s, this was a novel and unprecedented development. The Polish opposition liberated the public space that civil society came to occupy. This remains the only unambiguous case to date in Eastern and East Central Europe where an opposition created an extensive public space on

[19] For details on KOR's foundation, see Michael Bernhard, *The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976–1980* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), chap. 4.

[20] Ibid., chap. 6.

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a national scale on the basis of its own power and successfully maintained its boundaries vis-à-vis the state through practices of social self-defense. This is the space into which Solidarity and other independent movements of the 1980s would emerge.

However, it is only with the strikes of the summer of 1980 that we can talk about the reconstitution of civil society in Poland. The massive working-class strike waves accomplished something that the opposition movements of the 1970s did not. In accepting the twenty-one demands of the Gdańsk Agreement (as well as the agreements negotiated in Szczecin and Jastrzębie-Zdrój), the Polish party-state legally recognized the boundaries of the public space and the autonomy of the organizations situated within it. The accords of the summer of 1980 and the subsequent struggles over their implementation marked the reconstitution of civil society in Poland, albeit only for a short time.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski's declaration of a martial law in 1981 temporarily disrupted the reconstitution of civil society by withdrawing legal recognition of independent organizations within the public space and attempting to destroy the organizations themselves. It was ultimately unsuccessful in this attempt, because the social forces of the deinstitutionalized civil society were able to organize a broad underground self-defense movement.[21]

Polish politics throughout most of the 1980s lapsed into a stalemate. The party-state was unable to successfully reform the stagnant Polish economy or to fully isolate the opposition from its sources of social support. The opposition, while successfully defending the public space and its organizational integrity, was unable to regain its legal status or to compel the regime to make much needed reforms of the economy and the political system. This deadlock was finally broken in late 1988 after two small strike waves led the party-state to seek compromise out of fear of further deterioration of the economy and renewed working-class unrest. Making use of the expanded room for maneuver afforded by Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership in the Soviet Union, the party-state regime entered into roundtable negotiations on reform with Solidarity as the only seemingly palatable alternative.[22]

The unexpected and spectacular results of these negotiations are well known. In brief, the party-state legally recognized Solidarity and other independent movements and allowed them to legally contest partially free elections. This development reinstitutionalized civil society after an eight year hiatus. Further-

[21] For details on the underground, see Maciej Lopinski, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk, *Konspira, Solidarity Underground* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and Michael T. Kaufman, *Mad Dreams, Saving Graces—Poland: A Nation in Conspiracy* (New York: Random House, 1989).

[22] I address developments in the 1980s in more detail in "Legitimation and Instability: The Fatal Link," Program on Central and Eastern Europe, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Working Paper Series 2, 1990, 42–52.

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more, by unexpectedly allowing the forces within civil society to contest a number of seats in parliament, the party-state established institutional mechanisms for civil society to articulate its interests and even contest state power. By triumphing decisively in the elections and forcing the formation of a Solidarity-led coalition government, Solidarity took reform beyond the reconstitution of civil society and ventured into the realm of the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy.

Thus in Poland we see a unique relationship between the reconstitution of civil society and democratization. Civil society's self-liberation, growing out of the opposition movement of the 1970s, Solidarity's period of legal existence in 1980–1981, and the Solidarity underground of the 1980s were the driving forces behind the democratization of Polish politics. Not only was the Polish opposition able to carve out public space, but it also secured the legal guarantees necessary for a civil society. The actors in turn were able to affect a radical diminution in the autonomy of state from society by a program of democratization that has made the exercise of state power directly dependent on the support of social forces within civil society.

The central purpose of this article is to understand the role of civil society in the democratic transitions in East Central Europe. Were generalizations just to be drawn from Poland, a case where civil society liberated itself in a struggle for democracy, we might be tempted to conclude that civil society was the driving force behind democratization in the region as a whole. In the next sections, I will use the secondary literature on the democratic transitions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to see if such comprehensive claims about civil society are warranted.

To do so, I will comparatively analyze the role that the reconstitution of civil society played in the democratic breakthroughs in these three other cases. The Polish pattern will serve as the standard of comparison. By treating martial law as a temporary interruption, the Polish democratic transition can be understood in fairly linear terms. The self-liberation of civil society in Poland began with the formation of opposition movements. These movements then were able to effectively liberate and defend a public space from the party-state. Later they were able to compel the party-state to legally recognize their existence and the boundaries of the public space. This civil society was able to coexist for a time with a moribund authoritarian regime. Social forces within this reconstituted civil society then negotiated a compromise with the regime, which allowed them to contest state power through parliamentary elections. They continued and expanded the process of democratizing the state itself after triumphing at the polls.

In comparing Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia to Poland, I will pay attention to the extent to which opposition developed, whether it was able to liberate the public space and acquire the legal sanctions necessary for the reconstitution of civil society, and whether this played a role in the democratic breakthrough in each country.

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Hungary

On the surface there are a number of similarities between the Polish and Hungarian cases. After many of the important figures of the humanist Marxist Budapest school were sent into exile in 1973, an opposition began to emerge later in the decade. The Hungarian opposition was second only to the Polish in terms of development. It sponsored a number of modestly successful initiatives and averted full-scale repression. One of its more impressive successes was in the field of independent underground publishing, where the Hungarians brought out a number of books and several periodicals on a regular basis.[23] Some activists also established a Foundation for the Support of the Poor (SZETA). Over time such initiatives came to be joined by programs of uncensored lectures patterned on the Polish Flying University,[24] independent ecological movements such as The Danube Circle (*Duna Kor*), and peace movements like Dialogue (*Dialogus*).

Dialogue was able to stage a number of peaceful demonstrations in Budapest,[25] and to engage western peace movements in discussion on peace and human rights.[26] The Hungarian ecologists were also able to stage a number of protests.[27] The most impressive of these centered on the joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project, which evoked coordinated international protest.[28]

In the mid-1980s the scope of public involvement began to grow modestly. One change was a rise in the number of public demonstrations, which often included organized speakers and agendas. These demonstrations tended to draw larger crowds when they commemorated important events in Hungarian history, for example, the revolutions of 1848 and 1956, or protested maltreatment of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Transylvania.[29]

While the Hungarian opposition managed to achieve modest success, it did not grow as extensively or become as differentiated as its Polish counterpart. It

[23] Underground books began to appear in Hungary in 1977 and were joined by a number of journals beginning in 1979. The first independent publishing house (AB) began to function in 1981.

[24] For more information on the Flying University in Poland see Bernhard, *Origins*, chap. 6.

[25] Andras Bozoki, "Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary," *Sudosteuropa* 37 (July-August 1988): 381.

[26] Bill Lomax, "The Hungarian Peace Movement," *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe* 6 (Winter 1982-83): 35-6.

[27] Andras Korosenyi, "The Emergency [sic] of Plurality Trends and Movements in Hungary's Society in the Mid-1980s," *Sudosteuropa* 37 (November-December 1988): 646; H. Gordon Skilling, *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989), 184; and Gabor Revesz, *Perestroika in Eastern Europe, Hungary's Economic Transformation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 128.

[28] Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack, *East European Fault Lines: Dissent, Opposition and Social Activism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 212, 214; and Jacques Rupnik, "Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?" *Daedalus* 119 (Winter 1990): 264.

[29] Revesz, *Perestroika*, 128; Skilling, *Samizdat*, 186; and Timothy Garton Ash, *The Use of Adversity* (New York: Random House, 1989), 226-7.

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carved out a limited public space, but was confined largely to the capital city, Budapest, and to a small number of intellectuals of liberal and social democratic orientation.

Hungary differs considerably from Poland in that the reform wing of the party played a critical role in promoting the reconstitution of civil society. Polish communists were forced to comply with the demands of well organized movements in an already extensively liberated public space; the Hungarian reform communists intervened to prevent such a development. The impetus behind this action was the exhaustion of the Kadarist path of reform. Reformers such as Imre Pozsgay, Reszo Nyers, and Miklos Nemeth saw that the economic reforms had come to a political dead end due to the inability of Janos Kadar and the party's conservative wing to move beyond limited marketization as Hungary's economy stagnated and living standards deteriorated. Political reform thus emerged as a prerequisite to a solution of economic difficulties. At a party conference held in May 1988, Kadar and a number of supporters were eventually ousted from the Politburo and Central Committee.[30] Kadar was replaced as general secretary by a low-key party bureaucrat, Karoly Grosz, who later was replaced in response to even greater pressure for a radical transformation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

Considering the deterioration of the economy and the stirrings of opposition, the situation in Hungary was beginning to look pre-Polish. The Budapest critical intelligentsia consolidated their activity in a network of independent initiatives in fall 1987. They were joined in the late 1980s by new intellectual organizations such as an independent student movement—the League of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], some small independent unions,[31] and a better coordinated environmental movement.[32] A key development was the foundation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum in September 1987. It represented a new type of opposition, encompassing more traditional Hungarian populists and nationalists, many from outside Budapest.[33] The forum espoused a "third way" between western capitalism and Soviet communism. Its ideal was a "garden Hungary" of local communities with a multiparty system and a mixed market economy. It also put greater stress on local and economic autonomy—cooperatives, small farms, workers' councils, local self-government, etc.[34]

At this juncture, party reformers in Hungary also made use of Gorbachev's window of opportunity to push forward with more radical reforms including

[30] Revesz, *Perestroika*, 125–7; and Charles Gati, "Reforming Communist Systems: Lessons from the Hungarian Experience" in William E. Griffith, ed., *Central and Eastern Europe, The Opening Curtain* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 235–6.

[31] Laszlo Urban, "Hungary in Transition, the Emergence of Opposition Parties," *Telos* 79 (Spring 1989): 114.

[32] Bugajski and Pollack, *East European Fault Lines*, 215.

[33] Bozoki, "Critical Movements," 383–4.

[34] Andras Bozoki, "Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary," *East European Politics and Societies* 4 (1990): 223.

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the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy. Since the Hungarian opposition was still very limited in scope, reformers began to encourage its development so that it would have a credible partner in the reform process. The party literally acted as a catalyst in the reconstruction of civil society.[35] It did not do so for altruistic reasons. Some reformers like Pozsgay were genuinely popular and felt that a renovated Communist party could continue to play a role because of its history of reform and relative tolerance, and its success in promoting stability and relative prosperity after 1956.

In late 1987 the regime began informal discussions with official mass organizations, the established opposition, and new groups on the shape of reform.[36] Soon thereafter independent groups were officially allowed to form parties and other associations to become the state's partner in the process of democratization and further marketization of the economy. In the fall of 1988, historical parties such as the Smallholders and the Social Democrats were reconstituted by their surviving leaders.[37] This sequence of events initiated a process whereby the party tactically retreated from its controlling positions without obstructing the development of political competitors.

The reevaluation of the Revolution of 1956 was a key issue in both the struggle within the party and the activization of Hungarian society. The reinterment of the corpse of Imre Nagy, the executed leader of the revolution, from an unmarked grave to a place of honor in June 1989 was a watershed. For Hungarian society it represented a long overdue vindication of their actions in 1956 and a repudiation of both the Soviet invasion and Kadar's repressive policies during his initial period as party chief (1956–1961). The reburial also had a catalytic effect within the ruling party. Grosz was effectively demoted at the next Central Committee Plenum from first secretary to the only traditional party loyalist in a new collective party executive, the Presidium, which he shared with the reformers Nyers, Pozsgay, and Nemeth. Grosz eventually left the party when it transformed itself into the Hungarian Socialist Party.

Roundtable negotiations in June 1989 set free elections for the spring of 1990.[38] A coalition of conservative parties led by the Democratic Forum was able to

[35] This aspect of the Hungarian pattern of democratization became manifest in a conversation I had with Laszlo Schiffer, the head of the independent union of film industry workers. Schiffer spoke about how he as the head of a tiny union found himself thrust into the role of a full partner in discussions on the future of trade unions in Hungary. Reform Communist Imre Pozsgay, who became a prominent force in politics as general secretary of the People's Patriotic Front (a broad-based transmission belt to society), seems to have played a strong role in promoting greater societal activism in support of reform. He, for instance, attended some of the early meetings of the Hungarian Democratic Forum as an observer. Also his supervision of the press in the late 1980s allowed the official Hungarian press to become an important independent and critical voice for reform. See Urban, "Hungary in Transition," 114, 116.

[36] Elemer Hankiss, "In Search of a Paradigm," *Daedalus* 119 (Winter 1990): 205.

[37] Urban, "Hungary in Transition," 116.

[38] Hankiss, "In Search of a Paradigm," 205 n. 47.

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defeat the Alliance of Free Democrats (organized by the Budapest-based urban opposition), the Socialist Party (the reform Communists), and others.[39]

East Germany

Prior to the East German Revolution of 1989, there was only scattered resistance in the German Democratic Republic, mostly antiwar and ecological protest.[40] In comparison to the other countries of East Central Europe, opposition on human rights grounds and regular underground publishing got a late start.[41] New opposition movements, however, remained fairly isolated from society at large because of the efficiency of the East German security apparatus and because the regime had at its disposal a highly effective, low-cost repressive option—deportation to West Germany. This made it very easy for the security service to decapitate initiatives before they could gain political momentum.

This option ceased being effective in summer 1989, when large numbers of East Germans began to use Hungary's newly opened border with Austria to flee to the Federal Republic. This flight, combined with Gorbachev's refusal to sanction mass repression of demonstrators demanding change on the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the DDR in October 1989, shook the Honecker leadership.

The inability of the Honecker regime to bring an end to the demonstrations either by repression or promises of reform led to its downfall. A group of prominent communists from the ruling group who were more open to dialogue with society, including Egon Krenz, Gunter Schabowski, and Hans Modrow, replaced Erich Honecker and his more rigid supporters.

Krenz decided drastic action was necessary to stop the flight of East Germans westward. This flight symbolically was a ringing denouncement of forty years

[39] For a summary of the political tendencies in Hungary, see Bozoki, "Post-Communist Transition," 228–9.

[40] Some of the more important works chronicling and analyzing these movements include Roger Woods, *Opposition in the GDR under Honecker, 1971–85: An Introduction and Documentation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic," *Problems of Communism* 38 (March-June 1989); Bruce Allen, *Germany East, Dissent and Opposition* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989); Werner Volkmer, "East Germany: Dissenting Views During the Last Decade" in Rudolf Tokes, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1979); and Michael J. Sodaro, "Limits to Dissent in the DDR: Fragmentation, Co-optation, and Repression" in Jane Leftwich Curry, ed., *Dissent in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

[41] Sodaro speaks of many of the problems faced by resistance movements in the GDR (See "Limits to Dissent," 82–116). Explicit human rights activism was pursued by the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights which became active in late 1985-early 1986 (Allen, *Germany East*, 133–6). In June 1986, it also began to publish a regular bulletin, *Grenzfall* (Borderline Case) which was often disrupted by police harassment (Tismaneanu, "Nascent Civil Society," 104, 110; and Allen, *Germany East*, 168–9). Publications also appeared under the auspices of the Lutheran Church, but these were subject to very restrictive official limits on print runs.

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of Socialist Unity Party (SED) rule, and also the disappearance of large numbers of skilled laborers threatened to paralyze the East German economy. On the evening of 9 November, Schabowski, now official party spokesman, announced that restrictions on travel to West Germany would be abolished. Throngs of East Germans then forced the crossing points to West Berlin, and the whole dynamic of the East German events was radically transformed. Not only would East Germany never be the same, but the notion of a divided Germany collapsed.[42]

A new government with Modrow as prime minister began to negotiate for reform and free elections with independent political groups, most notably the New Forum, an umbrella group of different activists who began to channel to the regime the demands of the demonstrators. While this emerging opposition was able to compel the new leadership to enter into roundtable negotiations on free elections, both partners were soon rendered irrelevant by the actions of the demonstrators and the response of West German political parties to their demands. Reports on the life style of Honecker and his supporters, corruption, and the activities of the Security Service (*Staatsicherheit* or *Stasi*) as well as the inability of the new leadership to adapt to the growing radicalism of the demonstrators all led to the rapid evaporation of any credibility that the SED still had. Attempts to regroup as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) under the leadership of Gregor Gysi did little to stem this irrelevance.

The New Forum also failed to respond to the radicalization of the demonstrators. The forum's activists still for the most part were partisans of a third way, who wanted to salvage certain aspects of the social system of the DDR in combination with a more democratic political system. They had been quite effective in galvanizing discontent when the demonstrators had been chanting "We are the people" to emphasize their demand for democratization. However, when the crowds began to chant "We are one people,"[43] which expressed their desire for reunification and a comparable standard of living to that of the Federal Republic, the New Forum failed to adequately respond to these demands.

When the demonstrators pushed the subject of reunification to the top of the political agenda, West German political parties began to assist local forces in the campaign for the upcoming elections. The East German party structure came to roughly mirror that of the Federal Republic. In short, political parties from the other Germany intervened in the DDR and in concert with local forces began to organize civil society along the West German pattern.

Thus in East Germany we see a markedly different relationship between the reconstitution of civil society and democratization from the indigenous Hungarian and Polish patterns because of the postwar division of Germany. The existence of the Federal Republic as an alternative vision of how German society might be organized had a decisive influence on how the Honecker regime fell.

[42] For an excellent summary of the events of 9 November, see Elizabeth Pond, "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR," *International Security* 15 (Fall 1990): 48–9.

[43] Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern* (New York: Random House, 1990), 72.

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While the nascent opposition in East Germany, typified by the New Forum, was able to negotiate with the short-lived Krenz regime on behalf of the demonstrators for the liberation of the public space and the holding of free elections, it was not this opposition that came to dominate the newly liberated public space. Before East German civil society had a chance to reconstitute itself in a unique and indigenous fashion, the radical demands of the demonstrators for reunification permitted West German political parties to take a decisive role in shaping the political contours of the public space. Thus East German civil society has come to resemble an extension of that of the Federal Republic, and this in all probability will become even more marked now that the two Germanies have merged.

Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovakian case bears certain similarities to East Germany. Opposition was quite weak; mass demonstrations rather than the pressures exerted by an opposition led to the reconstitution of Czechoslovakian civil society and the democratization of the political system. The genesis of the Czechoslovakian opposition movement, as well as its weakness, was a direct result of years of effective repression by the Husak regime in the aftermath of the Prague Spring of 1968. Efforts to organize resistance to the party-state were made in the late 1970s by Charter 77 and the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS).[44] Charter's activities in some sense lay on the border of dissidence and opposition.[45] Much of its activity was geared toward demanding that the party-state authorities observe the human rights standards of Basket III of the Helsinki Accords. Charter also circulated a number of critical manifestos, analyses, reports, and worked to create a modest underground publishing sector. It also conducted a dialogue with western peace movements on questions of human rights and peace,[46] which later found an echo in Czechoslovak society.[47]

Charter did not aspire to become a mass movement.[48] It also was subject to exceptionally strong repression, which effectively isolated it from the population at large. Thus development of an unofficial public space and alternative institu-

[44] H. Gordon Skilling has done a masterful job of chronicling and analyzing the fortunes of Charter 77 and VONS in two studies: *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989); and *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).

[45] Within Charter, some participants were more concerned with conveying information to the "appropriate authorities" rather than reaching the broader public. Skilling, *Samizdat*, 27. Later, other Chartists participated in the formation of a new organization with a more oppositional outlook, the Movement for Civil Liberties. In October 1988, this group's founding declaration called for "liberal democracy, rule of law, and a mixed economy." See Ash, *The Uses of Adversity*, 237.

[46] See Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomin, eds., *Voices from Prague: Czechoslovakia, Human Rights and the Peace Movement* (London: European Nuclear Disarmament and Palach Press, 1983).

[47] See Ash, *The Uses of Adversity*, 69.

[48] Skilling, *Samizdat*, 45.

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tional development in Czechoslovakia lagged behind that of Hungary and Poland. VONS was specifically organized to defend Chartists arrested and harassed by the security apparatus. Czechoslovakia also possessed a small but imaginative aesthetic counterculture. While this sphere was highly dynamic, its efforts were aimed at securing private space independent of state interference rather than political acitivity. Despite this, Charter defended independent cultural figures who ran afoul of the authorities on more than one occasion.[49]

In the late 1980s the climate of fear and the effectiveness of repression in Czechoslovakia began to decline. The replacement of Gustav Husak, the aging head of the Czechoslovak Communist party, with the hapless and unimpressive Milos Jakes and reform in the Soviet Union both played a role in this. Public demonstrations occurred with greater frequency and encompassed larger numbers of participants.[50] This new public activism seems to have been related to the maturity of a new age cohort for whom the Prague Spring and the most repressive early years of normalization were at best a vague memory. It was an officially sanctioned demonstration (to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the murder of a student by the Nazis) staged by students of this generation in Prague which sparked the Velvet Revolution.

After demonstrating students were roughed up by the police on 17 November 1989, the population of Prague and other cities began to demonstrate en masse against the regime.[51] In this climate an ideologically diverse group of oppositionists in both the Czechlands and Slovakia organized themselves respectively in the Civic Forum (*Obcanske Forum*) and Public Against violence (*Verejnost Proti Nasiliu*). Early talks with Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec did not yield concessions acceptable to the Forum and Public Against Violence. Then in rapid succession the opposition toppled Jakes, compelled Adamec to resign by rejecting his proposed concessions, and then chased Husak from the largely ceremonial office of president. This last feat was accomplished by a one-hour general warning strike, which left no doubt where the sentiments of the working class lay. The opposition was able to convince Adamec's more reform-minded successor, Marian Calfa, to incorporate opposition politicians, including Vaclav Havel as president and Aleksander Dubcek as Speaker of parliament, into an interim government. This prepared the way for free elections.

Like in East Germany, the relative weakness of the Czechoslovak opposition and the limited public space that it was able to carve out meant that democratic

[49] Skilling, *Charter 77*, chap. 1; and Skilling, "Czechoslovakia Between East and West" in William E. Griffith, ed., *Central and Eastern Europe, The Opening Curtain* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 256.

[50] For examples, see Ash, *The Uses of Adversity*, 219, 237–8; Jeri Laber, "Fighting Back in Prague," *The New York Review of Books*, 27 April 1989, 39; and Vaclav Havel, "A Statement to the Court," *The New York Review of Books*, 27 April 1989, 41.

[51] For a far more detailed account of the events of November, see Ash, *The Magic Lantern*, 78–130.

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change was finally affected only when the opposition was able to channel spontaneous, unorganized, mass demonstrations to force far-reaching concessions from the party-state authorities. As in East Germany, the public space and state recognition of its boundaries was secured before there was extensive autonomous development of movements, organizations, and initiatives. Thus civil society in Czechoslovakia was reconstituted only after the public space had been carved out by a spontaneous popular insurgence that the opposition was able to mobilize against the party-state.

Conclusion

Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia now find themselves confronting the difficult task of consolidating democracy. For these attempts to succeed, the existence of a civil society compatible with a democratic state is an absolute necessity. Yet at the same time the role that the reconstitution of civil society played in each country's democratic breakthrough was quite different. In Poland, the process originated in the mid-1970s with the development of an opposition-liberated public space. The Solidarity movement was able to force the party-state regime to recognize the principle of autonomous organization and the boundaries of the public space. Civil society coexisted for a time with an authoritarian regime that tried to stifle it. When the regime found itself incapable of doing this, it acceded to demands for democratization of the political system.

In Hungary the opposition never developed to the extent that it did in Poland and remained incapable of formally institutionalizing the principle of autonomous organization or the boundaries of the more modest public space it had managed to carve out. The reconstitution of Hungarian civil society only proceeded once the party-state authorities took prophylactic action in order to avoid the sort of events that had occurred in Poland. The party-state in Hungary did not collapse as civil society liberated itself, but only after that state had intervened to create a framework for the reconstitution of civil society as a means to politically overcome the intensifying economic and political crisis.

In East Germany and Czechoslovakia effective political repression severely constrained opposition movements. The examples of Poland, Hungary, and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union created aspirations for far-reaching political change in these countries as well. When the Soviet Union demonstrated little or no desire to support stagnant antireformist regimes, the fear that had immobilized society in Czechoslovakia and East Germany began to disintegrate. These regimes toppled quickly in nonviolent revolutions by mass protest. In both cases the insurgencies from below significantly expanded the negligible public space that the oppositions had begun to create. Furthermore, the emergence of a political framework for democratic elections coincided with the legal recognition of the public space and preceded the proliferation of autonomous organization in society.

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Yet the two cases differ significantly in what transpired after this point. In Czechoslovakia, the society set off on its own indigenous path of organizational development critical for the reconstitution of civil society. In East Germany, these forms were in large measure imported from West Germany as part of the framework for reunification of the nation.

In polities where civil society has been suppressed, its reconstitution is an essential part of any process to create forms of authority dependent on societal consent, including democracy. But as the interwar history of the region and the Polish case make manifestly clear, civil society can coexist with milder forms of authoritarianism and thus the existence of a civil society in itself is not a sufficient condition for democracy. Forces within civil society must establish mechanisms by which the exercise of state power is open to universal contestation and becomes dependent upon social forces within civil society.

This understanding of civil society as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democratic government does not tell us much about what role a reconstituted civil society will play in democratization. Each one of these cases represents a unique national pattern of the reconstitution of civil society and the role that it played in the democratic breakthrough. Thus the recent experience of East Central Europe does not point to any universal conclusion about the role civil society plays in democratization or when its participation is necessary during the process.

The Polish case shows that it can be the driving force behind democratization. The other cases show it does not have to be. The only definitive conclusion that can be drawn is that the successful democratization of Soviet-type regimes will include the reconstitution of a civil society as a means to curtail state autonomy and as a basis for a new system of interest representation. These conclusions by no means exhaust the range of questions that need to be answered about the role that civil society plays in democratization. Further research is needed to understand the role that differently configured civil societies will play in the process of democratic consolidation and the transition to market economy in East Central Europe.

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The Meaning of Victory in Operation Desert Storm: A Review Essay

EARL H. TILFORD, JR.

In the two years since Operation Desert Storm concluded in 1991, three interpretative approaches have emerged.[1] Almost immediately a plethora of works appeared which told of air power and military accomplishments. Many writers proclaimed not only the American military's total recovery from the Vietnam war but also contended that Desert Storm heralded the advent of a military technological revolution. They pointed to precision guided munitions striking targets so accurately that they sent computers flying out the windows of the Iraqi Air Force headquarters. Many of these were picture books; few were scholarly.

After about a year, the more reasoned interpretations emerged. Some of these authors questioned just how "decisive" the military victory had been. Did all the weapons work as well as the Pentagon contended? To what extent did the strategic air campaign destroy Iraq's chemical, nuclear, and biological warfare production capabilities? Why did friendly fire cause nearly a third of all casualties suffered by the coalition forces? With the advent of the presidential campaign, a third approach developed. Seemingly sensing a vulnerable incumbent, some asked if the United States really needed to intervene in the Persian Gulf following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Others questioned President George Bush's motives for in-

[1] Richard P. Hallion, *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992); Jeffrey Record, *Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War* (New York: Brassey's Inc., 1993); Roger Hilsman, *George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure?* (Novato, CA: Lyford Books, 1992).

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tervening or, at least, the wisdom of having Americans saddled with blame for killing so many Arabs. What did the war accomplish? Who benefited most: the United States and the coalition or Saddam Hussein?

Richard P. Hallion, chief of the Office of Air Force History, has produced what is probably the best of the post Desert Storm "computers-out-the-window" interpretations of victory through high technology and air power in *Storm Over Iraq*. Hallion's thesis is that "the Persian Gulf War confirmed a major transformation in the nature of warfare: the dominance of air power" (p. 1). He argues that technology has caught up with doctrine to fulfill the prophesies of decisiveness in warfare through strategic bombardment, a premise first expounded by Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell nearly seventy-five years ago. Hallion echoes claims made throughout the air force that Desert Storm proves Douhet and Mitchell were right all along. In fact, he argues that since 1939, while air power may not have always delivered on all the promises made for it by the most ardent enthusiasts, air power has been decisive—or nearly decisive—in most major wars.

Hallion demonstrates two major faults endemic to air power enthusiasts. First, he has a selective view of history. Second, Hallion tends toward the evangelical in support of strategic bombing doctrine, now dubbed the "strategic air campaign." In terms of his selective view of history, Hallion ignores, or at least excuses, the failure of air power in the Vietnam war. He contends that political constraints hampered the effective application of air power in Vietnam and that it was "misused" with "that misuse often clouding results attributed to the limits *of* (emphasis in original) air power when they really stemmed from the limits *on* (emphasis in original) air power" (p. 19).

The thrust of *Storm Over Iraq* is that superior air force leaders directed magnificently trained aircrews flying excellent airplanes to deliver nearly perfectly performing weapons to achieve a decisive air power victory. Because Hallion possesses an almost total mastery of the history of weapons system development and because he writes exceedingly well, *Storm Over Iraq* may be the standard by which one measures books of this genre. It is, indeed, a vast resource of the kind of information many historians and political scientists regard as "irrelevant technical stuff," largely because they have neither the inclination nor the capacity to understand the technology.

Although *Storm Over Iraq* is a major contribution to the literature of the Gulf War, it suffers the flaw of reading like an Air Force Public Affairs Office (PAO) news release, albeit a thoroughly documented and well crafted PAO piece. Perhaps this is because Hallion is an air power enthusiast possessed by the same fervor that enthralls other true believers ever in search of facts to confirm prophecy. Land and sea forces base their doctrines on historic incidents and facts. There is a body of indisputable evidence about land battles from Arbela to the Bulge and of naval engagements from Actium to Leyte Gulf that form the basis of army and navy doctrine. While reasonable scholars may differ on interpretations of those facts, the resulting debates make for a more vibrant doctrine.

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Air power theory, conversely, is rooted in the prophecy of victory through strategic bombing. To argue that air power has not been decisive in places like the Pacific Theater in World War II or even in Vietnam constitutes heresy in many quarters of the air force. Consequently, air power thinkers accept that history which supports their evangelical expectations and reject that which does not. The result is that the storehouse of merits in air power thinking is relatively bare. Most of what passes for professional writing in the air force focuses on the operational level of war, where issues attendant to weapons and tactics dominate.

Washington defense analyst and U.S. Senate aide Jeffrey Record argues in *Hollow Victory* that there were two distinct air campaigns in the Persian Gulf War. First, there was a tactical campaign to force the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. Second, there was a strategic air campaign, the objectives of which were to destroy Iraqi leadership by prompting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and to destroy Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons production facilities. Record contends that while the air forces of the coalition performed well, the air war was hardly decisive. He maintains that air power played the dominant role only in that it paved the way for a successful ground campaign, which ultimately drove the Iraqis back into their homeland. Indeed, the Iraqi units most bloodied were those dug in along the border of Saudi Arabia and filled with poorly trained conscripts and reservists. The Republican Guard was either kept in the rear or not committed to Kuwait. Those Republican Guard units that were attacked survived almost entirely intact. They form the backbone of a resurgent Iraqi military.

According to Record, the strategic air campaign failed almost entirely. He concedes that the air war was brilliantly conceived and superbly executed and that the laser-guided bombs worked well; nevertheless, Record contends that the bombing failed to achieve its stated objectives. From Record's perspective, success is not in weapons performance, but in whether or not political and military objectives are achieved. He claims that since Saddam Hussein is still in power, since much of his military machine is still intact, and since the extent to which his chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare production capabilities were depleted is largely unknown, the air campaign failed.

The word "decisive" may be the crux of the difference between Hallion and Record. Air power evangelicals like Hallion are determined to prove historically what is largely a matter of faith: the prophecy of decisive victory through air power. Record seems just as determined in his role as iconoclast to denigrate the usefulness of air power, since in his opinion it has not yet been determined to be the decisive element in war.

There is no doubt as to the potential for air power to be employed decisively in a strategic air campaign. Since the mid-1950s, the United States has possessed the ability to conduct a decisive air campaign by using nuclear weapons to annihilate any nation. The advent of precision guided munitions makes it *theoretically* possible to deconstruct virtually any modern nation *if* that nation meets the following criteria: it is more or less a modern nation or nation-state; the economy

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is moderately well developed and dependent upon electronically transmitted and stored information; the armed forces are centrally organized and dependent upon electronically transmitted information for command and control; its armed forces are organized and equipped to fight a resource intensive war.

Iraq fits this description, but not all situations in the new world order would be amenable to the kind of air attack carried out in Desert Storm. According to Record, "it can be argued that the Gulf War provided no genuine test of U.S. fighting power . . . it was the mother of all military anomalies" (p. 135).

Each war is, of course, distinct. Furthermore, in a Clausewitzian sense, warfare is a clash between societies defined by political objectives and conducted according to cultural determinants with diplomatic, political, economic, and military means operating simultaneously. Roger Hilsman in *George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein* argues that Desert Storm was only a battle in what may be a long and potentially costly war.

Hilsman's book is the first of the third kind of interpretation and because it is in the forefront, it suffers from some of the same problems that afflicted the earlier "computers-out-the-window" school of writing. The book is not impressively documented, although with Hilsman's long and distinguished record as a scholar, he is entitled to write more analytically and interpretively than most. Hilsman contends that the Persian Gulf War was largely a struggle between Saddam Hussein and George Bush . . . and that Saddam may have won. Like Record, he argues that while the coalition forces performed well, they did not achieve all that much. Certainly Iraqi troops were forced out of Kuwait, but Saddam Hussein "not only remained in power, but his position seemed to have been strengthened" (p. 205). Like Record, Hilsman underscores the survival of a largely intact Republican Guard. He asserts that because Iraq's scientists and engineers survived, in a few years Saddam Hussein will have rebuilt his chemical, biological, and nuclear production capabilities.

Roger Hilsman served in the Kennedy administration first as director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and later as both Kennedy's and Lyndon Johnson's assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs. He was an early opponent of American involvement in Vietnam, and in February 1964 he resigned as the war began to escalate. For Hilsman, the Persian Gulf War is the direct descendent of the Vietnam war. At times his critique of George Bush seems to be displaced anger aimed at Lyndon Johnson. Hilsman's contention that George Bush dispatched American troops, ordering them to dislodge the Iraqi Army from Kuwait both to dispel his wimpy image and to punish Saddam Hussein for betraying the United States may be part of the explanation, but only part.

Military capabilities are important, perhaps not as important as Hallion believes; but the skill, training, and quality of any nation's armed forces are fundamental to how that nation can use those forces in support of foreign policy. Hilsman criticizes the Bush administration for using American troops to kill Iraqis and warns that "Bush's actions, far from promoting peace and stability

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. . . are helping push the world toward violence and savagery" (p. 249). His contention that the proper response to Saddam Hussein's aggression would have been to encourage an entirely Arab coalition under the leadership of an Arab general to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait, demonstrates his ignorance of military factors. Certainly having Americans and Europeans killing Arabs is not something to be sought, but the fact is no Arab force or combination of Arab forces could have liberated Kuwait. Presumably Egypt and Syria would have put aside their differences to join Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in a military endeavor. At best, this union would not have had numerical parity with Iraq's forces. Certainly a pan-Arab coalition would have had no qualitative military edge. The result would have been far more carnage. It is probable that a war of attrition similar to the eight-year Iran-Iraq war would have developed, resulting in many more dead Arabs. Kuwait would still be the nineteenth province of Iraq.

Hilsman published *George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein* before the November 1992 presidential election. In a way, his prescience is remarkable. What effect the tremendous popularity George Bush garnered from the quick victory in Desert Storm had on the way he conducted his campaign for reelection is not certain. But the high approval rating Bush enjoyed in the spring of 1991 did not sustain him through the autumn of 1992.

The Bill Clinton administration, like the Kennedy administration Hilsman served, represents a watershed in the American political experience. Clinton, like Kennedy in 1961, brings to Washington the exuberance of youth and its cohort, idealism. With the end of the cold war and the emergence of the United States as the only superpower, the temptation might be to revert to the kind of Wilsonian idealistically-based, declamatory foreign policy that compelled earlier generations into World War I and Vietnam.

Decreasing military appropriations may well drive the military services back into the interservice rivalries that marked—and marred—their relationships with each other and with the Kennedy administration. Many air power enthusiasts point to the air force's performance in Desert Storm as an example of how air power is now the dominant form of warfare, capable of delivering far more for the defense dollar through the speed, range, flexibility, and lethality of air power. Nearly ten years ago, historian Loren Baritz of the University of Rochester stated that "Our National myth showed us we were good, our technology made us strong, and our bureaucracy gave us standard operating procedures. It was not a winning combination."[2] Those considering a *Pax Americana Technocratica et Aerospacia* would do well to read recent history for understanding rather than as a support for institutional prerogatives or political biases.

[2] Loren Baritz, *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did* (New York: Ballantine, 1986), 40.

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Book Reviews

Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–1971 *by Douglas Brinkley. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992. 429 pp. $35.00.*

Douglas Brinkley, who teaches at New College, Hofstra University, has provided an important account of Dean Acheson's eighteen-year, post-State Department career. On one level, it is a fascinating outline history of U.S. foreign relations between 1953 and 1971. Acheson was personally involved in the debates over disengagement from Europe, NATO reform, the Cuban missile crisis, the 1968 decision to begin cutting back the commitment in Vietnam, and the argument that raged over decolonization in Africa. When not personally involved, he fired off pungent personal letters to influential friends or newspapers on these and other topics. On another level, Brinkley provides a critical examination of one of the globe's most prestigious statesmen as he moved to shape French, British, and German policies, as well as American, even while out of power.

In this regard, Acheson is nearly unique. The closest parallel in American history would perhaps be John Quincy Adams during the last seventeen years when he served as a member of Congress. Both men simply wore down opponents through brilliance and tenacity. Both, as Walt Whitman said of Adams, loved a meleé. Both refused to fudge their views, regardless of the audience. Even Presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon witnessed first-hand James Reston's widely quoted observation that "Next to the Lincoln Memorial in moonlight, the sight of Mr. Dean G. Acheson blowing his top is without doubt the most impressive view in the capital" (p. 82).

Both men nevertheless could change. Adams's view of slavery and the Indians notably became more enlightened. Acheson changed, but not to the same degree. Brinkley reveals how Acheson met and was highly impressed by Fidel Castro in 1959, then warned Kennedy away from the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961. He also relates how Acheson understood the terrible errors in policy toward Vietnam between 1962 and 1965. Too often, however, Acheson's earlier successes—not to mention his pro-European bias, critical views of non-European races, and anti-Soviet fears—led to enormous problems. His misreading of Soviet policy

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led him to advise Kennedy to conduct strikes on Soviet missile installations in Cuba during 1962. His fear of any negotiations with Moscow led him bitterly to oppose Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* of 1969–1970. Most notably, in a section that Brinkley handles skillfully, Acheson's determination to ensure U.S. access to Portuguese bases and his sometimes high opinion of European colonialism led him to justify dictatorship in Portugal and white minority rule in Southwest Africa—just as the dictatorship's and white-minority's days were numbered. Brinkley notes how Acheson was as adroit as John Foster Dulles in employing moralistic arguments to buttress his policies. In Africa, however, it was not only moralism that Acheson abandoned, but his proud realism.

Brinkley wisely allows Acheson to speak for himself. This is the man who in the 1960 Kennedy–Nixon presidential race comforted friends by writing, "the best campaign cheer I know is . . . they can't elect both of them" (p. 112); who wrote in 1963 that Kennedy's advisers "who regard themselves as intellectuals are capable of less coherent thought than we have had since Coolidge" (p. 196); and who, when congratulated by Nixon for being "Present at the Resurrection" of NATO in early 1971, replied that "some of my fellow Democrats . . . seem to have cast me for both the thieves at the Crucifixion for whom no such outcome is recorded" (p. 300). Well researched, informative, even instructive, this biography is also a delight to read.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society *by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York, Norton, 1992. 160 pp. Cloth, $15.95; paper, $7.95.*

In the midst of an emotionally charged debate over the role of history in American education, a distinguished historian makes a powerful case for a traditional point of view. The United States, Arthur Schlesinger asserts, has succeeded as a nation precisely because it has been able to fuse together people of diverse ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds through adherence to a set of democratic principles. Yet what Gunnar Myrdal called the American Creed is under attack today by those who stress the U.S. failure to live up fully to its ideals and who emphasize the distinctive features of each ethnic group. The danger, warns Schlesinger, is to place a premium on what separates us rather than the bonds that hold us together.

In a post-cold war world rocked by ethnic disputes and tribal warfare, Schlesinger's call for a renewed adherence to the American faith in democratic ideals has a powerful appeal. He understands those who reject the melting pot concept, with its disdain for the values of all but Anglo-Americans, and he sympathizes with the cultural pluralism championed by Horace Kallen, who in place of the melting pot suggested an ever-changing national mosaic in which there was room for the contributions of all peoples. At the same time, Schlesinger has little

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tolerance for those who would use history simply to raise the self-esteem of black, Mexican, or Asian children. Instead of such feel-good history, he advocates a curriculum that shows how the principles of individual liberty and democratic government have enabled all Americans, of whatever race or ethnicity, to share a common bond and achieve a better way of life.

The response to Schlesinger's eloquent appeal to traditional historical values will vary widely. These who champion multiculturalism will react against his denunciation of ethnocentrism and insist that he has failed to take account of the gap between democratic ideals and the reality of life in the American ghetto. Conservatives will think he has gone too far in advocating cultural pluralism and reject his optimistic view that the American Creed will eventually triumph. But in the face of the tragic civil and ethnic tensions disrupting such previously stable areas as Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, few could quarrel with his assertion that "the genius of America lies in its capacity to forge a single nation from peoples of remarkably diverse racial, religious, and ethnic origins" (p. 134). Nor could one argue with his conclusion that the essential question facing the American people today is "how to vindicate cherished cultures and traditions without breaking the bonds of cohesion—common ideals, common political institutions, common language, common culture, common fate—that hold the republic together" (p. 138). It is precisely this shared historical experience, based on a belief in the freedom of the individual and the right of free expression, that has made America the envy of the world.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order *by Richard Falk. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1992. 255 pp. $39.95.*

Richard Falk has for many years sought to transcend conventional thinking about international relations, which takes the nation-state and its propensity toward violence as given. In this volume, he extends his critique to modernism, which he identifies with a combination of technological skill, fragmentary identities, and the lack of ultimate grounding of ethics in a meaning beyond our lives: "It is the intensifying interdependence of the modern circumstance conjoined to this fierce sense of specific identity that makes the world so dangerous and frightening" (p. 6). "Postmodernism" for Falk does not mean deconstructivist skepticism, but quite the opposite: "the rediscovery of normative and spiritual ground upon which to find meaning in human existence" (p. 7). Indeed, Falk's postmodernism has a great deal in common with the great human philosophies and religions, with their roots in premodern civilizations.

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Falk is acutely aware that the modernism of nationalism and statism is not easily challenged, and he is severely critical of claims that transformation will occur easily. Indeed, he repeatedly argues that after World War II the state system was strengthened, rather than weakened, and he even gives credit to realist thought for functioning "as a viable ideology for the political democracies of the liberal West in the specific setting of one stage of international history" (p. 227). What he hopes for is an "axial upheaval" that will fundamentally alter human values, but he only expects such radical change to be achieved through struggle and suffering. Such an upheaval would enable reformers to go beyond fragmented efforts to abolish apartheid, institute arms control, and protect human rights—each of which is modernist because "it is dependent upon either violence or state power, or both, as the focus of its action" (p. 13).

Falk hopes to achieve the transformation for which he searches by "gentle subversion" of the state system (p. 55). In his view, the search for state autonomy in the Third World, top-down reform from state leaders, and "deferential" reform movements such as World Federalism are all illusory paths to real change. He is even critical of the Willy Brandt, Olaf Palme, and Gro Harlem Brundtland commissions, which despite their articulation of "radical ideas of reversal," made incremental concrete recommendations in order to put forward "realistic" or "attainable" policies (p. 82). Falk's model of a change agent is not the Brundtland Commission but the Great Peace Journey of a number of Swedish women or the environmental activism of Greenpeace. He hopes that someday crises will lead to radical change in the statist order.

In his emphasis on transformation of culture through religion and social movements Falk seems to this reviewer to emphasize personal fulfillment and moral commitment at the expense of political efficacy. In a world dominated by states, social movements affect peace, justice, and welfare through state institutions. The Brundtland Commission, progressive activists in political parties, and dedicated bureaucrats with humane values should, it seems to me, be regarded as valuable allies rather than as false prophets. In some parts of *Explorations on the Edge of Time*, Falk seems aware of the value of incremental institutionalist approaches, as in his chapter proposing more judicial activism to uphold international law in the United States. And his recognition of the value of realism is more positive than the view taken in many of his previous writings. But despite its eloquence and inspirational value, his "rooted utopianism" still seems to me to be skewed toward utopianism. It depends for its realization on a fundamental change in human consciousness that is unlikely ever to occur on a global basis. To be valuable in the struggle for peace and justice, Falk's vision will have to be adapted by people with greater understanding of institutions.

ROBERT O. KEOHANE
Harvard University

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Head Start: The Inside Story of America's Most Successful Educational Experiment *by Edward Zigler and Susan Muenchow. New York, Basic Books, 1992. 274 pp. $27.50.*

This may strike many political scientists as an odd book. Edward Zigler is a respected professor of psychology at Yale, a member of the 1965 planning committee that created Head Start for Lyndon Johnson, and the first director of the Office of Child Development established in the Nixon administration. His coauthor is a former reporter, child advocate, and administrator of child care programs for the state of Florida. The book is an unusual and somewhat awkward mixture of personal memoir, program/administrative history, and policy analysis, interlaced with archival research, interviews and italicized vignettes scattered throughout the text. In short, this is hardly a conventional history or political science treatise on the Head Start program.

But where is it written that such conventional treatises are the only route to knowledge? *Head Start* is a sincere and honest book that conveys a deep understanding of the issues in an easy and direct prose. It has much to teach not only students of American government but any citizen concerned with the social disaster that has overtaken millions of American children.

The story begins with the simple-minded optimism about social engineering in the early 1960s and LBJ's outrageous overselling of the Head Start program. It goes on to recount how the program's serendipitous combination of parental involvement and health and family support services developed; how social science evaluations and Congress almost wrecked the program; how top Nixon appointees saved it; how struggles over the 1971 Child Development Act set back child care policy for a generation; how Jimmy Carter helped to all but destroy Head Start not once but twice; and how Head Start survived the Reagan years. The authors conclude by courageously pointing out the fatuous numbers game that has been played in recent expansions of Head Start funding. Instead of expanding the existing half-day, part-year program for preschool children, Zigler and Muenchow put forward five utterly sensible recommendations to reshape Head Start along lines commensurate with the immense needs that exist.

There is rich material here for anyone teaching or writing about American government and public policy. We see the development of a policy constituency and childrens' lobby where once there was nothing. We watch the use and misuse of policy research, bureaucratic infighting, and the delicate work of undoing the overselling while building support for Head Start. I especially liked the story of how Caspar Weinberger, with the assistance of the wife of a Brooking's economist on Nixon's enemies list (the late Joe Pechman), worked to save Head Start from Governor Jimmy Carter's ill-considered effort to bring the program under state control.

However, this book speaks to something of importance beyond the Washington power game. It takes us from the original goofy optimism about raising poor kids' IQs with a summer preschool program to a grim recognition of the

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enormous problem we face in giving today's children a decent start in life. There will be other, more complete books about Head Start, for this is only two people's account. But if political scientists and their students are to take the whole subject of family policy more seriously (and I think they should), Zigler and Muenchow are good guides and companions with whom to begin. Honest about his own and the program's failings, Edward Zigler reveals himself to be not only an excellent social scientist and effective public official but also a decent man. It is good to learn that there is a state-of-the-art Head Start Center in New Haven named for him.

HUGH HECLO
George Mason University

Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement *by Timothy Brook. New York, Oxford University Press, 1992. 265 pp. $25.00.*

Timothy Brook's book is a major effort to piece together the puzzle of the 1989 crackdown in Beijing. The most useful part of the book is the middle section, which contains a comprehensive account and analysis, while the introduction and conclusion are more subjective and sometimes unsubstantiated. Chapters 2 and 3 describe those triggering events leading to the crackdown. Chapter 4 examines how the military failed to take over the capital through nonviolent means, which eventually led to the final assault (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 investigates casualty figures, and Chapter 7 assesses the consequences.

These chapters suggest (possibly against the author's own normative judgment) that the tragedy was the result of misperception and escalation of violence by both sides, even if the decision to send in the military was the root cause. The military indeed tried peaceful means, while reactions of the unarmed civilians were by no means nonviolent. Neither side fully anticipated this vicious action-reaction cycle.

The author concludes that the crackdown was Deng Xiaoping's last decisive action before the century's end and suggests that the world around China sets the terms for the country's future, precluding any possible change from within. Such a view is somewhat fatalistic, even cynical. China continues to change, perhaps more dynamically than expected. Internal debate has continued over the methods of the crackdown. Nothing can justify the use of lethal force against unarmed civilians. But after this extreme suppression, future leaders may be more cautious in facing similar situations. Moreover, if the Chinese people learn anything from this tragedy, it is the art of compromise that is absent in both Chinese culture and politics. This book suggests that once the students set the ball rolling, it developed its own momentum. The hunger strike practically pushed the movement to the point of no return. The warnings by those prominent intellec-

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tuals like Fang Lizhi were never heeded. Authorities' tolerance toward any civil disobedience, however, has limits for both democratic and authoritarian systems. Although notions of freedom and democracy are more appealing, ultimately people may live with order without liberty, but not liberty without order. Many Chinese learned this in 1989, but at a terrible cost. So have the former Yugoslavs, Somalis, and, possibly, people in Los Angeles today.

Brook dispels some widely spread rumors: fighting between rival field armies, the use of dumdum bullets, etc. There are still some unsubstantiated claims. One repeatedly cited case about the 38th Group Army's initial disobedience, especially by its commander, was simply untrue. The 38th was perhaps the only complete group army involved throughout. Even if many officers and men "strayed" during the operation, given the chaotic and unfamiliar urbane environment, there was no organized disobedience.

Another debatable point was the shooting at foreign residences. The author suggests that the army unit did so to prevent other rival units from learning its posture through news televised by foreign cameramen from those buildings. The more likely motivation was that the army unit, under extreme tension, just reacted to what should be done under fire.

Finally, the author does not offer a plausible explanation for the unconfirmed claim that the troops were drugged in order to implement the killing. Both common sense and reliable sources suggest that it was not a surprise to see "extreme tension, darting eyes, dilated pupils, and swollen faces" of the soldiers after several weeks of high-level physical and mental stress (p. 164). Moreover, the first sign of human blood in such a confusing and chaotic situation was perhaps the most shocking experience for most of the military. Despite these problems, the book provides some useful insights into the Tiananmen crackdown.

BIN YU
Wittenberg University

The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era *by Tan Qingshan. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1992. 179 pp. Cloth, $32.00; paper, $16.95.*

Most students of U.S.–China policy are pilots who navigate by the seat of their pants, more interested in where they are going than in how they get there. Tan Qingshan, however, is an instrument flyer, concerned with process as much as he is with substance, and it is this concern that animates his valuable monograph concerning Sino-American relations from 1979 to 1985. Properly skeptical of reductionist approaches that explain U.S. China policy exclusively in strategic terms, Tan employs a deductive case study method to test the utility of three major decision-making models—rational actor, bureaucratic politics, and interbranch politics. His four meticulously examined cases are the making of the Taiwan

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Relations Act (1979), the extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China (1980), the management of the Taiwan arms sales crisis (1981–1982), and the U.S. nuclear technology transfer agreement (1984–1985). The result is a sound and tautly argued study that demonstrates both the strengths and limits of employing theory to study Sino-American relations.

Using a wide array of public documents, contemporary accounts, and participants' memoirs, Tan convincingly argues that in each of his cases the particular outcome is the endpoint of an interactive political process involving the executive branch, Congress, and various bureaucratic interests. Noting the growing importance of Congress in the making of U.S. China policy, he concludes that the interbranch politics model, which focuses on executive-congressional relations, is the most useful of his three models. To be sure, none of this has the force of revelation, since earlier students of U.S. China policy such as Robert Sutter and Harry Harding have reached very similar conclusions; but it is useful, nonetheless, to have the point as rigorously stated as Tan does.

If anything, the author's approach can be faulted for still being too simplistic and narrow. In particular, Tan sees policy making almost exclusively as a governmental process, and he pays virtually no attention to the role of nonstate actors as participants in the policy process. Similarly, he overlooks the role of American public opinion. He also largely omits from consideration the influence of third parties (the Soviet Union, Taiwan, Japan, etc.) in helping to shape U.S. China policy. These defects originate in his case study approach, which fragments U.S.–China relations and fails to convey a sense of the overall relationship, which at any given time is more than the simple sum of its parts. In addition, traumatic events such as the 1989 Beijing massacre can have an impact on the relationship with the force of a meteor destroying the existing structure of widely shared American assumptions about China that inform the thinking of governmental as well as nongovernmental participants in the policy process.

Tan's cases, moreover, are all ones in which some concrete decision was taken or a specific issue was resolved. But in reality, many issues of Sino-American relations such as those pertaining to human rights, trade policy, and Taiwan are much more shapeless and indeterminate. They either persist or recur in one form or another over many years and are never fully resolved at all. It would have been instructive to examine a case in which the president and Congress failed to reach agreement, even after prolonged interaction. The contretemps between President George Bush and Congress over attaching human rights conditions to the extension of MFN after 1989 is a prime case in point and one which Harding has carefully analyzed in *The Fragile Relationship*.

Tan's study, then, provides important insights into U.S. China policy making in the Carter and Reagan years, but it does not pretend to be an overall history of the Sino-American relationships for those years. Nevertheless, one hopes that it will inspire Chinese and American scholars to work separately or together to produce matching studies of Chinese policy making toward the United States,

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which is likely to be equally complex and much more opaque than the American policy focus of Tan's monograph.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
Boulder Run Research

New York at Mid-Century: The Impellitteri Years *by Salvatore J. LaGumina. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 272 pp. $47.95.*

In 1950, there was a special election in New York City for mayor. Mayor William O'Dwyer had resigned, just ahead of some major political scandals, to accept the post of United States ambassador to Mexico, and Acting Mayor Vincent Impellitteri was a candidate for the remaining three years of his term. Impellitteri, although a life-long Democrat, was not the candidate of the Democratic party organization and was forced to run as an independent. He ran against Democrat Ferdinand Pecora and Republican Edward Corsi in an election marked by an extraordinary circumstance. Three candidates for mayor of New York City were Italian-American, all of them born in Italy. With limited political support and with few newspaper endorsements, Impellitteri went on to a surprise victory in the special election and served for three years. By 1953, after a rather uneventful tenure and a lackluster performance, he was defeated by Robert F. Wagner, Jr., who was to serve for three terms.

The story of Vincent Impellitteri is not a particularly inspiring one. He did try to deal with spiraling budgets, labor unrest, and infrastructure problems. But his solutions were temporary and his view of the mayoralty was a limited one. He saw himself as a manager and not as a leader. He did not assume the office with a sense of the need for political change, and he relied heavily on the existing apparatus of the municipal government and on many of the incumbent political officeholders. He tried to reach some accommodations with the powerful party bosses to insure his reelection; but he failed most critically with the Tammany chief, Carmine DeSapio. In the process, he really muddled through his mayoral term.

In this account of the Impellitteri years, LaGumina tries to bring an energy and competence to Vincent Impellitteri that was not really there. This very favorable biography focuses on the personal qualities of the man and highlights perhaps the most favorable aspect of his term as New York City mayor. He was liked for his gentle manner, and he was admired more for who he was rather than for what he did.

While the story has its shortcomings in the portrayal of Impellitteri's term, there are some features of the work that are worth noting. LaGumina is very much at home in telling the story of the Italian-American contribution to the political life of New York City. Italian-Americans were slow to organize politically, with low voter registration numbers as the strongest evidence of their

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antipathy. They often fought with one another and were frequently manipulated by other ethnic groups. The work tells many of these stories and uses sources that are generally overlooked. In addition, LaGumina speaks about Italian Americans with real understanding and insight into their characteristics. New York City was very different in 1950. It had a substantial middle class, an abundance of economic wealth, a fine infrastructure, and an optimistic vision of its future. There were problems to be sure, but this was a New York City confident of its future and its capacity to provide solutions to the problems it had. Italian Americans stood well satisfied and as willing partners in the process of civic improvement. It is a very different story today. LaGumina has given us a view of a New York of more than forty years ago. He is optimistic, and the stark contrast to New York City today is saddening.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University

The Future of Liberal Revolution *by Bruce Ackerman. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1992. 160 pp. $18.50.*

Bruce Ackerman takes on the difficult task of attempting to place the developments of the late twentieth century in their appropriate historical and philosophical context. At a time when many scholars, chastened by their failure to predict either the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 or the Soviet Union itself in 1991, are hesitant to offer any but the most tentative and short-term analyses, Ackerman heroically uses broad brush strokes and vibrant colors to portray the grand sweep of history.

The result is an elegant and thoughtful treatise that deserves to be taken seriously. His points are tightly and lucidly argued. The book's outline follows a neat logical progression. While one may not accept all of his conclusions, one must respect the sincerity and conviction with which Ackerman addresses his subject and the intellectual rigor that he brings to his task. To paraphrase Edward Gibbon, his faults are those typical of this type of exercise; his virtues are his own.

The crux of Ackerman's argument is that the world is currently confronting a unique historical opportunity to advance liberal principles for ordering social, economic, and political life. Lacking the optimism of scholars such as Francis Fukuyama, who have argued that the triumph of liberal political and economic institutions is now assured, Ackerman recognizes (correctly, in my view) that the current ascendancy of democratic ideals in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America may be short-lived. Thus, he argues for a strong and immediate focus on constitution building, believing that this strategy will establish a "higher" legal system that can enshrine and sustain liberal principles even after popular support for them has waned.

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At one level, it is difficult to quibble with this analysis. Few could argue that the proponents of market economics and western parliamentary democracy have not registered remarkable gains within the past four years. Between 1974 and 1990, for example, more than thirty countries in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems of government. Similarly, it is hard to make the case against strong constitutional guarantees for individual liberties in societies where human rights have often been neglected or abused in the past; where old political systems are discredited and new ones weak and untested; where the current political debate is shrill and polarized; and where age-old religious and ethnic animosities are resurfacing—in short, in practically any country of the former Soviet bloc.

Yet one leaves Ackerman's book with the conviction that there is more to heaven and hell than is dreamt of in his philosophy. The field of political development is a complicated and confusing one that defies easy rationalizations and parsimonious explanations. In any attempt to view history from the commanding heights, subtle distinctions become blurred, and complex causal relationships are inevitably oversimplified.

These distinctions often matter. Take, for example, Ackerman's argument that only Romania and Bulgaria have approved new constitutions, and that the other countries have only haphazardly modified constitutions that were drawn up under the communists. This contention is not wholly accurate: Estonia and Slovenia have also ratified new constitutions, and Poland has ratified a new interim constitution. Furthermore, in many countries, former constitutions have been thoroughly reworked. Hungarians are fond of noting that the only clause left unmodified in their constitution is the provision designating Budapest as the capital. Rather than making a blanket division between old and new constitutions, Ackerman should have engaged in more rigorous empirical research—probing the relative merits of these constitutions in areas such as the protection of fundamental human rights.

A more serious flaw is that Ackerman never adequately establishes his central premise. It is by no means clear that a liberal constitution is either a necessary or sufficient factor in institutionalizing liberal values. Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe had elaborate constitutions with impressive safeguards for human rights, at least on paper, and yet these guarantees were woefully inadequate to protect their populations from widespread and systematic abuse. On the other hand, Ackerman rightly notes that Britain and Canada—although lacking formal constitutions—have benefited from being liberal societies with a strong common law tradition, which compensates for this deficiency. This evidence could indicate that other factors, such as political culture, are more important than a constitutional legal framework in protecting individual liberties.

The Canadian case is illustrative in the sense that the very act of drafting a constitution can be highly contentious and divisive, forcing countries to directly confront issues on which there is no social consensus. The legalistic approach inherent in constitution drafting can polarize the electorate by framing issues in

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terms of fundamental rights, which must be recognized and acknowledged, rather than as the conflict of competing interests, who can be bought off, compromised, or otherwise assuaged. Should we assume that in every instance constitution drafting should be the fundamental priority of new democracies? Or, if society is radically polarized and it would be difficult if not impossible to gain consensus, then who is to say that relying upon an interim constitution, such as Poland has done, or a modified earlier constitution, such as Hungary has done, is not an appropriate strategy for the time being?

Ackerman would argue that such an approach might miss a valuable window of opportunity that has opened up in many of these countries, in which members of the opposition have unique moral capital that will dissipate quickly in the rough and tumble world of day-to-day politics. But the recent tribulations of men such as Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa indicate that this moral capital has long since departed. This does not mean that far-reaching legal and institutional reforms will cease—simply that they will be unable to transcend the brutal political warfare that accompanies major political changes in any advanced democratic society.

In this struggle, it would be unwise to focus too narrowly or exclusively upon reforming the legal system, for it represents only part of a much broader set of needed institutional reforms. After decades of living under regimes that systematically ignored their legal rights, many in Central and Eastern Europe initially succumbed to an excessive legalism—the belief that one merely had to get the laws right for social transformation to move forward. Only later did the need for a massive restructuring of government ministries, to take but one example, become obvious. As many scholars and government officials have now realized, without the development of a competent and politically neutral civil service, legal reforms stand little chance of being implemented effectively and appropriately.

Perhaps the book's most significant shortcoming is that it does not adequately account for or address the variance in local circumstances in laying out its thesis. As Central and East Europeans incessantly remind western visitors, aside from sharing a brief and unpleasant experience under communism, their countries often have very different ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, and historical traditions. Legal norms and values, respect for the rule of law, and the development of civil society can vary tremendously between countries such as Albania, Hungary, Latvia, and Turkmenistan. As Robert Putnam's recent research on Italy reveals, these factors—particularly the absence of a highly developed civil society—can undermine even the most well conceived legal system.

In conclusion, Ackerman's book will be of considerable interest to academics, political theorists, and the occasional philosophically-minded government official. Anyone who is deeply interested in political development for personal or professional reasons should read it. But the reader should remember that although essential, constitutional reform is only one of a host of necessary changes. And in some countries, it may not even be the most important.

ROBERT P. BESCHEL, JR.
Harvard University

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Thinking for a Living: Education and the Wealth of Nations *by Ray Marshall and Marc Tucker. New York, Basic Books, 1992. 283 pp. $24.00.*

Two influential advisers to the Clinton administration have produced a critique of all levels of the U.S. education system and provided detailed prescriptions. Their models for change come primarily from Europe with considerable attention to Germany, Sweden, and Norway for labor force development, but there is little analysis of the problems of transporting solutions from Europe to the United States. Their proposals are bold and range from a national value added tax to measuring the value added of higher education. They are staunch opponents of vouchers for kindergarten through twelfth grade (K–12) education, but proponents of national curricular content standards and national exams. Their changes cover every age from birth to experienced workers, but this is *not* a book about the politics of changing education policy.

Ray Marshall was secretary of labor under President Jimmy Carter, and Marc Tucker was a grant maker during the Carter era for the National Institute of Education. Both are aware that the pieces of the education system must fit together and be reformed in a coherent manner. A key contention is that the United States lacks a labor market system—a collection of policies and institutions that brings workers together and establishes the rules for employment. Their primary interest is front line labor that excludes managerial and professional jobs. The book alleges that the Europeans have a much better labor market system for the nonuniversity group who in the United States are called the forgotten half of the labor force.

Marshall and Tucker contend that the mass production era created harmful policies and beliefs that must be changed. For example, production machinery was more important than skilled and motivated workers; authoritarian management produced the best results. The crucial tactic to improve workers' conditions under mass production was union organization and collective bargaining rather than upgrading skills. The authors want this system drastically modified so that worker attitudes and capacity are emphasized in a revamped work place that features employee problem solving. In the 1980s, Ford Motor Company replaced its welders with robots, and the former welders now statistically monitor and reprogram robots. Clinton's ideas of taxing employer payrolls for on-the-job training and apprenticeships are part of Marshall and Tucker's approach.

This new system needs managers who believe that workers know best how to perform their jobs and redesign the work place. This assumes that management will reward workers financially for their creativity and invest in their continuous skill upgrading. It also implies dramatic changes in collective bargaining practices with more cooperative problem solving and win-win bargaining. If business and labor are to forge a new partnership, they must rethink their basic relationships and worker training concepts.

The book's scope makes it a concise place to see the education and labor reform agenda of the Clinton Democrats. There is an optimistic ending that claims all

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this change is politically feasible, but no analysis of the politics of change. The authors seem to believe good ideas and the election of Clinton will provide sufficient political momentum. However, American firms spend about $30 billion to train their employees, but over $20 billion is for university graduates. What is likely to change this allocation? Moreover, restructuring elementary/secondary schools has been advocated by major elected politicians for over five years, but very few schools are restructured. In sum, Marshall and Tucker provide a carefully designed blueprint for the reform of U.S. human resource policies, and the election of President Clinton means that their ideas will receive serious consideration.

MICHAEL KIRST
Stanford University

Inviting Women's Rebellion: A Political Process Interpretation of the Women's Movement *by Anne N. Costain. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 188 pp. $28.00.*

It is amazing to realize how little scholarly literature on the contemporary women's movement seriously and systematically investigates its relationship with government and politics as conventionally understood. Certainly, studies of gender-based law and policy or feminist jurisprudence mention the feminist movement and the roles of feminists or feminist ideology and theory as do studies on women's mass and elite political behavior. There is a growing literature on women's movement history, which to varying degrees relates incidents in this relationship. But to focus specifically on the links between the women's movement as a social movement and government and governmental processes from the point of view of more general political theories is rare indeed. For this reason Anne Costain's contribution is most welcome.

Costain begins with a review of some prominent theories of social movement formation and impact. She settles on political process theory to frame her work, which she defines as surpassing resource mobilization theories by placing "more emphasis on the political system, indigenous accumulation of resources, and psychological aspects of movement identification" (p. 12). In contrast to the widely accepted resource mobilization theory, Costain stresses the importance of assessing the dynamic and shifting balance of power, needs, and perceptions between governmental and movement actors and organizations in addition to the question of resources. The government is a facilitator as well as an object of movement activity. Correct as far as it goes. Costain unfortunately does not incorporate a clear recognition of differences among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in her theorizing as a political process approach and history itself would seem to demand.

This book revolves around empirical analysis of data covering the 1970s through 1980s, including especially Washington interviews that Costain conducted in 1974–1975, congressional data on bills sponsored, records of legisla-

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tion, and women's movement events data derived from *The New York Times*. Despite her defense, the latter distorts measurement of women's movement activism, although not fatally.

The analysis is most detailed for early years, losing texture as it moves past the period covered by her interviews. The writing was clearly completed around the time that Clarence Thomas was nominated for the Supreme Court. Given the emphasis on the interplay between government and the women's movement, from our historical vantage point it feels as though the book ends as the other shoe was in mid-air, about to drop.

Consider Costain's conclusions with respect to her very important secondary theme, the historical tension between "equal rights" and "special needs" feminism; or the goal of gender equality (and perhaps similarity) versus gender-specific issues confronting women. Pursuing either goal historically seems to undermine the other. Which goal and under what circumstances takes its place at the top of the governmental and social movement agendas?

Costain argues that the women's movement's "neglect of the special-needs agenda in the rush to pass the ERA leaves it now in a position where the movement is virtually without government support, grappling to resurrect issues like child care, parental leave, reproductive rights, and comparable worth. . . ." (p. 138). Would anyone argue that had it not been for the choices of the women's movement, it would have had more success with the government during the Reagan–Bush years? The point becomes even clearer post-1992.

But despite these difficulties, those interested in the politics of the women's movement or the links between social movements and government more generally should read this book. It makes a contribution to scholarship, while its style should make it accessible for undergraduate classes.

VIRGINIA SAPIRO
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security *by J. Ann Tickner. New York, Columbia University Press, 1992. 180 pp. $30.00.*

This is a particularly accessible and, therefore, especially welcome introduction to international relations (IR) generally and the meaning of global security specifically when examined through a gender-sensitive lens. It renders feminist perspectives intelligible to IR readers, the theories and practice of IR intelligible to feminist readers, and offers a delightful and insightful read for all who seek new ways to think about and understand world politics.

The first chapter surveys IR and how its traditional and contemporary views of security are constrained by masculinist assumptions. Along with other core concepts, the meaning of security is challenged by developments in today's world. Feminist perspectives enrich our understanding of these developments by not only

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analyzing the partiality of masculinist accounts but also illuminating alternative constructions.

The second chapter examines security through the dominant IR lens of realism. Three levels of analysis—man, the state, and war—frame how realists explain the causes of war and advocate the pursuit of national security. But these levels are profoundly gendered: they rely on male experience and privilege stereotypically masculine behaviors. Feminists challenge the accuracy and efficacy of this model, joining others to promote alternative constructions of security (for example, common security, which includes economic and ecological concerns). But feminists also insist that insecurities generated by gender inequalities have significant implications for achieving global security: sexual, economic, and military violence are interconnected and a comprehensive global security requires more than the elimination of "direct" violence (p. 66).

By taking feminist critiques and women's activities seriously, the third chapter exposes masculinism at work in the three dominant approaches to international political economy—liberalism, nationalism, and Marxism. Liberalism's atomistic individualism, instrumental rationality, and focus on the formal market economy are based on male experience and perspective. Because economic nationalism privileges a state that is gendered, promoting the state's economic welfare favors men at the expense of women's economic security. And the Marxist emphasis on class obscures how gender divides labor and power, not only in the public sphere of production but also in the private sphere of reproduction. In contrast, feminist approaches start "from the standpoint of those at the periphery," assume a "connected, interdependent individual," and attend to both reproductive and productive labor (p. 92).

Because ecological concerns are disparaged as soft politics and associated with the "devalued private domain of women," Tickner is able to link IR's "inattention to environmental problems and . . . [its] silencing of women" (pp. 97–98). She situates ecopolitics by reference to the Enlightenment practices that celebrated rationality (associated with men) and advocated the domination of nature (associated with women). With others, feminists criticize shortsighted and inequitable consumption patterns, unsustainable development models, and state-centric responses to global crises. But feminists enrich these analyses. Ecofeminists criticize how culture-nature and civilized-wild are gendered dichotomies and clarify how environmental degradation has gender-differentiated effects (for example, as subsistence providers, women must work harder when food, water, and fuel resources deteriorate, and as caretakers they are further burdened when disease and disasters create dependents).

The concluding chapter moves "toward a nongendered perspective," (p. 127) reviewing how gender informs all dimensions of current insecurities and arguing that fundamental transformations are required to achieve the gender equality necessary for truly global security. It is a perspective worth exploring.

V. SPIKE PETERSON
University of Arizona

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Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities *by Frank J. Sorauf. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992. 274 pp. $27.50.*

Lurking in this provocative study is a vision of the nationalization of American politics, channeled substantially through organized groups, which has caused "the 'enfranchisement' of a new political constituency, a campaign funding constituency" (p. 245). Sorauf disapproves of initiatives that would curb political action committees (PACs)—"the worst reform idea of the post-1974 regime" (p. 199)—or discourage the substantial "shift to out-of-state money" (p. 46) in congressional campaigns. Not all will agree, however, that "the localism of American electoral politics is increasingly anomalous" (p. 174).

At a minimum, democrats may be concerned about the influence of massive aggregations of wealth, such as corporations and unions who are not citizens and have no franchise, on a political system whose underlying premise is the voting equality of individuals. Present arrangements create significant inequality between the most accountable political actors, parties, and candidates, who must raise their funds at their own expense on a transaction-by-transaction basis, and the less accountable actors, corporate and union PACs, who may charge fundraising costs to "treasury money" (union dues and corporate revenues) and may automatically collect contributions through payroll deductions.

One cannot gainsay the insightfulness of Sorauf's observations about campaign finance. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, Sorauf detects a substantial surge in the total amount of money entering the political system. In the late 1980s, the money supply began to stabilize, but the distribution changed dramatically. Sorauf speculates that renewed competition—perhaps following redistricting or a wave of congressional retirements—might bring more money into politics. This happened in 1992 when total spending for the House rose 43 percent and for the Senate and House a combined 29 percent.

Sorauf skillfully lays bare major shifts in campaign finance. From small to large donors: in 1989–1990 8,579 donors gave more than $5,000, totaling $95 million, and tens of millions more was given as soft money. From direct individual giving to organized (mostly PAC) contributing. From check-off money through public funding mechanisms to private funds: the percentage of federal tax filers checking off declined from 27.5 percent in 1976 to 19.8 percent in 1989. From congressional challengers to incumbents, who raised 38 percent of total contributions in 1978 and 62 percent in 1990. From entities within the framework of the Federal Election Campaign Act (candidates, parties, PACs) to those outside it, such as independent spenders and the nonfederal accounts or committees of parties, whose spending affects federal elections but does not specifically advocate the election of federal candidates. And from local donors to out-of-district givers.

Sorauf argues that PACs or large donors no longer dominate the "grand exchange" of campaign giving. As incumbents have become safer and safer, donors have little leverage, and those seeking access have little choice but to follow a

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risk-averse incumbency strategy. Open-seat races and certain ideological and labor PACs are exceptions. The incumbency strategy of donors also means that "the campaign finance system offers challengers no weapons with which to overcome the advantages of incumbency" (p. 170), thus greatly weakening electoral competition and voter choice.

Sorauf comes gingerly to campaign finance reform: public funding "alone would replace interested money, fund candidates so [sic] order to achieve competitiveness and solve or minimize many of the compliance problems with the present regulatory system" (p. 237). However, public funding "is clearly an idea whose time has not come . . ." (p. 237). Sorauf grapples less successfully with other reform ideas. Among them is a dalliance with tax credits, whose ability to stimulate giving has never been demonstrated and whose tendency disproportionately to reward the well off for pre-existing behavior has been suggested by one or two older studies of tax incentives.

At the opening of the 103d Congress, both Democratic congressional leaders and President Bill Clinton once again pledged that campaign finance reform will be on the national agenda. Frank Sorauf has provided a comprehensive, thoughtful, and often provocative analysis that will help frame the debate.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917–1991 *by R. Craig Nation. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1992. 341 pp. $29.95.*

The task of drawing a broad, overarching interpretation of the recent history of any state is daunting. To be sure, this study addresses not all aspects of Soviet policy, but only Soviet security policy for some seventy-three years. Yet today the conception of security and hence security policy is undergoing redefinition. There is a great deal of ground to cover, and many earlier books have dealt with features of this terrain. Thus the task in large measure, as the author acknowledges, is to prepare "a work of historical synthesis" (p. xv) that offers new insights.

Nation has met the challenge. *Black Earth, Red Star* is a comprehensive work of scholarship with original interpretation, and it makes a real contribution to understanding. It is based on solid research by the author, as well as his use of other studies to inform a history covering what he defines as seven stages, each meriting a chapter. While delineated in terms of time periods, the governing element is the author's interpretation of seven distinct, successive security paradigms: revolutionary internationalism (1917–1921); accommodation and retreat (1921–1929); collective security (1933–1939); survival (1939–1944); retrenchment (1947–1953); competitive coexistence (1953–1985); and mutual security (1985–1991). (As the alert reader will have noted, the years 1929–1933 and 1944–1947 are omitted as transitional.) One may quarrel with one or more of these character-

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izations, but the author's interpretation bears pondering and in most respects seems justified.

While not unique in addressing Soviet foreign and military policies and their interrelation as security policy, or the relation of both to roots in domestic considerations, this is one of very few studies that attempts to do so on a broad span; it may be the first to do so successfully for the entire Soviet period. While publication came just in time to be able to close the books on the end of the Soviet period at the close of 1991, the discussion of the final Gorbachev or mutual security period seems suspended in an uncomfortable incomplete state, not unlike the reality. But the fact that the book's coverage does comprehend the entire Soviet period does not mean that the author had the opportunity to reexamine the Soviet period as a whole. When the study was conceived and drafted, the Soviet Union was still a going concern. Does the fact of its collapse introduce a new perspective for reconsidering the nature of its historical journey? The facts of seven-and-a-half decades are not changed, but their place in the historical continuum may be. This comment is not a criticism but an observation suggesting that, notwithstanding Nation's achievement, we all may yet have a further challenge ahead (apart from the promise of new data in the former Soviet archives).

This book should be of interest to a fairly wide readership and is suitable for assigned reading in courses on international relations and security studies as well as Soviet-Russian politics and history. It also warrants reading by scholars in the field, who should be stimulated by the author's interpretative picture, even if the historical data base is familiar.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Brookings Institution

Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History *by Alexander DeConde. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1992. 270 pp. $32.50.*

This lucid historical account of the influence of racial and ethnic factors on foreign policy makes large claims for the significance of race and ethnicity as catalysts for foreign affairs activism. DeConde even suggests that these elements transcend both religion and class in importance but then hedges his bets in denying to them any decisive role in policy outcomes.

DeConde's intriguing departure is to treat Anglo-Saxon policy makers and opinion leaders as ethnics pitted against others in the contest for power. This angle allows him to construct an Anglo-American history of efforts to influence policy making that stretches back to the colonial era. It permits fresh glimpses at familiar material, but is also frequently disingenuous, as when the author suggests that the War of Independence and the War of 1812 had significant ethnic components in modern terms.

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More fundamental is the problem of defining and manipulating concepts of race and ethnicity. Certain definitions are vague and ultimately unworkable. "Ethnoracial" and "ethnoreligious" are elisions that help sidestep the need for systematic usage, and race and ethnicity often substitute for one another in the text. Unfortunately, the past's contemporaneous employment of such nomenclature is not our own, and it begs the question to blur distinctions among epochs.

Anglo-Americans form a major element of continuity in this work. Anglos in high office brought with them an affinity with British culture and ideas that shaped subsequent U.S. foreign policy and created a community of interest with a counterpart establishment in England. DeConde is better at accounting for Anglophilia than for the Anglophobia he discounts. If it is surprising to learn that eighteenth-century British immigrants possessed a single ethnic character that is synonymous with the U.S. national interest, it is astounding to find that this is how things should be. After all, "some group has to maintain the cultural and ethnic basis of the evolving American identity," DeConde argues (p. 199). Ronald Reagan's and Margaret Thatcher's rapport is presented as further evidence of such persistence. This contrasts with another Britain where, besides the Celtic minorities, numerous communities of color contest the meaning of Britishness in a world less bereft of class and ideological considerations than the one depicted here.

This study provokes but does not explicitly address several significant questions. What, for example, is the state's role in the policy arena where ethnic interests compete? What are the broad implications of a particular minority's dominance throughout a nation's formative and mature periods? What is the relationship between a group's foreign policy agenda and its domestic commitments? Historians violate no professional canons by addressing such issues. On the contrary, in so doing they enrich and advance historical inquiry.

DeConde writes authoritatively about the foreign policy activism of various ethnic groups, particularly when they came of demographic and political age after 1914. Yet, because he did no primary investigation for this volume and relies heavily on the conclusions of others, he often makes unsubstantiated generalizations about these diverse experiences. Certainly the observations on the activities and concerns of racial minorities, a still understudied area, would have benefited from more careful conceptualizations of race and ethnicity and by original research.

BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER
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The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan *by Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1992. 165 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $9.95.*

This is a timely book that organizes and anticipates the major issues of assertive humanitarianism, although the authors might be surprised by the option of direct

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military intervention by the United States. It is written by two scholar-activists: Deng was ambassador to the United States from Sudan some time before he assumed his present position as senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program of Brookings Institution in Washington; Minear worked for nongovernmental organizations in international development before he joined the Humanitarianism and War Project in Washington as codirector. Both authors wrote earlier separate reports on famine relief activities in Sudan. These are now distilled and joined in the core chapters of the book: one (Deng's report to the UN on the work of its Office of Emergency Operations in Africa) on drought-induced famine, essentially in northern Sudan, 1983–1986, and one (Minear's independent study of the UN's Operation Lifeline Sudan) on conflict-related famine in southern Sudan, 1987–1991. These chapters are sandwiched between a discussion of causes and responses to famine in the Sudan and a final chapter that evaluates past policies of humanitarian relief and recommends several initiatives toward more effective action.

The book is an important contribution to the debate on humanitarianism in foreign policy on two levels. First, on the level of relief operations, while the Sudan represents but one case in what could be an inventory of similar tragedies elsewhere, the case does raise prototypical problems. As the authors make clear, it is virtually impossible to avoid political interference by local authorities in the distribution of relief supplies to target populations. The authorities' perceived ability to govern is threatened even in instances other than open civil war. How to deal with entanglement in local politics is complicated by an enormous coordination problem, since international relief activities attract a large number of donor countries, nongovernmental organizations, and UN agencies. Aside from the issue of the different agendas of the various agencies, coordination is made even more difficult by the inexperience of administrators on the ground and in the various agency headquarters, largely in North America and Europe. Ad hoc, jury-rigged operations seem the norm. Finally, it seems no accident that distribution—requiring money—is more of a problem for operations than supply, since grain surpluses of western countries are more easily tapped than national treasuries.

Recommendations for reform focus on greater utilization of the UN as an institution and improvement of its institutional effectiveness. Here the book moves from relief operations to the level of international politics in a broader sense. Based on the recognition that famines raise the issue of internal political legitimacy and that interventions to relieve famines raise the issue of international sovereignty, the question addressed—but not fully answered—becomes how can the UN be politically strengthened so that its burgeoning role of major organizer of relief can be more effective? Perhaps even more fundamental is a second political question. The book makes the point that famine ultimately is not just a relief issue, it is a development issue. How can international institutions—including but not limited to the UN—deal more effectively with causes of famines and not merely their symptoms?

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Readers will be tantalized but probably hungry for more details on the authors' five major recommendations: an international review mechanism for humanitarian emergencies to prioritize and deal with the range of such problems worldwide; the achievement of a sense of balance in responding to multiple emergencies (inter alia, avoid being driven by the media); establishment of a professional code for relief administrators and staff; utilization of indigenous resources to rebuild local institutions in the process of delivering relief; creation of authority for the UN to apply humanitarian principles in the midst of armed conflict. These are useful thoughts. They begin to cut a path into the thicket encountered by a policy of assertive humanitarianism. But we must ponder the implications of the generic problems considered inherent by the authors only a short distance from where we (and they) started. Emergency relief assistance remains external in character, at best an embarrassment and at worst a threat to vulnerable regimes. The authors presciently observe, "the international community must be willing to override the resistance of political authorities to intervention . . ." (p. 121). While the present U.S. involvement in Somalia may not be exactly what they had in mind, the consequences of a process of riding over political resistance remain unexplored and indeed are unsettling. Context is the second "generic problem," the fact that planning for emergencies is inherently difficult and indeed ought to involve prevention rather than hasty cures. The third problem, that of coordination, is a staple of every international effort. And the fourth problem, ambivalent results, could characterize the whole story of emergency relief—an increase in dependence and limited learning from the past on each new occasion. In fact, the suggestion that the international community ought to attend to these problems raises the ultimate question of the meaning of community: if we had one we would not have these problems to the extent we do. Nevertheless, the United States is now in Somalia attempting to end a famine and has created the precedent of protecting the Kurds in Iraq, in part to prevent starvation there. Charting a direction in this new era will benefit from serious consideration of the analysis and recommendations of this little book.

HARVEY GLICKMAN
Haverford College

Rival Capitalists: International Competitiveness in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe *by Jeffrey A. Hart. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1992. 305 pp. Cloth, $32.95; paper, $16.95.*

Victory in the cold war, many have argued, means not the end of history but rather the start of a new phase of economic conflict among the major industrial countries. Capitalist rivalries, no longer constrained by a need to preserve the western security alliance, are expected to multiply in both scope and intensity. A new great game is beginning, it is said. And in this looming geo-economic

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battle, the key to success will lie in how well each nation can organize itself to promote the international competitiveness of its industries.

In this context, Jeffrey Hart's fact-filled new study is both timely and useful. Focusing on five of the world's largest capitalist powers—the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and Britain—the book carefully examines the strategies followed by each in dealing with fundamental change in national and international markets. Three key industries are selected for detailed analysis, each representing a distinct period of historical transformation in the years since World War II: steel, automobiles, and semiconductors. Hart's principal conclusion is that variations in what he labels "state-societal arrangements" best explain observed changes in international competitiveness. State-societal arrangements encompass patterns of relationship among three core groups of actors in each country: the state, business, and organized labor. These patterns of relationship matter, Hart argues, because they can be decisive in either accelerating or impeding the development and diffusion of technological innovations that are crucial to commercial success.

The book is organized like a sandwich, with the real meat of the analysis—five substantial country studies—squeezed between relatively thin slices of introduction and conclusion. All five country studies are structured similarly to permit direct comparison and contrast of diverse national and industrial experiences. Each is a model of clarity and concision, providing as much information as needed to make intelligent judgments about the events discussed. Overall, they appear to suggest that Japan and Germany perform best at preserving or promoting international competitiveness, Britain and the United States do worst, and France falls somewhere in between.

Hart compares his state-societal approach with five alternatives that have been proposed in the literature to explain changes in international competitiveness: the macroeconomic, culturalist, statist, neocorporatist, and coalitional approaches. All, he argues, have shortcomings as compared with his own preferred perspective, being either unwittingly superficial or exceedingly parsimonious; only the state-societal approach is sufficiently general to fit the data at hand. But this is surely somewhat disingenuous. At least three of the alternatives (the statist, neocorporatist, and coalitional approaches) are really more like variations on a theme than competing explanations. Each in effect directs attention to a particular subset of the broad groupings included in state-societal arrangements; and it is clear that depending on circumstances one or another of these subsets rather than the more general approach may in fact represent the proper level of analysis. Hart's effort at product differentiation here seems just a bit strained.

One might also raise some questions about selection bias in this study's design. Can one generalize as much as Hart does from the limited sample of three industries he has chosen to examine? Would the United States come out looking so bad had the aerospace or computer software industries been selected rather than steel and automobiles? Would Japan or Germany look so good had high-definition television been included alongside semiconductors? Hart's handling

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of the evidence is thorough and fair. But would evidence from other industries lead us to the same conclusions? The last word is not yet in.

BENJAMIN J. COHEN
University of California, Santa Barbara

The Congressional Experience: A View from the Hill *by David E. Price. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1992. 194 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $16.95.*

David Price has taken advantage of a rare opportunity. As a political scientist and, since his election in 1986, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, he is uniquely well trained and placed to offer thoughtful perspectives on the workings of Congress. We, the readers, are indeed fortunate that he has chosen to devote the necessary time and effort required to produce this volume. Although David Price's story, as he reminds us, is not a typical one, it provides us with important insights into the congressional career and the operations of the House that are not available elsewhere.

Price covers a range of important topics in separate but interrelated chapters. We learn about the struggle to win office; adjusting to life in Washington and in the district; developing policy interests and expertise; the growing importance of political parties in the House; the struggle over the budget, religion and politics, and the ethical dilemmas of public service. In each of these areas Price starts at the personal level and then develops a broad-ranging and often theoretical perspective to the subject matter. Thus, much of his chapter on getting elected focuses on his efforts to raise large amounts of money for his campaign, especially the difficulties he faced when he was a challenger. From this he builds to an analysis of incumbency advantage, turnover, and the need for campaign finance reform.

Throughout the book I was struck with the range of representational dilemmas Price has had to face. These go beyond the usual ones of committee choices, how often to go home, where his family should live, and whether to vote in accordance with his constituents' preferences; they include things like what issues should receive a member's attention and what kind of member does one want to be. As political scientists, we would like to believe that one of our own is more troubled by questions of representation than most members. Yet what comes through Price's manuscript clearly is that these dilemmas are ones that confront and concern all members.

As with Richard Fenno's recent studies of the career development of individual senators, Price indirectly demonstrates how much of a member's life is spent on activities that are not oriented toward a concern with reelection. Being there and staying there for their own sake is not the prime motivation of most people in political office. There is a commitment on the part of these individuals to make a difference in the lives of people, to be good public servants, and to achieve

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tangible results. In that sense they are no different from professors who want to educate students, doctors who want to make patients well, or people in any range of occupations. Price's book is accordingly another response to the overly cynical view about the profession of politics.

If there is any reservation that I hold regarding Price's experience as presented in this volume, it is that it of necessity is presented a bit too close to the vest. I did not expect nor desire an exposé. But I did wish that the book had a bit more of the sweatiness of politics in it. Price's presentation rarely grasps the drama, tension, anger, and humor of political life. It is a thoughtful and reserved presentation of learning to exist and thrive in the legislative arena.

This reservation aside, Price has performed a valuable service to his political scientist constituents and to their students. He takes the problems faced by legislative institutions and their members to a higher plane. In doing so, he is both supportive and carefully critical of the institution in which he serves. Price presents truly important observations for those with interests in congressional reform.

BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER
University of Houston

Health Policy Reform in America: Innovations from the States *edited by Howard M. Leichter. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1992. 220 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $16.50.*

Why the United States Does Not Have a National Health Program *edited by Vicente Navarro. Amityville, NY, Baywood Publishing Company, 1992. 252 pp. Paper, $23.45.*

In light of the recently renewed interest in national health policy reform in the United States, these two books are timely. Anyone who follows the debate over health policy reform will find them thought-provoking.

In his volume on health care reform in the United States, Leichter reviews innovative state-level health policy reforms undertaken in recent years. During the 1980s, the role of states in health policy making grew markedly. Leichter attributes this expanded state role to a number of factors, including the retreat of the federal government from social policy making and the modernization of state governments. The Nixon administration's intentional shift of funds to the state level through the use of revenue sharing and block grants, and the national mistrust of the federal government in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam began to shift the locus of social policy making away from the federal government toward the states. This process continued through the Ford and Carter years and was intentionally accelerated during the Reagan presidency. Ronald Reagan sought to devolve more responsibility for social policy making to the states while simultaneously cutting the flow of federal funds to the states and reducing federal regulations imposed on the states.

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The federal retreat from the health policy sphere was accompanied by a modernization of state governments. Changes in state constitutions, the professionalization of state legislatures, and an expansion of state courts into the policy process have helped to move the states into a prominent role in formulating social policy.

Leichter's volume documents the increased state role by reviewing health policy innovations in the areas of maternal and child health, AIDS, aging, mental health, and access to care. It focuses on innovations in several states including Oregon, Hawaii, Texas, and Massachusetts. This review of state innovation suggests that Leichter's decision to concentrate on state-level reform is justified. The last ten to fifteen years have seen an impressive variety of health policy innovations at the state level. The lessons learned from these state experiences should be an integral part of the debate over national health reform.

In his volume, Navarro, through a series of articles reprinted from the *International Journal of Health Services*, forcefully makes the case for an expanded governmental role in providing health care services to all U.S. citizens. Navarro argues that the current shape of U.S. health policy is a result of class struggle, which the working class has largely lost. He suggests that despite the conventional wisdom promoted by the media and academics, the U.S. public is supportive of an expanded governmental role in providing health care. Our current reliance upon the private health insurance industry has helped to drive up health care costs and is fundamentally at odds with the principle of guaranteeing health care as a right for every citizen. Private health insurance, therefore, should be eliminated and replaced by a government program. Navarro presents Jesse Jackson's 1988 plan for a federally administered national health program that guarantees universal coverage as a model for the nation.

While there is little that is new in this volume, assembling these articles is useful. Despite some overlap among the various chapters, the book makes Navarro's case quite clearly. While many will disagree with all or portions of Navarro's analysis and with his recommendations, as we advance in our debate over national health policy reform, his arguments deserve to be read and seriously considered.

ANNE LENHARD REISINGER
Columbia University

The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations *by Helene Carrere d'Encausse, translated by Franklin Philip. New York, Basic Books, 1993. 292 pp. $24.00.*

The author ably chronicles one part of the complex process that turned the Soviet Union into its successors. Her thesis is that the combination of *glasnost* and the Chernobyl nuclear accident spurred the long suppressed but restive constituent nations of the USSR into rising up and destroying the communist glue that held the empire together.

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The book is organized in four parts. In the first part, Carrere d'Encausse describes Mikhail Gorbachev's ignorance of and insensitivity to the national question. Then she explains how the Communist party's crackdown on the endemic corruption of the Breshnev era was perceived by the southern republics as discriminatory. In the four chapters of the second part, the author provides case studies of the ethnic-national conflict that bedeviled Gorbachev in his six-year tenure. Carrere d'Encausse devotes the third part of the book to explaining the growth of the peripheral republics' power over their own affairs. The middle chapter on Russia's search for its identity is one of the best treatments of the subject available.

The final four chapters of the book should not be lumped together under one rubric. The first chapter describes the center's frantic search for a formula that would keep the union whole. The next chapter deals with the problem of the various diasporas produced by the USSR's disintegration. In the conclusion, Carrere d'Encausse examines the possibilities for coexistence between democracy and the virulent nationalism that emerged as a result of the center's collapse. Finally, because she originally completed the book before the Soviet Union officially collapsed, the author tacks on an epilogue that takes the reader on a final tour of the wreckage.

Though the author's thesis is plausible, she does not really consider the national problem in the larger context of the Soviet Union's other problems. The book would have been much more helpful to political scientists had Carrere d'Encausse taken more time to relate the events she describes to both the body of literature on the Gorbachev era and established theories of revolution and imperial decline. The second criticism is related to the first: despite the author's mastery of primary source material, she seems to have ignored important contributions already made by others, for example, Paul Goble, on this subject. Third, there are some factual errors that should have been caught. Andrei Gromyko, not Anastas Mikoyan, preceded Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Supreme Soviet. The author notes incorrectly (p. 213) that less than two-thirds of the population of Lithuania were ethnically Lithuanian. Moreover, the name of the Russian foreign minister is Andrei, not Alexis (p. 252) or Alexei (p. 291) Kozyrev. Finally, throughout the book the author fails to provide first names. This is confusing, because a number of political personalities with different political orientations share the same last name.

Despite its flaws, *The End of the Soviet Empire* is well written and provides much needed historical perspective on an important and timely subject. Carrere d'Encausse's effort helps those of us charged with the difficult task of teaching courses on the politics of the Soviet Union to navigate through the bewildering complexity of its ethnic and national conflicts.

GLENN CHAFETZ
Memphis State University

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Showa: The Japan of Hirohito *edited by Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard. New York, Norton, 1992. 315 pp. $25.00.*

Few westerners would suggest that the years from 1926 to 1989 constitute a single distinct era of modern history. Yet this is what most Japanese and many Japanologists assume, because of the fact that during that period Emperor Hirohito occupied the throne and the period therefore carries his reign name: *Showa* (enlightened peace). Artificial as this division of history into imperial reigns may seem, it is not less rational than the division of history into units of decades and centuries that we all tend to accept. For the Japanese, this was an era in which their country moved from relative liberalism and pacifism into authoritarianism and war, then into foreign occupation and reform, and in the last forty years into world prominence in industry and trade again under a democratic and pacifist government.

In 1990, following the death of the emperor, the journal *Daedalus* published a special issue of *Showa: The Japan of Hirohito*, in which nine American and seven Japanese scholars assessed the era that had just ended. This book, which carries the same title, is a reprint of those essays together with a stimulating 62-page introduction by Carol Gluck, in which she delineates the varied discourse on those years. The fact that only American and Japanese scholars were invited to participate in this project reflects the belief, shared by the editors and the participants, that the United States has been the most meaningful foreign country, whether as friend or adversary, for Japan in the twentieth century. This problematic bond, which both sides have yet to come to grips with, is one of the central themes of this book. The contributors differ about how much each side was to blame for the Pacific war and who is responsible for their present growing animosity, but they all agree that a Japanese-American collaboration is vital for the world's welfare.

Most participants are critical and worried about present-day Japan. Chalmers Johnson, in a provocative essay titled "The People Who Invented the Mechanical Nightingale," argues that Japan is extraordinarily powerful and adept when engaged in routine matters of production and marketing, but extremely vacillating and inept when confronted with critical issues requiring vision and choice. John Dower, in his essay "The Useful War," observes that as international tensions arise in response to Japan's economic eminence, strident ideological legacies of the World War II years emerge in the form of "neonationalist appeals to the hegemony and superiority of the 'Yamato race'" (p. 67). Masataka Kosaka thinks that despite all the reforms carried out after the war, Japan's political structure still suffers from lack of an identifiable focus, and the Japanese people still prefer "their own peculiar brand of logic to the universal principles and values of others" (p. 45). Shoichi Royama, in his essay "Money and the Japanese," expresses concern that the recent preoccupation with speculation and acquiring money for money's sake may spoil the Japanese will to work and disrupt the egalitarian nature of Japanese society.

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Others are more sanguine about Japan's future. Edward Lincoln, while urging Japan to show a greater openness, believes that low rates of crime, high educational achievements, and the ability to work well in large group settings promise that Japan will do well in the coming years. It will be left to the *Heisei* (establishing peace) era, which started in 1989, to tell us which prediction was right.

BEN-AMI SHILLONY
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

From Rhetoric to Reality: Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections *edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1992. 182 pp. Paper, $29.95.*

This reader is a timely publication focusing on the participation of Latino voters in the 1988 presidential election. The contributors examine how Latino voters influenced the nomination of the candidates of the two major parties, as well as the issues raised during the 1988 presidential campaign. The editors provide forty-seven tables composing a wealth of national, state, and local electoral data about Latinos.

Several conclusions can be discerned from the eleven essays. First, the Latino electorate has much potential influence in both the selection and election of candidates for public office, as well as in helping to mold the kinds of issues that are emphasized by the major parties. The electoral potential of Latinos derives primarily from their population growth rates and residential patterns. Latinos tend to be concentrated in cities that can swing statewide votes for presidential candidates and in states with significant numbers of electoral college votes.

A dampening effect on the potential level of Latino electoral influence, however, is the significant proportion of noncitizens among the adults (over 18 years of age) of some Latino groups. The editors show that the number of noncitizen Latino adults exceeds the number of potential Latino voters in several of the states highlighted in the book. As a matter of fact, in 1988 there were approximately 3.7 million Latino voters and 4.8 million Latinos over 18 years of age who could not vote due to lack of citizenship.

Another important finding of this reader consists of the differences between groups like Cubans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Central Americans within the Latino electorate. As has been reported in several other reports and publications, a few of the essays show that there is a common agenda of sorts involving issues such as bilingual education and more liberalized immigration policies among these groups. But this Latino common agenda is coupled with important differences.

There is a common thread in all the essays regarding next steps for enhancing the political influence of Latinos in national elections. First, Latino voters must

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attempt to rally and mobilize around unifying themes so as not to split their vote. Second, the Latino voter turnout must be increased. Alas, electoral strategies to increase Latino turnout will be tempered by the fact that this group is very young relative to other racial and ethnic electorates.

While the focus of this reader is the Latino electorate's impact on the 1988 presidential election, one major issue should have received greater attention: the developing relationship between Latinos and blacks. Not emphasizing this issue is unfortunate, because the particular political relationships between blacks and Latinos could explain further the potential and actual impact of the Latino voters in the electoral arena.

Another issue hardly touched is the growing social differences within some of the Latino groups included in the study. While the editors are correct in detailing how the Latino electorate is composed of different nationalities and groups, it is also true that within these very same subgroups varying political developments are beginning to reflect the impact of social and class differentiation.

JAMES JENNINGS
University of Massachusetts/Boston

Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents *by Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley. New York, Basic Books, 1992. 243 pp. $25.00.*

With presidential poll-watching becoming a national pastime, it is useful to have a book that puts the polls in historical perspective. Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley have analyzed presidential approval ratings for all of the presidents since Franklin Roosevelt in light of historical events of the postwar period, economic trends, and presidential actions.

Brace and Hinckley find the most consistent trend in presidential approval is the decay of popularity, steeper in the second term than the first. Looking at the relationship between popularity and activity, the authors conclude that approval declines because presidents have to do something, and the more they do, the less they are appreciated.

The critical factors in presidential approval, however, are not substantially under the president's control, namely economic trends and international events. If the economy goes down hill, presidential approval sinks with it. If international events produce an up-rush of patriotism, presidential approval goes onward and upward. The authors are concerned that presidents experiencing declining popularity, prompted, say, by downturns in the economy, will be inclined to engage in foreign adventurism. The data give reason for concern. In the postwar period, force was significantly more likely to be committed following but not preceding bad economic news.

Even without ascribing costly and cynical self-interest to presidential motivation, the Brace and Hinckley finding is in line with received wisdom that presi-

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dents become frustrated with domestic policy. Republican presidents in particular may be attracted by an arena not controlled by Democratic congressional majorities. Brace and Hinckley do find that the presidencies of both Ronald Reagan and George Bush were characterized by what they call the "military-rhetorical" style of leadership, that is, use of force abroad accompanied by many speeches at home.

The Reagan-Bush presidencies prompt Brace and Hinckley to see a trend in presidential style. One might ask here, as with other aspects of the analysis, how many points does it take to establish a trend? The postwar presidents number only nine. Even the worrisome relationship between economic trends and use of force only holds for first-term presidents.

A key portion of the analysis rests on the regression of approval ratings on event data, controlling for exogenous conditions. The method provides some unexpected results. Many presidential actions that appear to be taken to improve presidential standing with the public (for example, foreign and domestic travel) have negligible or negative impact on popularity when other factors are controlled. Furthermore, presidents who appeared unpopular during their terms of office look more successful in this analysis. Considering the economic conditions he faced, Jimmy Carter, for example, was "above average" in public approval. Brace and Hinckley argue that their approach is more accurate than comparing the raw approval scores of modern presidents. Their conclusions may be useful for presidential scholars, but they ignore the fundamental finding of their analysis, which is that the public holds presidents responsible for economic conditions.

The case of George Bush (whose reelection was in doubt when the book was written) illustrates the two sides of Brace and Hinckley's analysis. On the one hand, the Bush record demonstrates that the projection of force accompanied by rhetorical flourish can inflate presidential approval ratings; on the other hand, the slide in Bush's popularity when he ran out of military engagements suggests how little presidents can do to shore up their popularity when the economy goes sour.

The authors direct their argument to the public, cautioning against extravagant expectations of presidential popularity; but the message might better be directed to journalists, who play a major role in interpreting presidential approval polls for the public.

MARION R. JUST
Wellesley College

Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean *by Robert A. Pastor. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992. 338 pp. $24.95.*

The end of the cold war has provided an opportunity for many of us to reflect on the future of U.S. foreign policy. Robert Pastor's analysis and provocative

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recommendations are set out in his newest book on U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, in which the author leads us on a soul-searching exploration of the history and future possibilities of inter-American relations.

Because U.S. relations toward the hemisphere have been closely identified with and sculpted by individual presidents (though influenced by the public mood and Congress), the first part of the book reviews the policies of the past three administrations. In Pastor's opinion, the differences lie essentially in approach. Whereas the Carter administration stressed cooperative multilateralism, the Reagan administration opted for heavy handedness and unilateralism, and the Bush administration for pragmatic responsiveness.

For all their differences, the policies pursued by each of these administrations struggled, as their predecessors had, to fashion an effective response to security threats posed by instability in the region. An analysis of the recurring inability either to manage transitions from dictatorship or relations with revolutionary regimes in a manner that enhances U.S. interests in the region is the focus of discussion in the second part of the book. Within that context, Pastor also casts a critical historical eye on efforts to promote development through bilateral aid policies, arguing that these tend to breed resentment on the part of recipient Latin American countries and an exaggerated sense of influence on the part of the donor United States. Similarly, attempts to promote democracy are assessed by Pastor, who views such efforts as having had a marginally positive influence. As the author underscores, this is largely a reflection of the difficulties and trade-offs inherent in framing a foreign policy around democracy goals.

But Pastor's account is neither wholly critical nor limited to an examination of past policies. The need to learn from past mistakes is an underlying message in the book, and the author draws on the historical experience to offer a new road map designed to guide U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-cold war era. Not entirely surprising in light of his role as the chief Latin Americanist on the National Security Council staff during the Carter administration, the author's "clues for an exit" call for a resurrection and extension of the Carter policy of cooperative multilateralism, which he also views as a trademark of the latter years of the Bush administration. The book thus concludes with a plea for U.S. and Latin American policy makers to seize the moment—a window of opportunity presented by the absence of an extra-hemispheric rival—to cast aside our worst stereotypes about each other and to realize Pastor's vision of a hemispheric community knit together through a shared democratic commitment, strengthened by the erection of an American free trading zone, and maintained by the acceptance of and adherence to principles of collective action and defense.

Pastor's book can be criticized for overemphasizing (as so many U.S. administrations have also done in the past) Central America and the Caribbean; for admitting that elections do not make democracy but then proceeding to discuss the promotion of democracy primarily in terms of facilitating free and fair elections and the subsequent transfer of political power; and perhaps for presenting

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an overly general set of policy recommendations. Although such criticisms are fair, the book remains very much worth reading. Pastor writes with ease and wit, offering a wealth of information that only an insider can provide and an historically grounded analysis. Combining the talents of policy maker and scholar, the author presents a text rich in images, a timely addition to current thinking about the future of U.S. policy in the hemisphere.

ANITA ISAACS
Haverford College

Weapons of Influence: The Legislative Veto, American Foreign Policy, and the Irony of Reform *by Martha Liebler Gibson. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1992. 188 pp. $38.50.*

In the 1983 *Chadha* case and subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court found legislative vetoes of executive actions unconstitutional. This book contends that in some foreign policy issues, the loss of the veto has increased the "intensity of conflict" (p. 45) between the presidency and Congress to the detriment of U.S. foreign policy.

The author's argument may be expressed as follows: First, before *Chadha*, the threat of a legislative veto allowed Congress to compel executive consultation and compromise in relative secrecy. Without that threat, Congress embraced other legislative weapons of influence that publicize its conflicts with the executive. "The result has been to . . . undermine confidence in the coherence and stability of American foreign policy" (p. 5).

Second, the intensity of conflict between the branches (the dependent variable) varies in a direct relationship with three independent variables within Congress: institutional motives, electoral motives (placating powerful interest groups and public opinion), and congressional will to oppose the president.

Third, whether one or more of the independent variables are high or low varies with the type of foreign policy issue. In crisis issues, Congress's electoral motives and will are low, resulting in little or no increase in overt interbranch conflict since the loss of the legislative veto in 1983. Strategic-nonsalient issues are not important to congressional constituents. Hence, electoral motives and will are low to moderate, and the conflict has been moderate and occasional. In strategic-salient issues, all three independent variables are high; consequently, conflict between the branches has increased since 1983. The same pattern governs intermestic issues. These combine foreign and domestic policy, and affect the interests of legislators' constituency groups or public opinion. Examples of these issue types are developed in case study chapters, where the variables are applied consistently and the theoretical framework is coherent.

But there are problems, beginning with the dependent variable. Interbranch "conflict intensity [before and after *Chadha*] is measured by the number of bills and resolutions introduced in Congress to kill or limit an executive policy or

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proposal" (p. 46). The author intentionally ignores all legislation that supports executive policy making. The dependent variable would be improved if it were operationally defined as the net balance between the number of pro- and antipresidential policy measures introduced.

However, the improvement would be marginal. A persuasive indication of a conflict's true "intensity" (the author's word) is less a thousand points of light from legislation introduced than the laser-sharp heat of the Boland amendments and House Speaker Jim Wright's quasi-diplomatic relations with Daniel Ortega. Yet the battles over U.S. policy toward Nicaragua is ignored (possibly because it may not conform to the high electoral motives required for strategic-salient issues?).

A second problem of credibility is a lack of supporting evidence. There is not a single finding from opinion polls substantiating any of the author's numerous assertions about public attitudes toward selected foreign policy issues. Nor is there persuasive evidence to support the oft-repeated insistance that open conflict between the presidency and Congress has severely damaged U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, there is a weak political (as well as constitutionally questionable) foundation for the author's proposed reforms: prior approval of presidential policy by joint resolution, and the executive's agreement to "informal" (p. 159) committee vetoes. Viewed from the White House, these prescriptions might be less mechanisms for compromise than terms of capitulation.

HARVEY ZEIDENSTEIN
Illinois State University

Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change *edited by David Butler and Austin Ranney. New York, Oxford University Press, 1992. 294 pp. $59.00.*

We know a lot about the money aspect of campaigns; we can describe the calendar, structure, and process of the presidential election cycle; and we know something about the rise and decline of would-be presidential candidates. Campaign politics, however, has almost no research literature these days (although it did into the 1960s), only a few books, and a few more how-to-campaign manuals (most out of print and quite fugitive).

There isn't much concern about this lacuna. Our regressions of the (presidential) vote on various (endlessly debated) measures of economic conditions have produced such high multiple correlations that few are prepared to believe that campaigns are consequential. After all, if an election can be accurately predicted by factors candidates can't manipulate, why should anyone believe that all the sound and fury of the campaign signifies anything? Many, perhaps most, seem to believe that elections are determined by structural factors. Campaign effects are regarded as limited and countervailing, as demonstrated by blind statistical models that predict outcomes so well.

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However, one can at least argue that this received wisdom reflects our failure to study campaigns. Before we will ever be able to measure their influence, we must first understand what activities constitute a campaign. *Electioneering* fills some of the void by outlining these activities and the formal frameworks within which they occur in some dozen countries.

As a collection of country studies which didn't use a common framework, the book thwarts a simple summary. Some chapters are narratives about campaigns, others focus on political structures and the parties, still others are quite thematic, describing campaign techniques and the tactical and strategic viewpoints of politicians and parties. The best chapters describe how much candidates and parties spend and what they spend it on; the relative roles of the press and the parties in shaping and disseminating a campaign message; how campaigns use the press, exploit structural characteristics of the media, and generally orient campaigns in ways which allow the press to communicate a party's message to the electorate; the importance of polls and their effect on voters and on campaign decisions, the use of professional public relations approaches to campaigns, and the development of a political public relations package by PR firms; differences between local and national campaigns; and the emphasis different countries place on traditional rallies and canvassing; the attention paid to secondary associations with party links. The better chapters are by Dennis Kavanagh, Peter Esaiasson, and Gerald L. Curtis (on Britain, Scandinavia, and Japan). Close behind are Max Kaase and Stephen Gungle's chapters on Germany and Italy, respectively. Larry M. Bartels's chapter takes the reverse side of the topic, essentially arguing for the marginal significance of campaigns on election outcomes.

The essential dilemma of the book is its audience. *Electioneering* is an overview, not meant to surprise anyone who is conversant with the politics of a country. Most Americans will profit from becoming more familiar with how campaigns are conducted elsewhere. They are not going to learn anything from the chapter on the United States. It is not that Jody Foster and Christopher Muste didn't write a solid account. Rather, their essay isn't for American specialists; it's most appreciative consumers are likely to be Brits (who won't get much from Kavanaugh's chapter) or Germans (who will be unsurprised by Kaase's essay). Put differently, this is a *generalist's* book, worth reading if you are interested in campaigns. *Electioneering* can be part of a foundation of literature on campaigns and election politics. Butler and Ranney have brought us a good collection and sensible introductory and concluding essays to the country chapters.

JOHN R. PETROCIK
University of California, Los Angeles

The Establishment of the Japanese Constitutional System *by Junji Banno, translated by J. A. A. Stockwin. New York, Routledge, 1992. 250 pp. $55.00.*

The 1889 Meiji constitution, evolved in large part because the ruling oligarchs hoped that the existence of a constitution, complete with parliament, would help

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convince the western powers to remove the unequal treaties established in the 1860s. This is underscored by J. A. A. Stockwin's comment in the translator's introduction that "Constitutional government . . . is not the same as democratic government." The role of external forces would be far more direct in 1946 when the United States essentially redrafted the constitution.

Historians have long viewed the nondemocratic roots of the earlier constitution as a vital link in a chain of events that led toward militarism in Japan. But Junji Banno persuasively argues that there were loopholes in the constitution that could be exploited by the nascent political parties. In an effort to strengthen their hand, the oligarchs wrote provisions into the constitution designed to give them the ultimate voice in the crucial budget process. Japan needed to develop industrial might in order to secure military power. The oligarchs felt that without the two, as well as the more subtle persuasive power of having a regime resembling the West, the possibilities of unloading the unequal treaties were nil. In order to insure that this power could be attained, the oligarchs required a secure source of funding. A true democratic order enshrined by a constitution might jeopardize this, especially if the political parties were clearly independent.

The Meiji constitution thus stipulated that if the Diet could not agree upon a budget, the previous annual expenditure levels would simply be carried over. The only problem was that budgetary demands grew in direct correlation with Japan's growth as a power, and so carrying over the previous year's budget was insufficient to keep up the demand requiring the government to pursue extralegal routes.

The 1890s was the constitution's first decade. The chief conflict was between the ministries dominated by the oligarchs and the lower House of the Diet, where most of the political party action found itself. Banno demonstrates that while the parties were unable to win, they unexpectedly were able at least to force a gridlock. The parties demanded tax reduction and were far less willing to support the growing military-industrial complex. This lasted until the turn of the century, when the Seiyukai party was created by Hirobumi Ito, one of the constitution's framers, and abdicated it's opposition to revenue reduction.

The book provokes the reader to ponder links between past and present Japanese political culture. As Stockwin points out, one is struck by the analogous way that the modern day Liberal Democratic party handles the opposition with the way the oligarchs regarded the early parties. In addition, the antecedents of Japan's money-politics scandals are clearly evident. Banno cites a letter from a prefectural governor indicating no shyness at all in securing support by paying huge sums of cash.

This book is a colorful and politically charged account by a scholar highly regarded in Japan and abroad. Stockwin is to be congratulated for this translation, which allows a wider audience access to important concepts relating to the creation of modern Japanese political institutions.

ROBERT M. ORR, JR.
Temple University, Japan

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Foreshadows of the Law: Supreme Court Dissents and Constitutional Development *by Donald E. Lively. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1992. 168 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $17.95.*

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once wrote that a dissenting opinion in a court of last resort "is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day. . . ." Most of those appeals, however, have either been rejected or were never heard. Of the over 4,000 dissenting opinions penned by members of the United States Supreme Court, most have been forgotten. Some remain as useful teaching tools in constitutional law casebooks, but relatively few have been adopted by a majority on the Supreme Court as the supreme law of the land.

Lively's book examines Supreme Court dissenting opinions that have shaped the development of American constitutional law. Most of his choices are quite famous: Justice Stephen J. Field in the *Slaughterhouse Cases* (1873), Justice John M. Harlan in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1996), Justice Oliver W. Holmes in *Lochner v. New York* (1905) and *Abrams v. United States* (1919), and Justice Louis D. Brandeis in *Olmstead v. United States* (1928) and *Whitney v. California* (1927) (the last for legal reasons a concurrence, but in effect a dissent). Less well known, but also deserving, are the dissents of Justices John McLean and Benjamin R. Curtis in the *Dred Scott* case (1857).

Few students of the American constitution would argue with these selections. But certainly there are other dissents whose importance would justify inclusion in a study of this sort. I would also have chosen Justice Hugo Black's dissent in *Adamson v. California* (1947) and that of Justice Frank Murphy in *Koramatsu v. United States* (1944).

While the author's case selections may be suitable, his execution of the material is flawed in several respects. The book contains no footnotes, only general references to the cases in the text, and no references at all to secondary sources. But more importantly, the book contains too little analysis of the dissenting opinions that are supposed to be the subject of the study. Instead, much of the work is devoted to a history of the Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional subject that produced the dissent. Thus, Field's dissent in the *Slaughterhouse Cases* and that of Holmes in *Lochner* is discussed only as part of a chapter devoted to the rise and fall of substantive due process. The discussion of this topic, as well as the others treated in the book, presents no new interpretation of the work of the Supreme Court and covers ground well known to persons familiar with American constitutional law.

I also disagree with some of Lively's analysis. For example, he misstates the contemporary significance of the "clear and present danger" test in interpreting the First Amendment. The *per curium* opinion in *Brandenberg v. Ohio* (1969) never mentions Holmes's famous test, and Justices Black and William O. Douglas agreed to accept the opinion only because it excluded all reference to "clear and

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present danger." Indeed, the phrase is only infrequently found in post-*Brandenberg* opinions of the Supreme Court.

Reading *Foreshadows of the Law* led me to ponder the question of what modern Supreme Court dissents would be selected for inclusion in a similar book a century from now. At the close of his study Lively emphasizes the significance of Justice William J. Brennan's dissent in *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986). But there are other possibilities. Any of the numerous dissents by Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall in capital punishment cases might be worthy candidates. On the conservative side of the Supreme Court, perhaps Justice William Rehnquist's dissent in *Roe v. Wade* (1973) might be adopted for use. Or any of several dissents by Justice Antonin Scalia on the Bill of Rights and affirmative action programs could qualify for inclusion in a late twenty-first century book on important dissenting opinion of the United States Supreme Court. It's an interesting topic, one guaranteed to provoke a heated discussion among scholars of the American Constitution.

WALTER E. VOLKOMER
Hunter College

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest

AIDS Law Today: A New Guide for the Public *edited by Scott Burris, Harlon L. Dalton, Judith Leonie Miller and the Yale AIDS Law Project. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. 443 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $15.00.*

Basic Documents on Human Rights, 3rd. ed., *edited by Ian Brownlie. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 651 pp. $35.00.*

China Documents Annual 1989: The Crisis of Reform *by Peter R. Moody. Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1992. 468 pp. $72.00.*

CQ's Guide to 1990 Congressional Redistricting, Part 1 and Part 2 *edited by Colleen McGuiness. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993. 178 pp. $21.95.*

The Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. I, II, and III *edited by Richard Dean Burns. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993. 1692 pp. $280.00.*

Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 *by Human Rights Watch. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. 393 pp. $20.00.*

Labor History Archives in the United States *edited by Daniel J. Leab and Philip P. Mason. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1992. 286 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $15.95.*

International Affairs Directory of Organizations: The ACCESS Resource Guide *edited by Bruce Seymore II. Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, 1992. 327 pp. $75.00.*

The Maine Constitution: A Reference Guide *by Marshall J. Tinkle. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1992. 197 pp. $59.95.*

The Nuclear Present: A Guide to Recent Books on Nuclear War, Weapons, the Peace Movement, and Related Issues, with a Chronology of Nuclear Events, 1789–1991 *by Grant Burns. Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1992. 633 pp. $69.50.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Shibley Telhami's article in *PSQ* 107 (Winter 1992–93), "Evaluating Bargaining Performance: The Case of Camp David," gives high marks to Begin's performance at Camp David. However, it ignores the economic consequences of Camp David:

1. Israel gave up, without compensation, the offshore Sinai oilfields it had developed. These oilfields, when fully developed, would have made Israel totally independent of oil imports.

2. Israel had to rebuild, back in Israel, at a cost of several billion dollars, the airfields it gave up in the Sinai.

While the United States has subsequently provided $3 billion a year in foreign aid to Israel and guaranteed its access to oil imports, plainly Israel took a major economic hit at Camp David, and its economy and balance of payments have never been the same since then. Thus Camp David was far from as one-sided as your article would suggest.

BILL GREEN

Dr. Telhami replies:

In his letter to the editor about my article, former Congressman Green is correct in pointing out that Israel made some important compromises, including economic ones, during Camp David negotiations. But that is not really the focus of my article.

To begin with, I assumed that *both* Egypt and Israel made important compromises to arrive at a bilateral deal and that "For strategic reasons, a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt was better than the status quo for both, other factors aside, and Camp David accomplished the minimal goals of both sides" (p. 631). In this sense, the deal was "good" for both Egypt and Israel, and Israel's

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compromises were offset by the strategic benefits of neutralizing Egypt's military threat, which was also economically beneficial, and preserving the strategic relations with the United States. These issues were extensively discussed in my book, *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords.*

The focus of my article as I specified was "How much more than the minimum did each side accomplish? What accounts for this" (p. 631)? In pursuing this question, I argued that it is easier to evaluate the bargaining behavior of each side than it is to assess the outcome. Even though I concluded that Israel bargaining behavior was considerably more professional than Egyptian bargaining, I still pointed out that "Whether or not the outcome could have been different given optimal Egyptian behavior remains unclear" (p. 648). Ultimately, I concluded with the "informal conclusions" that the two primary areas could have been affected by bargaining behavior: the extent of linkage between the two Camp David agreements and the extent of the freeze of the building of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Since Mr. Green brought up the issue of economic compromises in relation to the Sinai oil and the rebuilding of air bases, it is worth reflecting on this question. As Mr. Green points out in his letter, the United States has provided $3 billion a year in foreign aid to Israel and guaranteed access to oil imports. Even though this may have been a fair deal, at least some members of the U.S. delegation did not believe that the United States had to go to that extent, because Israel was getting the full peace with Egypt that it wanted; and former Israel Defense Minister Ezer Weizman was reluctant to push for more of this aid for several reasons. Since Israel ultimately received this U.S. aid despite reluctance by some Israeli and U.S. negotiations, this confirms my primary hypothesis in the article: Israel bargained well for itself.

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

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
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

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